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Abstract. 
The model of the managerial modern business enterprise set out by A D Chandler 
defines a specific organisational structure and specific techniques of corporate 
control which are presented as the most effective form of governance for large 
enterprise. It is generally accepted, however, that this form of governance remained 
largely unadopted by large UK enterprise before World War Two. This thesis offers 
an explanation based on the particular role and function of directors in UK firms. 
Part One of the thesis examines the structure and control technique of large UK 
enterprise before World War One and the theory of the firm that underpinned them. 
It is shown that the favoured form of joint stock company structure, here called 
`proprietorial', was the consequence of the perceived role of company directors as 
shareholders' representatives rather than managers of the business. Much flowed 
from this. The legitimation of directors powers through property rights impelled 
them to retain centralised control despite their customary part-time status. This 
restricted the growth of top management, fragmented management and business 
professions into narrow departmental structures and restricted the development of 
control techniques. Under these circumstances the development of firms of the 
Chandler type was unlikely. 
Part Two of the thesis examines four case studies of large UK enterprise in the 
inter-war years: ICI, Unilever, the London Midland and Scottish Railway and 
Austin Motors. They have been selected because by sector, leadership or 
progressive repute they can be taken as representative of UK enterprises most likely 
to have evolved towards the Chandler model. It is shown, however, that the legacy 
of UK proprietorial governance was powerful enough to prevent all four case 
studies - and by implication all UK enterprise - establishing the Chandler structure 
before World War Two. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Argument 
In his book The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business, A D Chandler describes how US business in the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth century began to internalise transactions previously co-ordinated by the 
market. This process was a demonstrably profitable response to rising demand for 
goods and services. But the conversion of market transactions into administrative 
processes required crucially that a managerial hierarchy was established within the 
firm in a form and with the skills to fully exploit the potential of the emerging mass 
producing, mass transporting and mass retailing business enterprise. That British 
enterprise did not generally build managerial hierarchies until after World War Two 
now seems to be the concensus view among business historians. (See Chapter One.) 
But the explanations which have been offered for this failure to build managerial 
hierarchies have not been entirely convincing. This thesis intends to show that an 
alternative explanation can be given, namely that in British joint stock companies 
business structure was a consequence of the distinctive role, interests and powers of 
the board of directors. 
In UK joint stock companies, boards of directors were a representative 
committee of the owners and were seen as quite distinct from the managers whose job 
it was to carry out the directors' orders. In the US, as Chandler makes clear, any 
distinction between directors as owner's representatives and directors as the most 
senior tier of management seems to have been transcended without apparent struggle 
or difficulty. In the UK on the other hand the particular form adopted by the joint 
stock company institutionalised and built on the distinction between directors and 
managers. The evolved structure of the railways and the evolving structures of other 
large enterprise is described in Chapter Two for the period between 1890 and 1914. 
The explicit assumptions of that period on how a UK joint stock company should be 
organised, assumptions in many cases reflected in and reinforced by case law, are 
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considered in Chapter Three and the consequences of those assumptions for UK large 
business enterprise structure are explored. 
The significant factor that emerges from this study of UK joint stock 
companies is that as shareholdings became dispersed and the directors tended to be 
less and less the holders of controlling percentages of shares, the distinctive role and 
powers of the directors remained unchanged. Thus as the separation of ownership and 
control proceeded the power of the managers did not grow and the management 
structures that Chandler traces in the US did not emerge in the UK. This intermediate 
- but not necessarily transitional - position between the joint stock company as 
effectively a large partnership with limited liability and the joint stock company as 
managerialist modern business enterprise I have called, for want of a better word 
"proprietorial". "Proprietors" was the name given by the nineteenth century railway 
companies to their shareholders and the use of the word is designed to identify the 
legitimation of the directors' powers in their imputed role as representing the 
shareholders as shareholders themselves. In other words the directors were part 
owners supposedly representing all owners. 
In the US, according to Chandler, the separation of, ownership and control and 
the construction of an empowered managerial hierarchy were part of the same process. 
The British experience shows them to be separable. But it also suggests that the facts 
that proprietorial structures were superseded and that the new managerial hierarchies 
in the US were of a quite specific form are connected. That is to say that the power of 
proprietors would be undermined by the adoption of a managerial form of 
organisation and that conversely a managerial structure could not emerge from a 
proprietorial organisation organically - some decisive break would be necessary. The 
case studies in Part Two are designed to examine the extent to which the most 
"advanced" firms had moved from a proprietorial to a Chandlerian form in the 
interwar years. The degree of approximation of the firm's structure to the Chandler 
type and the extent to which the new techniques necessary to run such a structure had 
been adopted are used as diagnostic tests. The conclusion reached is that no UK firm 
had become managerialist in Chandler's terms before 1939. 
3 
2) 	 The Chandler Thesis and its Critics 
The significance of this finding lies in its relevance to a wider debate which is 
not considered in the body of this thesis but which provides the context within which 
it should be placed: the debate on the relative decline of the UK economy and 
Chandler's contribution to that debate. For Chandler the pervasive failure of UK 
enterprises to build managerial hierarchies and the subsequent failure to build 
managerial hierarchies of a specific multi-divisional type is a key cause of the UK's 
wider decline. In his book Scale and Scope Chandler argues that as the Twentieth 
Century has proceeded relatively small numbers of very large companies have 
expanded their operations world wide to form global oligopolies. The companies that 
form these oligopolies were those that made an investment in technology, marketing 
and management structures within crucial and relatively narrow time frames. The 
technological and organisational efficiencies which these firms gained allowed them 
to capture large market shares and profits which enabled them to sustain competitive 
advantage by further investment in technical and human capital. Failure to make the 
right investment at the right time resulted in the loss of considerable first mover 
advantages and catching up became very difficult for rivals. In Chandler's view the 
failures of UK firms to invest in technology, marketing and management was 
systemic and the consequence was long term national economic decline. 
Chandler is not without his critics. In general these critics do not question 
UK relative decline, the existence of global oligopolies or first mover advantages -
though the extent and vulnerability of those advantages has been the subject of 
debate.(1) Criticisms have been made, however, in four broad areas. Chandler has 
been challenged on his account of the development of-W corporations which has 
been seen as sanitised and eulogistic. Furthermore, his use of the developed form of 
the US corporation as the yardstick against which the corporations of other nations are 
to be measured has been considered "ethnocentric"(2) and thus of limited or no 
relevance.(3) This last criticism is linked to further criticisms of what is seen as an 
over-sharp dismissal of family as opposed to managerial businesses.(4) Finally, the 
importance of the link between corporate form and national competitiveness has been 
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questioned.(5) There is some justice in the details of all these criticisms. Overall, 
however, it will be argued that the broad picture presented by Chandler remains a 
robust and practical developmental model which is very relevant to a discussion of the 
tardy evolution of large UK corporations and the UK's relative economic decline. 
We will deal first with criticism of Chandler's account of the development of 
corporations and then with criticisms of the applicability of the resulting model to 
firms outside the US. 
There is in Chandler's account of the development of US corporations an 
assumption that the structural and technical innovations they adopted were the 
consequence of a purely administrative logic operating within the firm. 
	 This 
assumption is open to doubt. The large corporation may have emerged for quite other 
reasons. It has been argued, for example, that the US corporations had to internalise 
more functions and services because the US economy was under-developed and could 
not provide these functions and services in the market.(6) It has also been argued that 
these corporations may have emerged as the organisational consequence of rent-
seeking monopolies taking advantage of protective tariff barriers.(7) Similarly, it can 
be argued that Chandler's account of the development of the US corporation presents 
too orderly and rational a picture. It may be, as Chandler argues, that step by step 
administrative innovation allowed more functions and services to be internalised as 
their marginal cost fell below their cost in the market. On the other hand it may be 
more realistic to suggest that the reduction in cost of internalised functions was the 
result of desperate if innovative attempts to achieve control and cut costs in large 
amalgamated companies constructed for quite other monopolistic or vainglorious 
motives.(8) It has also been argued that the social consequences of these large 
corporations were not simply benign prosperity as Chandler seem to imply: there are 
long standing as well as more recent criticisms of bloody and dysfunctional 
interventions by large corporations in US society.(9) 
None of these quite valid criticisms of Chandler's work, however, undermine 
the effectiveness of Chandler's developmental modelof the firm. It does not matter Vsc  
how contingent, messy or unworthy the origins and development of the US 
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corporations may have been: the resultant creation of new management structures 
and the development of management techniques required to run them allowed the 
construction and control of business of unprecedented size and complexity. It does 
not matter whether structure followed strategy or vice versa.(10) Once certain US 
corporations had established their structures and control techniques within one market 
global expansion became a quantitative rather that a qualitative leap because the 
organisational innovations required for global expansion had already been established. 
But were the organisational forms developed by US corporations a yardstick against 
which firms in other national economies could be measured? In order to answer this 
question it is necessary to stress the place that organisational form has in Chandler's 
model of the development of the firm. 
The importance of Chandler's work lies in his demonstration of the concrete 
and practical administrative requirements that permit the development of firms. The  
Visible Hand is essentially a history of the accretion of organisational structures and 
techniques for the purpose of allowing companies to prosper and grow, it is not a 
history of structure and technique per se. Understood in this way, therefore, the 
adoption of, say, the multi-divisional form or a system of budgetary control cannot be 
separated from the purposes for which it was adopted. No organisational form or 
technique is presented by Chandler as good in itself. As firms grow in size and 
complexity different organisational structures and techniques become optimal and 
firms cannot prosper and grow unless they use them. Some industrial sectors may 
produce firms which can grow to large size without needing the multi-divisional form 
to optimise commercial success.(11) Some firms may find themselves in national 
economies where it is possible to come to arrangements with other firms which avoid 
the complex internalisation of functions in a managerial hierarchy - for example, 
through market co-ordination as in Nineteenth Century Britain or by networking as in 
Twentieth Century Japan (see below). The crucial issue is, however, the use of the 
optimal available organisational structures and management techniques and the 
readiness to adopt new ones when organisational and commercial circumstances 
change. Unless the organisational form which a company adopts is understood in the 
context of commercial optimisation and adaptability then Chandler's essential point is 
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lost in either his criticism of personal or family management in UK firms or his 
endorsement of the multi-divisional firm. 
In dealing with the family firm, Chandler shows little concern with questions 
of ownership except where it retards or encourages the optimisation of commercially 
effective management structures and techniques. 	 Thus Chandler ignores the 
incomplete transitions of control from individuals or families to managers at large 
companies like Du Pont or General Motors.(12) What is important about these 
companies for Chandler is that the dominant individuals or family did not prevent 
optimal profitable effectiveness in the business. This was the case even when it 
meant the dilution of individual or family control by adopting different management 
structures and promoting appropriately skilled outsiders to the highest management 
posts. In the long run, the result of this dilution was to pass control to managers but 
this was an effect rather than a cause of business success. Chandler's criticism of UK 
family firms (which is considered in more detail in Chapter One below) is not 
specifically that they were family owned but rather that in the UK this ownership 
prevented the firm from achieving maximum business success. 
Similarly, the importance of the multi-divisional form of company structure is 
that in the period from 1890 to the 1940s it provided a solution to problems of 
controlling large complex firms and allowing them to prosper. It is not proposed as 
the most effective form of corporate governance in all circumstances. Adopted half-
understood in a managerially under-developed organisation on the recommendation of 
management consultants (as, it is suggested, was the case with many UK firms in the 
1960s) it is merely a fetish.(13) To question generally the importance of the multi-
divisional form because it has been inappropriately applied is to miss Chandler's 
point: the multi-divisional form is important as a means to a commercial end when a 
firm reaches a certain size or complexity and a necessity for firms taking part in global 
oligopolies. It is not an end in itself. 
This discussion attempts to show the applicability of Chandler's 
developmental model to firms and economies outside the US. This is not necessarily 
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helped by Chandler himself. When Chandler compares the collective business 
histories of the US, the UK and Germany in Scale and Scope his approach is 
undoubtedly mediated by his earlier studies of US business. His "ethnocentrism" 
does not lie in the typology of firm structure or the details of administrative technique 
but in the primacy he gives to the growth of the stand-alone firm. For example, the 
development of large globally successful unitary firms through a protectionist route of 
inter-firm co-operation and state aid is deprecated as "co-operative capitalism" in the 
case of the German chemical firms. He clearly finds it difficult to give equal weight 
to different routes through different economic cultures to arrive at the status of multi-
national, multi-divisional member of global oligopolies.(14) Nevertheless the test 
that Chandler applies to corporate development in the US in The Visible Hand -
commercial success through the application of optimal organisation and technique -
can properly be applied to other business cultures as can the emergence of national 
multi-divisional firms as precursors of global oligopolists. That the UK failed both 
these tests relative to other advanced economies now appears to be accepted (see 
Chapter One below). Some critics have argued however that this failure need not be 
closely connected to loss of international competitive advantage. 
Kirby and Rose, for example, have said that "International competitive 
advantage is not determined solely, or even mainly, by the managerial structure of 
business".(15) This is true in the sense that there are many factors which contribute 
to national competitiveness related in a complex way to each other. Michael Porter in 
his The Competitive Advantage of Nations(16) places "firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry" in an interacting web together with factor conditions, demand conditions, 
related and supporting industries, government - and chance. Positive reinforcement 
of these factors will increase national competitiveness but because they are 
interrelated the primacy of one cannot be asserted. On the other hand, the weakness 
of one factor - for example a general failure to adopt optimal management structures -
will reduce national competitiveness. However, unless the factors can be quantified 
the extent to which any one will affect competitiveness will remain open to dispute. 
Porter does not attempt quantification and, indeed, it must be doubted whether it is 
possible. It would seem prudent, therefore, only to say that if management structure is 
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not the sole or even main determinant of international competitiveness it remains a 
very important one. 
Porter, however, makes a further important point which raises the question 
once more of whether the Chandler model gives a true comparator for economies 
outside the US. Porter suggests that there are different optimum management 
structures for different industrial sectors. 	 No one national economy displays 
dominance across all sectors which suggests that the interaction of the various factors 
affecting competitiveness in any national economy favours particular management 
structures. This point could be taken to support the extreme relativist argument of, 
say, Alford that all corporate structures are nation-specific and that there is no 
universal paradigm.(17) 
There is no doubt that corporate structures do display strong national 
characteristics but a strongly relativist position ignores the separation of corporations 
from the national framework that takes place as they begin to compete on a global 
scale. If a company can remain largely within a national institutional web, and trade 
largely undifferentiated products successfully internationally, then it can retain strong 
national characteristics. The narrower the scope of the firm, narrow scopeYf being a 
characteristic of the networked companies of Japan(18) or the flexible specialist 
companies of Italy(19), the more the firm can retain sparse, idiosyncratic and/or 
personal management structures because relationships of trust or cross-ownership 
with other firms provide services which otherwise have to be provided internally in a 
managerial hierarchy. However, once the firm begins to move outside national 
boundaries to produce in or for markedly different markets, to cope with different 
legal or institutional arrangements or to work in partnership with foreign firms or 
groups, of foreign suppliers then decentralisation with concomitant control 
mechanisms becomes increasingly necessary. The consequence is that the multi-
divisional company becomes the optimal organisational form; 
It is significant that the work published in English so far on Japan and its 
distinct national commercial culture does not appear to have dealt in depth with the 
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managerial effects of the "hollowing out" of the Japanese economy in the 1980s as a 
consequence of the steady rise of the value of the yen. A great deal of manufacturing 
has been exported followed by increasingly complex arrangements with indigenous 
companies. The global strategy summed up in the phrase "think global, act local" 
which the largest Japanese corporations have adopted is, essentially, a summary of the 
multi-divisional firm. It is significant that a company like Sony with global markets 
and no historic network of related companies moved directly as it grew to the multi- 
divisional form without hesitation.(20) 
	 While Fruin, for example, emphasises 
continuity of the historic institutional context of Japanese business, other authors 
chronicle trends towards divisionalisation before 1980 which can only have 
accelerated since.(21) We may conclude, therefore, that the fact of great diversity in 
national commercial institutions and cultures does not prevent convergence in 
corporate form as companies become globally competitive. It is not necessary to 
assume one best developmental path to suggest that the multi-national, multi-
divisional firm is the universal form at which the large companies making up the 
global commercial cultures aim. We may therefore conclude that it is a valid exercise 
in any commercial culture to enquire whether companies have adopted optimal 
managerial structures and to enquire to what extent this process has brought them to 
the construction of the multi-divisional company as a contribution to a wider enquiry 
into the economic rise and decline of nations. 
3) 	 The Chandler Model 
Before we can use the existence or otherwise of a Chandlerian managerial 
hierarchy as a diagnostic test we must make explicit the key features of the Chandler 
model. The features of this model are in various locations in The Visible Hand and 
for convenience they will be summarised here. We have followed Chandler in tracing 
the evolution of this structure historically which allows some discussion of the way in 
which each step was a solution to particular organisational problems. The first 
business structure that emerged as a type (as opposed to contingent agglomerations or 
individually personalised structures) was that of the centralised functionally 
departmentalised firm shown at Figure 1. 
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CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY 
F2 	 F3 
I 
etc 	 etc 
	 etc 	 etc 	 etc 
FIGURE 1 
In this structure, the different functions (eg sales, purchasing, production) are 
shown as Fl, F2, F3 . . . representing the different departmental heads at the top of 
their departmental hierarchies. At the top of this structure is shown a "central 
authority" which simply indicates at this stage that the functional heads are 
responsible to centralised authority. This structure was adopted by the early US 
railroads and was general in large US industrial companies by World War One. 
Up to a certain size or complexity of firm such a structure was perfectly 
adequate. Beyond a certain point however, two broad sets of problems emerged. 
Firstly, as the number of functions grew or the relationship between them needed 
more complex controls, changes were forced on the central authority. We will deal 
with these a little later. Secondly, as the number of tiers in the organisation grew, 
lateral co-ordination between functions at lower levels was left unaccounted for. The 
only place where there was enough authority to resolve disputes was right at the top of 
the structure. An early response seems to have been to reduce the number of tiers by 
grouping the functions in divisions with functional officers in the divisions reporting 
to functional managers at HQ as shown at Figure 2(22). 
P1.2 P2.2 F3.2 I 
DIVISION 2 
1.1 F2.1 F3.I 
DIVISION 1 
F1.3 P2.3 P3.3 I 
DIVISION 3 
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CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY 
FIGURE 2 
This structure is interesting because it demonstrates how the divisional 
structure evolved out of the departmental structure. But the structure shown at Figure 
2 did not resolve the issue of co-ordination at divisional level. This problem was 
resolved by the structure shown at Figure 3. At first sight the only difference is that 
divisional managers have been appointed to ensure co-ordination between functions at 
divisional level (23). However, what is also different is the relationship between the 
functional managers at HQ and the functional officers in the divisions. Now the 
functional officers in the divisions take orders from the divisional managers. The 
functional officers are guided in technical matters relating to the functions by the 
relevant functional manager and report to them on technical issues. Technical 
guidance is enforced by the central authority through the divisional managers. In 
separating line management and functional management in this way the role of the 
functional managers at HQ changes. (Their relationship to functional officers in 
divisions is now shown as a dotted line.) No longer responsible for the line 
management of functional staff they form part of a new top management. This 
structure also changes the role of the central authority. In creating the divisional 
management it has delegated management authority and together with the HQ 
functional managers forms top management whose role became strategic planning, 
overall supervision and allocation of resources 
CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY 
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TOP 
MANAGEMENT 
FL F2 	 F3 
FUNCTIONAL 
MANAGERS 
DIVISONAL 
MANAGER I 
DIVISIONAL 
,MANAGER-2, 
DIVISIONAL 
MANAGER 3 
Fl 	 F2 FI 	 F2 	 F3 
FIGURE 3 
FUNCTIONAL F3 
OFFICERS 
In the US the central authority was the President of the company. The role of 
president seems to have evolved from a position approximating to a UK part-time 
managing director into a full-time executive with considerable delegated board 
powers in the middle years of the nineteenth century.(24) It is difficult to see how a 
structure such as that shown at Figure 3 could have evolved without such an 
empowered chief executive officer. Without delegation from the board to the 
president there could be no further delegations to divisional managers. Without a 
strong head there could be no day to day arbitration between functional managers and 
between functional and divisional managers. It is inconceivable that such a role could 
be provided by a part-time board of directors or its committees. The existence of such 
a powerful chief executive officer .would also appear necessary prior to the creation of 
a divisionalised structure - this was certainly the case in the US and it seems a priori 
unlikely that the divisional structure and the role of president should be invented at 
the same time. So while the centralised functional departmentalised firm shown at 
Figure 1 could and did have a central authority of varying forms - management by 
boards or their committees, partnerships, single proprietors - it appears to have been 
normal US practice to delegate board powers to a chief executive officer in the 
centralised functionally departmentalised firm thus providing a necessary condition 
for the adoption of a divisionalised structure. 
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The divisionalised structure shown at Figure 3 was capable of greater 
expansion than the departmentalised firm in two ways. Firstly, the structure at Figure 
3 could become a sub-unit within an organisation with a greater number of tiers. 
(Shown in box of dotted lines in Figure 4.) Secondly, as the number of functions 
grew top management could be extended by grouping functions under Vice 
Presidents. A divisionalised structure extended in both these ways is shown at Figure 
4. 
The organisation shown at Figure 4 demonstrates the key features of the 
divisionalised structure. A unified managerial "spine" is given to the organisation by 
the hierarchy of line managers. The separation of line and functional management 
allowed the decentralisation of decision-making while ensuring consistent practice 
with a very large number of tiers which was, nevertheless, subject to both line and 
functional authority. An expanded top management was subjected to a form of 
"cabinet" control by the President and Vice Presidents. In the US the first full 
divisionalised structure was invented by the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1857 and was 
equivalent to the structure shown at Figure 3.(26) The expanded version shown at 
Figure 4 was typical of railroads organised divisionally in the 1870's and was the 
form adopted by the first divisionally organised manufacturing companies, Du Pont 
and General Motors, in the early 1920's.(27) 
The establishment of this structural form allowed the control of organisations 
of unprecedented size. In order to control this structure, however, considerable 
attention to detail was required in many areas: information flows; the use of 
comparative data to judge performance of sections and divisions; delegations and 
authority levels; the balance of power between technical guidance (the dotted lines) 
and line authority; allocations of resources across divisions and so on. A self-
consciousness about organisational structures and their utility and a concentration on 
control and control technique were a necessity. This was the more so because the 
divisionalised structure with its line management structure in addition to functional 
management was a priori more expensive than a departmentalised structure and 
therefore in facing competitors the divisional structure had to make efficiency gains to 
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more than cover their additional costs. Attention to control had also to take account of 
the sheer inertia of the larger organisations. These organisations had to be as 
responsive to the market as smaller ones, yet the task of manoeuvering was far 
greater. It is no accident therefore that the emergence of the divisional corporation in 
manufacturing also saw the emergence of a conscious technique to ensure reaction to 
market signals - the technique of budgetary control. 
The key features of budgetary control are: 
i) 	 the use of a budget to integrate activity across an organisation by setting 
targets based on anticipated sales derived from an assessment of future market 
conditions. Anticipated sales determine production volume and timing which 
in turn determines purchases of raw materials or machinery, staffing levels and 
thus financial requirements; 
the use of budget targets to integrate activity down an organisation by breaking 
the targets down into divisional, departmental, sectional or even individual 
targets. To be carried through effectively this requires clear authority and 
responsibility levels through the organisation;. 
iii) 	 the use of targets to achieve control of the organisation by monitoring 
performance against target by department, section or individual in order that 
swift remedial action may be taken if targets are not met; 
the ability of the organisation to respond in an ordered and timely way to 
changes in demand. 
While budgetary control is a technique which can be used by small 
organisations it becomes more and more essential as production volume and 
organisational size increase. The inception of budgetary control is the beginning of 
business planning, the systematic attempt to achieve relative certainty of business 
conditions and response without which the great size of the new enterprises would be 
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a major liability. In the process control over the organisation is greatly increased. 
The twin themes of relative business certainty and internal control are exemplified by 
General Motors in 1920-1921. A loose agglomeration of acquired companies up to 
that point, a crisis of over-production and soaring inventories in a slump brought 
about both a restructuring in a divisional form and the system of budgetary control to 
regulate its activities through production and financial planning on the basis of 
predicted sales.(28) 	 General Motors was not the first US company to install 
budgetary control (29) but it was, it appears, the first for whom it was a basic 
necessity for survival and prosperity. The example was infectious. In 1922 it could 
be said that "the firms are largely in the minority which have formally adopted 
budgetary control at the present time".(30) By 1926, however, "of all the many 
forces at work in American business today there is nothing so new, so arresting and so 
much in men's minds as Budgetary Control" (31) and in the opinion of a 
representative of the New York Banker's Trust "The results have been and continue to 
be marvellous...."(32) 
It has to be emphasised however that budgetary control in large companies 
was not possible without certain pre-conditions which included clear organisation 
structures and levels of responsiblity, sound costing systems, sound inventory 
systems and financial and other reporting mechanisms capable of regular and speedy 
delivery of information. In this sense budgetary control stands at the apex of the 
development of a number of control techniques and a number of experiments in 
corporate organisation. As a consequence, therefore, the existence or not of 
budgetary control is an important diagnostic test for the emergence of a Chandlerian 
modern business enterprise. 
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PART I 
PROPRIETORS AND MANAGERS: 
LARGE UK ENTERPRISE BEFORE WORLD WAR ONE 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BRITISH ENTERPRISE AND THE FAILURE TO BUILD 
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES 
1) 	 Managerial Hierarchies and British Firms  
For some time the work of Alfred Chandler has been central to any discussion of 
the development of British corporate structures despite the fact that he has only recently 
considered the subject in depth.(1) This has come about through Chandler's strongly 
schematic accounts of US developments which clearly invite "compare and contrast" 
exercises with other national economies. Chandler's emphasis has shifted somewhat over 
time. In his first major work Strategy and Structure (Cambridge Mass., 1962) his main 
theme is the emergence of a specific form of corporate administration, the multi-
divisional structure. In The Visible Hand (Cambridge Mass., 1977) the emphasis is on 
the replacement of market mechanisms by corporate management as skilled co-ordination 
reduced the costs of large organisations below those of the market. In this book the 
emphasis is as much on the techniques and the professionalisation of management as it is 
about corporate structure and its evolution. The professional managerial hierarchy is 
presented as the sine qua non of an efficient response to the opportunities presented by 
new high volume technologies serving the new US mass markets. 
In Scale and Scope (Cambridge Mass., 1990) these essential elements are retained 
but the emphasis shifts to entrepreneurship. In this comparative study of US, UK and 
German industrial development, relative success or failure is ascribed to the extent to 
which firms made a "three pronged investment" in new productive processes, in 
marketing and distribution, and in a management hierarchy. The use of the word 
"investment" is significant because it implies both that an entrepreneurial decision has to 
be made and that there are a range of options to choose between - including doing 
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nothing. This contrasts with an almost determinist model in the earlier works which 
considered the US example alone.(2) 
The idea of choice has to be introduced for this comparative study because in the 
British case, at least, a determinist model will not do and neither will any simple 
evolutionary one. Chandler clearly shows that the choice whether or not to make the 
"three pronged investment" was put to British enterprise by available markets, by foreign 
example and by foreign competition - and partially or wholly declined. This was 
particularly the case in important areas of the Second Industrial Revolution like organic 
chemicals, non-ferrous metals, electrical engineering and light machinery.(3) At the heart 
of this entrepreneurial choice was a pervasive failure to build the extensive managerial 
hierarchies which these new industries required. The exceptions were few - the only 
enterprises to get Chandler's unreserved approval as modern business enterprises in the 
inter-war years are ICI and BP. The consequence of British failure to invest in the 
necessary physical and human capital was that the modern corporation only really 
emerged in the UK in the 1950's and 1960's. Chandler's explanation for this failure will 
be considered later. 
Since the publication of The Visible Hand (and even before) it has not been 
possible to ignore the influence of Chandler's thinking on a discussion of the evolution of 
British business even when the implications of the Chandler model are resisted as they are 
by Leslie Hannah and others. Hannah's work combines assertions of progressive 
modernity in the UK corporation with modifications and caveats. Hannah states that in 
the UK in the 1920's "institutional changes - in business opinion, the capital market, 
government policy and management practices " caused a merger wave "and other 
developments in large corporations which marked the birth of the modern corporate 
economy in Britain" with a "settling down of this structure in the 1930's and 1940's".(4) 
Elsewhere, in conscious opposition to Chandler, Hannah says that while the multi-
divisional corporation arrived relatively late in European business "other statistical 
indicators suggest that many of its characteristics became dominant in British economic 
life no later than 1930" and not after World War Two "where Chandler has placed it."(5) 
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Hannah's statistical indicators are the rate of merger, the size of merged firms, 
their relative market share and their market dominance over time.(6) The notable 
concentration of UK firms in the inter-war years that Hannah describes is indisputable. 
But Chandler's "three pronged investment" are neither a necessary condition or 
consequence of increased concentration or firm size. It is crucial to Hannah's argument 
that the new large merged firm adopted increasingly sophisticated management structures 
and techniques: 
Management was the crucial factor in the realisation of economies of the 
type relating to relative efficiency of firm and market in integrating 
economic activities.(7) 
He discusses fears expressed in the inter-war years that firms would grow to 
unmanageable sizes but says that where 
management skills were highly developed it was realised that the 
managerial constraint on growth need not be a significant one at all. The 
important variable was management. The analysis of the means by which 
barriers to growth were pushed back, as the skills of companies in 
digesting acquisitions and managing larger extended organisations were 
evolved therefore offers an important key to the merger process and the 
internal development of the modern firm.(8) 
But Hannah does not, in fact, demonstrate that skills in managing "larger extended 
organisations" grew in any general way. In his subsequent discussion of new office 
methods, professional associations, the recruitment of managers, accounting techniques 
etc, the key section in The Rise of the Corporate Economy which discusses the 
organisational techniques and professional skills actually deployed by inter-war British 
companies only gives one clear example, ICI.(9) Other firms suggested as possible 
examples are said to await a "definitive study on the lines of ... Chandler's classic 
description of the evolution of enterprise structure in the United States ...".(10) Other 
large firms of the period are shown to be decentralised "as much by default as by choice" 
with holding company structures, persisting private control of subsidiaries, persisting 
internal competition and "with minimal policy and financial controls being exercised from 
head office."(1 1) This loose structure might still give some benefits in controlling 
25 
markets and information pooling but he shows that failure to integrate brought slow 
growth and could also sometimes be disastrous - a particularly noticeable example being 
Vickers.(12) 
Hannah, then, has overstated what was new in the inter-war economy. Chandler, 
having participated in conferences (13) with Hannah and familiar with the latter's 
arguments is, in effect systematically rebutting them in the British section of Scale and 
Scope. Hannah seems to have accepted now that Chandler's case is overwhelming. In his 
review of Scale and Scope Hannah wrote, that at the core of British entrepreneurial failure 
(and he accepts that there has been such a failure) is the failure to 
develop managerial hierarchies as deep, or (though this is stressed less) as 
well trained and professional as those in America (or in Germany). I find 
this convincing ... one cannot but come to this conclusion as one examines 
one weak firm after another ...(14) 
The consequence of this acceptance means, however, that the "statistical 
indicators" of a rising corporate economy are much weakened as evidence. Once it is 
accepted that the organisational transformation from loose (if permanent) cartel to 
professionalised managerial hierarchy is the key stage in the development of a modem 
corporation out of a merger then the mere fact of merger is not enough. 
With the effective withdrawal of Hannah no scholar appears to wish to claim great 
inter-war advances towards managerial corporations. 	 As we have seen in the 
Introduction, Hannah's subsequent position now appears to be to question the importance 
of such findings rather than the facts of the case. Thus Chandler's account of the general 
(if not complete) failure of British enterprise to build managerial hierarchies in the inter-. 
war years stands unchallenged. There may be problems with the use of this failure as a 
key cause of British economic decline or the ascription of this failure to a failure of 
entrepreneurship. These problems have been touched upon in the Introduction remain 
largely outside the concerns of this thesis. On the other hand, Chandler's explanation of 
the more particular reasons for the failure of British enterprise to develop modern 
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managerial hierarchies are very relevant. We shall proceed to consider them and some 
related ideas. 
Explaining Failure 
In Scale and Scope Chandler puts forward a general explanation of "Personal 
Capitalism" by which he means the persistence of the influence of founders or heirs in 
firms, ensuring federal structures and little power sharing with salaried managers who 
were in any case few in number. In turn this could happen because market pressures on 
British firms were not sufficiently strong to force change: the British market was 
compact (and therefore required no complex networks of branch plants) and growth was 
low (thus removing the pressures of rapid expansion) 'arid the market was (legally) 
controllable by cartels. Loose amalgamations were able to control the market where 
cartels could not. Certain firms, for example, Imperial Tobacco, Cadbury-Fry, 
Pilkingtons, were able to prosper in loose structures under personal management. Others, 
however, became extremely vulnerable at- times when they attempted to diversity 
(Vickers, Armstrong-Whitworth) or when new foreign products invaded the market 
(machine tools, electrical equipment). Nothing in the domestic market had prepared UK 
firms for such crises. 
The linking of the persistence of family influence to firm structure or 
entrepreneurial failure is not a new idea.(15) However, in linking "personally managed" 
firm structures to crises of adaptability to changing market circumstances, Chandler 
removes us from the kind of unprovable and ultimately tautological cultural explanations 
for British failure which have found favour with some writers.(16) There are two points 
worth making here. The first is that continuing personal control by the "personal 
capitalist" is presented as an entrepreneurial choice rather than a defining imperative of 
capitalism itself. We shall return to this point below. The second point is that Chandler's 
treatment of adaptive failure relies overwhelmingly on secondary sources (mostly 
business histories) which by their very variation probably do not allow an analytic 
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approach. Chandler leaves us in no doubt that there was a great deal of personal 
management in British enterprise but adaptive failure remains a suggestive possibility 
rather that a rigourously analysed general process in Scale and Scope. 
A fuller treatment of adaptive failure may be found in the "institutionalists" 
gathered in Elbaum and Lazonick's volume of essays by various contributors.(17) The 
editors say in their introduction: 
"... the sources of British decline are multifaceted, but operate along 
common lines of historical causation. Britain was impeded from making a 
successful transition to mass production and corporate organisation in the 
twentieth century by an inflexible institutional legacy of atomistic 
economic organisation. One element impeding the adoption of mass 
production was market demand conditions. Amidst sluggish domestic 
growth and free international trade, British firms found it difficult to secure 
the requisite market outlets to justify mass production. But Britain also 
faced critical supply-side constraints with respect to industrial 
organisation, managerial and technical personnel, long-term finance and 
labour relations. By implication to break this causal chain and arrest the 
process of decline requires policy measures that operate on the demand and 
supply sides in a co-ordinated fashion.(18) 
That is to say that the institutional features of the nineteenth century economy 
which had brought about spectacular economic success were now increasingly 
dysfunctional as other more corporate economies began to compete successfully. This 
institutional legacy meant that the British entrepreneur could not freely choose whether or 
not to make the three pronged investment. It was not [conservative] cultural values or 
entrepreneurial failure that was the prime cause of decline but "a matrix of rigid 
institutional structures that reinforced (conservative) values and obstructed individualistic 
as well as collective efforts at economic renovation".(19) The institutional log jam was so 
intense in certain areas of the economy - cotton, coal and steel, for example - that it was 
only breakable by massive coherent outside intervention either by finance capital or the 
state. The relative ineffectiveness of these two forces in the inter-war years may be 
accounted as yet another institutional rigidity.(20) 
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Elbaum and Lazonick's approach allows a richer etiology than Chandler's since the 
suggested causes for adaptive failure are structural rather than the supposed individual 
failings of the personal capitalist as entrepreneur. Chandler, it is true, offers structural 
explanations in that the British entrepreneur is described as acting within a market which 
allows him to act the way he did. Chandler may effectively blame the entrepreneur for 
the choices he made just as others may describe his actions as rational and profitable for 
the market within which he found himself.(21) Elbaum and Lazonick, however, appear to 
see the market not as permissive or given but constraining, composed of specific 
institutions and specific structures of commercial relationships that compelled particular 
responses. And in a similar way, the specific structures of state, education and capital 
market too (22) put limits on entrepreneurial activity. 
Using Elbaum and Lazonick's approach it is possible to construct a convincing 
institutionalist account of the forces which led, say, to weakly integrated mergers, though 
they themselves do not attempt it. Not the least contributory factor would be an atomised 
and competitive economy which made mergers of many small firms necessary in the first 
place, none strong enough to dominate but most strong enough to veto within any merger. 
Another factor would be the structure of capital markets and the consequent emergence of 
the relatively lightweight UK company promoter as opposed to the investment banker 
Napoleons of the US type. The institutionalist approach is thus a useful counterweight to 
over-simple explanations of Britain's economic decline. Elbaum and Lazonick's emphasis 
on constrained choice and structural determinants of action allow complex explanations 
of the failure of the British firm and the British economy to become corporate. 
Yet while institutional rigidity can explain why positive action is difficult it does 
not explain why there is little or no positive action. If the market allows firms to survive 
without effective managerial hierarchies then when the market changes and they become 
necessary should we not see desperate struggles to construct them? Institutional rigidities 
may have tended to prevent large scale merger - however, once it took place, faced with 
harsh market pressures on one side and available examples of more successful methods 
and structures on the other, we may ask why the personal capitalist's entrepreneurial 
choice was so often to do little or nothing even when the economic consequences were 
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disastrous. If the price of choosing "personal capitalism" was potential personal 
economic decline or extinction it would appear to make no capitalist economic sense at 
all. 
The difficulties increase when we consider such organisations as the railways, the 
UK's largest enterprises. The personal capitalist was not an issue here. 
	
Large 
administrative structures had been established and tasks of unprecedented complexity 
were carried out over a range of integrated operations. Yet as we shall see, structures of 
governance were adopted on UK railways which fell well below the efficacy of those of 
US railroads and were held on to despite a clear awareness that profits were lower and 
control less. This clearly was an acceptable price to pay for the structure adopted which 
kept power in the hands of the qualifying share-holders who made up the board of 
directors. 
We shall see that there were imperative interests at work which preserved certain 
dysfunctional structures and were prepared to bear the potentially high costs incurred. 
• Ownership whether of the family or joint stock type balances the imputed capitalist 
economic goal of profit maximisation against the preservation of their power and status 
and values that preservation highly. Chandler makes it clear in The Visible Hand that the 
creation of modern corporate structures and managerial hierarchies in the US involved the 
loss of control of the firm by owners or non-executive directors. This was not a process 
which required a change of personnel necessarily - owners could and did become modern 
type managers in the US, the obvious example being Alfred P Sloan of General Motors. 
The point was that owners had to lose power as owners.(23) We can see therefore that 
different types of company structure may represent the best options for control by owners 
or managers. It is after all nearly tautological to say that a power structure is created in a 
form which best serves those who run it. Shifts in structure therefore represent shifts of 
power and will be supported or resisted for that reason. It should not surprise us that a 
loose structure that preserved the power of the former owners in a merger should be the 
preferred form of organisation or that railway directors preferred their welters of board 
committees to delegations to managers. (See Chapter 2, below.) 
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It may be, as Noble suggests (24), that the returns from handing over the running 
of the company to expert managers were so great in the US that this compensated many 
owners for the withdrawal to render status. Voluntary abdication of power was, then, 
available at a price. We can speculate on reasons why such developments did not occur in 
Britain - a less fluid business class in the UK? Lesser potential returns from a more turgid 
UK market? We have accepted in the Introduction that Chandler's account of the organic 
development of managerial hierarchy from US capitalist enterprise may be open to 
question from modern critics and also from an older school of US historiography.(25) 
However, such questions are outside the scope of this thesis. 
Left alone the capitalist owner or joint stock director as much as the handloom 
weaver can be assumed to have a perfectly rational desire to preserve his independence 
and control his economic fate as far as possible, indifferent to macro-economic effects or 
the social good or even at the cost of a declining standard of living. It seems clear that the 
interests of ownership could only be extinguished by liberal compensation, by 
considerable force, or both. As we shall see, this point had not been reached in the UK 
before World War One. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STRUCTURE AND TECHNIQUE IN LARGE BRITISH 
ENTERPRISE BEFORE WORLD WAR ONE 
1) 	 The Nature of Large Enterprise, from the late Nineteenth Century 
Century to World War One 
The nature of large enterprise in this period depends to a degree on the 
measures used to rank enterprises by size. Researchers have used three methods to 
derive lists of large enterprises: 	 capitalisation(1), market value(2) and numbers 
employed(3). A further useful measure would be output but Census of Production 
data for individual firms has not been released(4). None of these methods may claim 
primacy and each complements the other. Capitalisation may not be an accurate 
measure of the value of assets employed: the problem of watered capital in the 
railways and the amalgamations of the late ninteenth and early twentieth century are 
well known(5). Market value on the other hand represents the stock market's view of 
the relative profitability of the use of assets and as long as due allowance is made for 
speculative booms or panics can indicate firms which have grown using retained 
profits. Rankings by numbers employed can indicate labour-intensive rather than 
capital intensive firms. Lists of large enterprises derived by these methods are given 
in Appendix I. 
It should be noted, however, that none of these methods do anything more than 
generally indicate the possible complexity of the organisational tasks involved. To 
say that an enterprise is large may be to say no more than the quantity of operations 
are large without any necessity for qualitative change. As we have seen in Chapter I, 
"statistical indicators" can only indicate not predicate. The stage in the Chandler 
model where administrative tasks become so complex that an irreversible managerial 
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mutation takes place to cope with them can only be assessed at the level of the 
individual firm. 
If we examine the lists at Appendix I it is immediately apparent that railways 
are overwhelmingly the biggest single category of large enterprise. In the rankings 
by market value the top ten are railways and railways make up 15 of the top 20 and 
22 of the top 50 companies. If the rankings by capitalisation are used, the pre-
eminence of railways is even more marked: the top 14 companies are railways with 
16 of the top 20 and 31 of the top 50 companies. Employment figures have not been 
systematically gathered for railways but the available evidence indicates that on this 
measure too, the railways would be ahead. 
For enterprises other than railways the lists for capitalisation and market value 
show one marked difference, namely the position of banks. 	 In rankings by 
capitalisation there were no banks in the top 50 while rankings by market value show 
that ten of the top 50 companies were banks. The balance of the enterprises in both 
lists is largely made up of manufacturing companies. When the manufacturing 
companies ranked by the various measures are considered we can see from Appendix 
I that they are largely amalgamated firms. These may most conveniently be treated by 
sector as shown in Appendix I. 
We can say, therefore, that large enterprise in the Edwardian period falls fairly 
neatly into three broad groups: railways, banks and amalgamated manufacturing 
firms, which we will deal with in that order. 
2) 	 Structure and Technique on UK Railways. Part A - Structure 
As the single biggest category of large enterprise in our period the railways 
would require attention. The railways have further significance, however, for their 
place in Chandler's account of the rise of modem business corporations in the US: 
The Visible Hand describes the railroad companies as the first modem business 
enterprises. Chandler shows that at least some of the railroads developed both 
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structural and technical/administrative innovations that then flowed into other 
industries by adoption or by recruitment of skilled personnel. He demonstrates an 
almost apostolic succession leading from railroads through steel to Du Pont and 
General Motors, modern corporations in their finished form. 
Thus the potential seminal role of UK railways is clear. If there was a general 
failure by UK enterprise to develop managerial hierarchies then we might expect that 
this failure would first become apparent on the railways and as a consequence inhibit 
developments elsewhere. 	 Chandler is clear on the structural preconditions for 
innovation on some US railroads: managers were not subject to tight control by 
boards of directors and were able to create a top management without day to day 
functional or departmental responsibilities which as a consequence was able to 
manage the organisation strategically. Decentralised divisional structures carried out 
the day to day running of the railroads subject to statistical and accounting control 
from HQ.(6) 
There was an element of creative voluntarism involved: the managers on 
some railroads did not innovate though they had the opportunity. Some railroad 
managers were prevented from innovating by boards of directors. Under these non-
innovative circumstances the structure adopted was of functional departments whose 
chief officers reported to the President - a full time chief executive. 	 Chandler 
describes this as "truncated top management" because the President was the sole top 
manager with no functional responsibilities.(7) As we shall see, the structure of UK 
railways did not even attain this level of generalist management. 
The structure adopted by British railway has fairly obvious historical roots. 
The first railway like earlier joint stock companies had directors whose job, they 
assumed, was to manage the line directly.(8) For example: 
In 1831 the Directors of the Liverpool and Manchester railway were 
solemnly deliberating such matters as the bad loading of an individual 
wagon, the dismissal of a clerk for drunkenness ... in short, 
endeavouring to conduct the day by day management of the line.(9) 
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This soon became impossible and the directors had to delegate tasks to paid 
officials but reserved as much power as they could to themselves. The consequence 
was that as functional officers were appointed as functions were split (for example by 
separating responsibilities for locomotive and carriage & wagon building) or 
increased (for example by ferry operation or hotels) committees of directors were set 
up to supervise each of the functions. Chief functional officers were generally 
appointed but no chief executive officer. As an American observer put it: All the 
main functional officers "were co-ordinate, and nobody short of the directorate, 
unskilled in railroad operation could harmonise their work on the interests of the 
whole company" °)That is to say all the chief officers were equal in status and 
independent. They had to mutually co-ordinate their work because no one chief 
officer had the power to coerce the others. Only the board had the power to tell chief 
officers what to do. 
The situation did not stay entirely static. By about the end of the nineteenth 
century "by almost imperceptible steps, the authority of the general manager [had] 
been extended to cover nearly all phases of current or dynamic railway operation. 
Static railroad operation, or responsibility for design and general policy, still [rested] 
with the directors and their departmental heads."(11) That is to say that the general 
manager would oversee the running of trains and the services to the passengers and 
goods they carried. But the civil and mechanical engineers were responsible directly 
to the board for the production and repair of rolling stock and the building and repair 
of the permanent way. The solicitor and company secretary also reported to the 
board directly. The company secretary was responsible for financial matters (to 
which the general manager's writ did not run) and also, somewhat bizarrely, for hotels 
and refreshment rooms. The company secretary was a powerful figure "often nearly 
co-ordinate with the general manager".(12) Thus the railways carried the marks of 
their early Nineteenth Century origins up to the First World War. The Chairman of 
the railway Shareholders Association could write in 1913 
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While the duties and responsibilities of railway managers have 
been growing year by year in numbers and in magnitude, the 
executive organisation has undergone no corresponding 
development. It remains very much on the primitive lines of 
its infancy. Its ideas, regulations and methods are often those 
of eighty years ago.(13) 
The number of committees of the board could be large, with the various 
internal supervisory committees supplemented by joint committees with other 
railways. 	 The sheer numbers of committees must raise questions as to the 
effectiveness of the system. The relatively modest North Eastern Railway (NER) had 
between six and seven functional supervisory committees.(14) The Midland Railway 
had ten to twelve supervisory committees and anywhere between 16 and 27 joint or 
representative committees.(15) The London and North Western Railway (LNWR) 
had fully 16 supervisory committees and 39 joint or representative committees.(16) 
(These break down into 13 "lines leased" bodies, 21 joint committees with other 
railways and 5 delegate bodies like the Clearing House.) 
The attendances of the various functional chief officers at the supervisory 
board committees is consistent with the fragmented "co-ordinate" management 
described above. We may take the LNWR as an example.(17) The Company 
Secretary attended finance related committees (and the Hotel and Medical 
committees) and the General Manager did not. The latter attended only those 
committees which concerned goods and traffic operating. These the Company 
Secretary did not attend unless there was a financial relevance (for example Cartage 
and Agency). The Chief Mechanical Engineer attended the Locomotive and Traffic 
Committees but the Secretary or other financial officers attended neither. 	 The 
General Manager only attended the Traffic Committee of these two. None of the 
above attended the Permanent Way Committee which had civil engineers attending. 
The organisation charts which were published from time to time before World War 1 
showing a managerial hierarchy culminating in the general manager were therefore 
misleading (see Appendix II). There was no empowered co-ordination below the 
level of the board whatever working arrangements were arrived between officials. 
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It is true that contemporaries saw the general manager as holding the highest 
status of the railway officers and this is confirmed by their pay which was also the 
highest.(18) A contemporary could argue for example that despite the lack of control 
by the general manager over civil or mechanical engineering activity or the financial 
aspects of the railway and 
although the heads of departments engaged in these ... branches of 
administration are responsible to the board directly, not to him, their 
work is so intertwined with that of the traffic branch that their main 
operations are brought under his cognisance and their more important 
proposals receive his approval before being carried out. In this way he 
gains the connected comprehensive knowledge of the affairs and needs 
of the company ... which is necessary to him as chief adviser of its 
board ... (19) 
This account suggests that the general manager might have the power to know 
what was going on and, in extremis, to veto proposals, but this power is strongly 
countered by the separate access to the board by chief officers of other departments 
and the rigidly separated nature of the departments - described by one railway 
chairman as "watertight".(20) Any assertion that there was a generally accepted right 
by the general manager or the traffic departments to dominate the other departments 
must also be called into doubt by accounts of long-running inter-departmental 
feuds.(21) In any case, the general manager was heavily burdened with his own 
duties with little time to interfere with other departments. An American observer 
wrote that the general manager "cannot do very much more than co-ordinate: he is 
doing work which would be performanced on a large American road by at least three 
vice presidents and a general manager besides, consequently his scrutiny can only be 
general."(22) This was not so much, then, a case of truncated top management as of 
no top management. 
Since there was no empowered co-ordination below the level of the board, the 
nature and scope of the control exercised by the boards of directors is central to an 
understanding of the way the railways were managed. As we shall see, in terms of 
expertise, decision making and method of control, board control was defective. The 
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expertise of the boards was severely limited. Apart from the occasional retired 
general manager (representing, as we have seen, a limited part of the business) 
railways boards were not drawn from people with practical knowledge of railways 
operation. Often they were landowners or customers watching out for narrow 
sectional interests. There was also a strong representation from peers and MPs 
recruited to protect the railways' interests in the legislature. 
As one disgruntled London and Northwestern shareholder put it: "in 
the vast majority of cases they [railway directors] are elected for every 
other reason than because they have expert knowledge of railway 
business." This was true.(23) 
Many directors' interest in their railways' affairs was desultory. However, it is 
said that for some director MPs in what was called "the efficient interest" it became 
the case that "the power and the responsibility developed into a career at least as 
important and vocational as that of being in Parliament."(24) This appears, however, 
to have been a career dedicated to the pursuit of railway interests in Parliament and 
politics generally, rather than applying themselves to the actual business of managing 
railways. 
This can be seen in the time actually spent by directors in managing the 
railway and the nature of the decisions they were called upon to make. Board 
committees and the board itself generally met monthly. On the LNWR there was a 
strict timetable of meetings compressed into two days. Functional/departmental 
committees with slots of one or one and a half hours were run in parallel on the first 
day with the Finance Committee and full Board meeting on the second day.(25) On 
the evidence of the records of those meetings, the business conducted was 
overwhelmingly routine with a great emphasis on approving expenditure items down 
to tiny sums: lists of "debts and defalcations", approvals for repairs to fences, lists of 
all approved wage rises in all departments fill the books. These expenditures were in 
turn approved by the Board.(26) Apart from periodic directors' inspections in each of 
the LNWR's ten districts(27) this appeared to be the sum total of directoral oversight. 
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Inevitably the question must arise of where the power lay in such an 
apparently thinly controlled system. It might even be asked whether such a system 
would allow sufficient freedom to managers to innovate. It has, for example, been 
argued that by the 1900's "the increasingly complex technical matters with which 
railway directors had to deal put them largely in the hands of their general managers 
and other staff officers."(28) But surely this had been the case, if it was the case, 
from the beginning. From very early times the board had expert technical employees 
to advise them and if they were in the hands of their officials they would also have 
been in this situation from the beginning. It could be argued that UK railway allowed 
scope for intra-departmental willfulness, particularly on the part of chief mechanical 
engineers but this is to ignore the key element in the power relationship between 
board and officers: the experts might propose but the directors disposed. In a 
number of key ways the directors retained control: they controlled expenditure, they 
determined the management structure and in consequence they controlled the careers 
and aspirations of managers. 
As we have seen, expenditure control was a central concern of the directors. 
This stemmed straightforwardly from the director's role as stewards of the 
shareholders' funds. The attitude of the directors was clearly stated by a general 
manager of the LNWR: "no expenditure whatever is incurred without the direct 
sanction of the Directors' expressed by a minute of some committee approved by the 
Board." (My underlining) In the case of capital expenditure the plan was not only 
approved by the board but signed by the Chairman and 
that gentleman, who keeps a watchful guard over the Company's 
pursestrings, has to be convinced that the expenditure is not only 
desirable but actually unavoidable ... Thus the shareholders may rest 
perfectly easy in the assurance that their money is not dissipated ... (29) 
Expenditure was indeed controlled through the use of board minutes. 
Surviving books of account show minute numbers against expenditure items which 
allowed straightforward audit trails.(30) It also prevented unauthorised expenditure 
and given the control of the finances by the company secretary, who also had charge 
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of the board minute books, showed the rationality behind the combination of these 
two functions. The consequence of this system was that any proposal for change that 
involved any expenditure would have to be taken to a parsimonious board to be 
picked over. A money-saving attitude expressed itself in positively trivial ways: for 
example, re-shuffling of staff on the retirement of top-of-scale staff were usually 
accompanied by the litany that it would "effect a saving to the Department of fx per 
year"(31) without the obvious rider that subsequent inevitable increases would bring 
this back up again. When the Midland Railway's general manager reorganised his 
Goods Department, his directors minuted no expectations of improved efficiency or 
more business only a request for "particulars of the extra costs involved".(32) 
Innovations that cost money were inevitably discouraged. 
As well as controlling expenditure the board controlled the management 
structure, as we have seen, through reporting lines from functional departments to 
committees of the board. Careers were limited to single departments, and although 
some movement across the traffic departments did appear possible, promotion by 
seniority and the heavily regulated and rule-run nature of the work tended to limit 
aspiration. While changes could be effected in one department, albeit with difficulty, 
the departmental rigidity meant that change was well nigh impossible across the 
company as a whole. There was no chief executive officer able to make proposals for 
change and the board's function was essentially supervisory not innovatory. The 
Boards were not orientated towards change and were without difficulty able to prevent 
change initiated by others. On occasions it appeared that even when boards felt 
change was desirable they felt unable to do anything about it. 
We may take as an example the furore caused by the appointment by the Great 
Eastern Railway of an American to the post of general manager in 1914. The 
Chairman justified the appointment on the following grounds; 
It was a subject of great regret to him and to all chairmen that on the 
English railway system at the present time there was an acknowledged 
dearth of first-class men coming to the front capable of fulfilling the 
duties of general manager. But is was not confined to the office of the 
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general manager. There was a dearth of first rate men coming to the 
front for even the minor appointments in our great railways. He was 
sure that in these days of education there were as many able young 
men as there ever were in the ranks of the railway companies. Why 
did they not come to the front; all our railway systems were divided in 
what he would call water-tight compartments. The traffic, goods, 
engineering and other departments were kept so apart that as a rule 
there was very little interchange from one to another on the part of the 
young men employed. The inevitable effect of that was to remove on 
the part of these young men any incentive to new ideas and new 
methods. (33) 
But the solution was in the hands of the Chairman and his Board! Yet the 
peculiar conservatism of the UK railways seems to have treated its structure as an 
immutable given fact. Even though the Great Eastern Chairman knew about methods 
used in the USA to develop management talent(34) it does not seem to have occured 
to him that he and his Board might introduce these methods into their own railways. 
3) 	 Structure and Technique on UK Railway, Part B: Control Technique 
As we have seen, a key element of Board control was the close supervision of 
expenditure approvals, enforced by an accounts department outside the control of the 
"spending" departments. An examination of railway minute books and reports to the 
Board does not reveal much else. There were studies of running expenses and coal 
utilisation by locomotives(35) and before the First World War there appear to have 
been attempts to introduce "scientific" methods into the engineering workshops.(36) 
(This will be subsumed under a discussion on costing on the LMS in a later section.) 
Particularly noticeable is the failure of the railway to develop or adopt new 
techniques - particularly costing techniques - in the face of an apparent crisis of 
profitability in the 1901 trade depression. This brought about requests from at least 
one heavyweight shareholders' action group for improved methods and statistics.(37) 
More importantly, it brought about a series of articles from a prominent railway 
economist, Sir George Paish, published in book form as The British Railway Position 
in 1902. This demonstrated quite clearly that a system of close supervision of 
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expenditure approvals did not amount to close control of expenditure. Paish was able 
to show that profitability had declined over 20 years and that this was the result of 
increasing expenditure rather than declining income: 
wages and other costs have risen during the past twenty years and ... 
until now British companies have been content to meet the advance in 
wages out of the profits arising from the additional traffic instead of 
increasing the efficiency of the dearer labour by a more skilful and 
more economical handling of the traffic.(38) 
Paish was able to contrast this situation with the performance of US Railroads 
where considerable efficiency savings had been made. 	 Paish proposed that 
performance data could be derived, and made available to a general manager in 
sufficient detail "that he can immediately ascertain on which portions of the system 
the greatest ability is displayed in handling the traffic economically. Thus he would 
be in a position to compliment or censure district superintendants, who should be held 
directly responsible for the economical handling of the traffic in their various 
districts . " (39) 
The implementation of Paish's proposed system could have allowed 
comparisons of performance over time and between companies. (The cost centres 
based on districts and district superintendants would probably be problematical since 
in a unitary system it would be difficult to disentangle the elements relating to the 
performance of single districts.) His system did not get under the surface into the 
details of railway operation in a way that could accurately identify cost elements for 
remedial action by managers. Essentially it was an instrument of general oversight, 
particularly for investors or the board. Proposals to include such statistics with the 
statutory railway returns were fiercely resisted by the companies and were not 
adopted.(40) Nevertheless, Paish's study laid bare the very limited nature of the 
available management information. 
Paish's investigations into the economic performance of railways over time 
had relied on information supplied by LNWR officers. Thus, had they wished, the 
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railways could have derived their own time series of performance but there is no 
indication that they did so either publically or privately after Paish showed what was 
possible. The information available, however, to produce his proposed system of 
performance indicators - average receipts per passenger per mile and per ton of freight 
per mile, average train loads and car loads etc - was "not only ... absent from the 
published reports but is known not to exist."(41) And if the averaged data was absent 
even more so was the kind of detail which was necessary to make informed 
management decisions at operational level. 
At the heart of the problem was the treatment of "aggregate expenses". The 
only costs that could be directly apportioned to passenger or freight traffic, for 
example, were repairs or renewals to carriages or wagons, compensations for 
passengers or goods and Government duty on passengers. That is to say that separate 
costs for passenger or goods traffic were only known in the case of those transactions 
which crossed the boundary of the general manager's departments. All that was 
known otherwise was the total costs of operation for all the departments under the 
general manager's control. In making up their accounts and statistical returns the 
railway companies apportioned these total costs on the astonishing principle of 
"dividing the aggregate expenses in proportion to the receipts for the respective 
classes of traffic."(42) This was more than "extremely crude" as Paish puts it, it 
defeated the whole object of allocating costs: to detect areas of inefficient working 
and reform them. 
So while, say, the Chairman of the LNWR could publicly admit that Paish's 
criticisms were "ably drawn" and -"perfectly true" and could state that the railways 
"were prevented by Parliament from making profit in any other way than by 
economising"(43) the railways had no means of knowing where economies should be 
made or how effective any initiative might be. So when detailed instructions were 
issued by the LNWR to staff in 1905 to increase the tonnage of freight per train, 
which was one of Paish's suggestions, the railways simply could not quantify any 
resulting benefits.(44) 
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The question must arise, though, whether it is realistic or fair to criticise the 
railways for not adopting techniques which might have been theoretically possible but 
which did not exist at the time in any useable form. As Bonavia puts it: 
One danger besetting historians ... is that of criticising a failure to 
employ techniques that hardly existed, if at all ... Examples may be 
found in traffic costing and staff productivity. Perhaps one may argue 
that the science (or art) of traffic costing did not have to wait upon any 
scientific or technological breakthrough and so it could have been 
developed earlier. The fact is that nowhere in the world was it 
effectively practised - and this despite the efforts of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in the USA.(45) 
But, it can be argued, the failure to employ costing techniques was not a 
theoretical but a real practical failure to adopt known techniques. Detailed costing 
was carried out by US Railroads and was not unknown to UK railways. Gibb of the 
NER and Paish had done the rounds of US Railroads.(46) They were not alone, there 
were regular visits but as one jaundiced account has it these "holiday trips have 
generally been limited to high officials ... on a flying trip of two or three weeks, most 
of which may be spent in festivity and sight-seeing." UK railways were urged to take 
the US example seriously and send across technical people like "our railways 
accountants, the class who, next to engineers, have the best right to be consulted." 
The writer, the Chairman of the railways Shareholders' Association, went on 
They will, we doubt not, be cordially received and have everything 
lucidly explained to them. They will see in the accountants office how 
minutely every item of revenue and expenditure is recorded, how 
carefully it is analysed and tabulated, and how the results are passed on 
to the heads of the respective departments. They will find passenger 
and freight train accounts distinguished from each other ... The final 
result ... is a profit and loss account for every train run. It may not be 
absolutely exact, but it is at least an honest approximation and for 
comparative purposes it has great value ... roads may differ ... in their 
classification of receipts and expenditure but there is a definite 
standard recognised and being worked up to. On our own railways 
there is no standard of any kind or even an approach to it.(47) 
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The writer's endorsement of US methods is perhaps over-enthusiastic. Work 
by US scholars has been critical of the managerial effectiveness and the technical 
accuracy of US railroad costing. Their argument is given in a footnote (48). For the 
purposes of a discussion of UK railways, however, it is clear from these scholars' 
work that even if they were flawed the costing methods deployed on US railroads 
before World War One gave average costs per passenger mile and per ton mile for 
distinct classes of traffic at a level of detail which allowed managerial decision 
making and monitoring. This was well in advance of UK practice. 
This latter remark is perhaps not entirely true. One railway, the NER under 
its general manager Gibb, carried out traffic costing though admitedly on a limited 
scale.(49) These exercises showed, for example, wide variations in profitability in 
handling coal from different collieries. Costing techniques were also applied to 
particular lines and to particular classes of work, such as shunting. 	 While the 
exercises did not long survive the departure of George Gibb in early 1906, they 
demonstrate that costing was a practical proposal before the First World War. All 
that was required was the will to do it. Given the pressures on profits and the 
perceived need to cut costs we may ask why there was no such will. 
The most likely explanation is a combination of conservative inertia and an 
unwillingness to spend any more of the shareholders' money than appeared absolutely 
necessary. The collection of ton-mile statistics, for example, was opposed generally 
by the railway companies "as a costly and, for all but statistical specialists, a useless 
luxury."(50) It was said that "the cost of compiling them was ... excessive in 
comparison with the usefulness of the result to the officials of the line."(51) But even 
when an official of the line, Gibb of the NER, alone among general managers, 
asserted the usefulness of ton-mile statistics to him, their eventual publication was at 
the expense of running disputes with his board.(52) This was despite the fact that 
Gibb estimated before introducting them that "with proper organisation the cost 
should not be great" and that the results would effectively pay for them.(53) 
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But if resistance to ton-mile statistics was strong and general on the grounds of 
cost how much more likely was resistance to a system that gave "a profit and loss 
account for every train run". Ton mile statistics certainly required the separation of 
passenger and freight operation in the books and the apportionment of running 
expenses on the basis of sampling (for example track wear and tear by freight as 
opposed to passenger traffic). Nevertheless, it remained an essentially financial 
 
accounting exercise, performable within an existing accounting department. The 
more detailed systems of management accounting, however, would require radically 
increased information flows and analysis. Even here the practical means were to 
hand to process the data in the shape of the Hollerith machine.(54) The chief 
Accountant of the London and Southwestern Railway, for example, was using the 
Hollerith to build up the railway returns to Government before the First World War 
and the company also appears to have been using it to control stock inventory.(55) 
The way in which the Hollerith allowed punched cards to be "sorted, counted, added 
and recorded in every conceivable way"(56) was well suited to costing and similar 
machines were so used by , among others, Austin Motors in the inter-war years. 
But a further explanation of the failure to adopt known and available control 
techniques lies in the structure of the companies, the knowledge and aspirations of 
managers and the question of the locus from which techniques could be initiated. 
Putting it simply: if the directors would not initiate them on the grounds of expense 
or because of amateurish ignorance, who could? The accounting sections of the 
railways were under the control of the Company Secretary and this could only 
reinforce an existing bias away from management accounting towards financial 
accounting with special reference to shareholders' business: 
In the majority of cases those connected with [the Accounts 
Department] seem to to take a pride in dissassociating themselves from 
the practical side of the business, and express a lofty contempt for it 
and its methods. Their ideal, and their sole ideal, is too often to build 
up annual accounts for submission to shareholders in general 
meeting . (57) 
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General managers appear to have had no control over any accounting 
manpower and generally because of the departmentally restricted career path were 
overwhelmingly likely to be "track and train" men with expertise in operations rather 
than accounting. Even when, like Gibb, they came from other backgrounds (Gibb 
had been the NER Solicitor) their room for manoeuvre was small. And when they 
tried to increase their powers they were blocked by their boards. 
In this way the themes of management power and management technique 
inter-connect. The case of Gibb is illuminating here. In 1905 Gibb tried without 
success to persuade his board to make him Managing Director of the NER. After his 
struggles over the publication of ton-mile statistics this was surely more than a request 
for "some kind of recognition for his long and exceptional service" as a recent 
historian of the NER puts it.(58) As managing director he would have the power to 
manage the whole company delegated to him by the board. This would have 
established a full time chief executive with the power to intervene in any part of the 
company's operations. It would have reduced the power of the board over him. He 
would have been in the position to institute sweeping reforms without having to 
constantly refer back to the board for permissions. Despite a consolation presentation 
of £5,000 and a formal minuted appreciation, Gibb left to run a London undergound 
railways (at a much increased salary) in early 1906. He was, however, invited on to 
the NER board. It was not a position which could ensure that his remaining proteges' 
reforming zeal would be effective. He left the NER board in 1910.(59) 
The production of more sophisticated control information was of little use if it 
could not be used effectively. It could not be used effectively if the organisation 
within which it became available would not allow organisational change or resource 
allocation decisions to be made on the basis of this information. 
	 In order for 
information to be used as a management tool there has to be a management in place 
able to use it: a unified power structure operating an agreed strategy. Gibb's victory 
in compiling and publishing ton-mile figures was undermined by his defeated attempt 
to change the NER structure in a way which would have allowed him to use them. 
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The pre-World War One railways demonstrate, then, that structural change 
was necessary before better control techniques could be introduced, structural change 
that integrated day to day mangement and radically reduced the power of the amateur 
part-time board. But without an external force majeure in the shape of predatory 
investment banking (as in the USA) or the state (as in Europe) the boards were 
immovable. UK financial institutions showed no signs of being prepared to attempt 
intervention and reorganisation in railway companies. The banks had no tradition of 
taking over and managing firms directly. The company promotors who in any case 
probably could not have raised the huge sums of money required were essentially 
short term speculators rather than long term investors. The UK state also showed 
little inclination to go further than certain forms of regulation: Parliament was quite 
prepared to legislate on the control of railway charges or employment practice but 
showed no signs of wishing to nationalise. 
The shareholders, too, while hungry for dividends and jealously conscious of 
US efficiencies were also uneasily aware that their enfrachisement through their 
representatives on the board - however unsatisfactory - was threatened by US 
methods. As the Chairman of the Railway Shareholders' Association put it in a 
discussion of US and UK railways: 
[In the UK there] are no Vice Presidents in charge of special 
departments - finance, stores, etc. Presumably their place is occupied 
by the Committees of Directors who do a large amount of departmental 
supervision. These may not be so expert as their American counter-
parts, and they may not have such a firm hold on all the administrative 
details, but on the other hand they are in much closer touch with the 
shareholders. 
In American Railroading shareholders count for very little; often they 
are entirely ignored, and the utmost civility ever paid to them is to 
solicit their proxies for the annual meetings. British shareholders do 
see their Directors and Managers now and then, and it is their own fault 
if they get very little information out of them.(60) 
So calls for managerialist change could not be particularly expected from that 
quarter. For pressure to mount for strong outside intervention a major crisis, either 
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financial or in the provision of services was required. There was no such crisis. Nor 
was it likely that any internal crisis of management control would force structural 
change: as Chandler has pointed out, it was perfectly possible to run railways 
without the voluntarist managerial mutations which occured on certain US Railroads. 
The consequence was, however, that the UK railways were not a source of 
management expertise for the economy generally. 
4) 	 Structure and Technique in Large British Banks 
British banking was transformed between the late 1870s and the four years 
after World War One when a "final frenzy" produced the "Big Five".(61) Stimulated 
by slump and a banking crisis in 1878 to diversify and increase deposits to reduce 
risk, expanding banks began to acquire others in mergers of ever-increasing size. As 
a smaller number of ever-larger competitors emerged their ambitions crystallised into 
the achievement of a national branch network and, where they were a country bank, to 
acquire a London base to carry out the lucrative trade of the City. As the banks grew 
their administrative structures had to cope with a greatly expanded volume of business 
and the associated problems of co-ordinating new specialist functions. We shall see 
that the administrative solutions to these problems were relatively straightforward, 
however. We shall also see that larger banks adopted similar policies in the use of 
board committees and the role of top managers. 
Where banks did differ was in the degree to which autonomy was retained by 
the constituent firms making up an amalgamation. Three banks may be taken to 
represent the range of variation; the Midland, Barclays and Lloyds. The Midland 
was the most ruthless in suppressing the identity of acquired banks. The result was a 
business run from its London HQ with barely a trace of local autonomy.(62) 
Barclays stood at the other extreme. It was formed in 1896 in a defensive merger by 
20 private banks who wanted the safety and other advantages of size without the loss 
of local autonomy. Barclays had a board of directors and an HQ in London .but the 
individual amalgamating banks became "Local Head Offices" and their former 
partners became local directors. As Barclays expanded by further acquisitions it 
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distributed branch banks among existing Local Head Offices or created new ones. By 
1926 there were 33 local head offices.(63) Lloyds Bank took a middle course 
between these extremes: the boards of the more prominent acquired banks continued 
as local committees whose influence, however important initially, was allowed to 
steadily decline over subsequent decades.(64) 
The key commercial decisons that banks had to make were decisions on loans. 
If local autonomy was to mean anything, local boards had to keep control of these 
decisions.(65) If local autonomy was lost these decisions were centralised. Because 
of the directors insistence on keeping close control of these decisions, however, there 
were consequences both for the structure and roles of boards and managers. The 
limits to which branches could lend without reference to the board were relatively 
low: the Midland required board decisions on loans over £2,000 but others had limits 
as low as £300.(66) As a result the volume of work that the boards reserved to 
themselves was large and committees of directors had to be formed and meet 
frequently to cover it. Generally it was said that boards met weekly and held board 
committee meetings on three or four days a week.(67) This is confirmed by 
arrangements at the Midland: by 1900 it had five board committees and they and the 
board met weekly. (The process was to continue, six more board committees would 
be added by the 1930s.)(68) Barclays and Lloyds varied from this pattern only to the 
extent that these decisions were delegated geographically to local directors' 
committees rather than committees of the main board meeting centrally. 
Because the commercial decison-making was largely reserved to the board and 
its committees the role of senior management was restricted to control of the 
administrative structure. At the top of the management structure the Midland, Lloyds 
and Barclays all had single chief executive officers as long as they were going through 
their dynamic periods of amalgamation and expansion. Edward Holden of the 
Midland also extraordinarily combined his chief executive function as managing 
director (from 1898) with that of Chairman (from 1908) until his death in 1919. The 
Midland's last major merger was in 1918.(69) 	 Barclays kept a single general 
manager until a last major merger in 1918.(70) At Lloyds a single general manager 
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was in place until his retirement at the end of a series of three post-World War One 
takeovers between 1918 and 1923.(71) 
Once this period of expansion ended, however, these banks did not keep single 
chief executives but relied instead on joint general managers. The Midland used its 
three existing ones. Barclays added a further three to its existing one. Lloyds 
appointed five, later reduced to three. The effects of these appointments was to 
emphasise the co-ordinating role of the board and its committees and to remove any 
empowered co-ordination below the level of the board. Thus as banks moved from 
what might be called the heroic to the organised phase, the boards moved to 
decisively weaken managerial power. 	 It has to be said, however, that the 
consequence was no obvious weakening of operational control or commercial 
effectiveness. This may be because the methods of controlling operations were well 
established and the comfortable oligarchical position of the banks did not bring strong 
competitive pressure to bear. 
Because of its strong centralising tendencies the Midland may have been a 
pioneer of standardised methods: by "the late 1890s, Midland branch managers 
worked to standardised regulations and procedures, continually updated by new 
instructions and circulars."(72) On the other hand the Institute of Bankers had been 
holding qualifying examinations from 1880 which included papers on the practice and 
law of banking which indicates a common body of professional knowledge.(73) 
Textbooks published before World War One also assume common practice across 
different banks.(74) Indeed, it is said that the later bank amalgamations could 
proceed smoothly because of common well-established routines: "... the acquisition 
of a new bank has simply resulted in the enlarging of operations transacted on well- 
defined lines."(75) 	 As far as the control of branches from headquarters was 
concerned, use was made of two parallel hierarchies. The first hierarchy was line 
management running from the general manager through district superintendant to 
bank managers. The second hierarchy ensured compliance with set procedures 
through local inspectors to chief inspector to general manager. This was augmented 
in some cases by inspection of branch accountants' work by inspectors from the chief 
54 
accountants office at HQ.(76) Once established, this structure seems to have been 
capable of almost unlimited expansion. The routine nature of branch banking was 
eminently suited to standardised forms of reporting, none of which required any 
particular advance in technique to develop. Essentially, each branch bank sent in a 
trading account daily to head office which could readily be reconciled by inspectors 
by reference to branch balances held at HQ and cash in the tills at the branch.(77) 
At least one contemporary identified the organisation of HQ functions as a 
more daunting task: "The most difficult problem ... is to relate and co-relate the work 
of the different departments. To overcome this difficulty necessitates elaborate 
machinery for the purposes of communication ..."(78) Unfortunately the available 
secondary sources do not allow any detailed analysis of the banks HQ management 
structures. 	 Interesting questions must therefore remain unanswered including 
whether general managers controlled some of the special functions at HQ or whether 
there were independent Chief Accountants and the like, or whether senior officers 
attended committees and, if so, which ones. 
There is much in our discussion of banks which echoes earlier points made 
about the railways, in particular the substitution of committees of the board for 
delegations to managers and fragmented top management structures. There are 
further echoes. 	 At least one contemporary feared that the increasingly rigid 
bureaucracies would undermine the banks' ability to provide for management 
succession.(79) They also identified a decline in profitability after amalgamation. 
From 1874 to 1923 net profit as a percentage of "Total Working Resources" for 
English and Welsh joint stock banks declined from 1.88% to 0.57%.(80) The cause of 
this decline was identified as an increase in expenses which came from two sources: 
1) the number of branches consequent upon competition and amalgamation and, 2) the 
increased costs of the "elaborate machinery for the purposes of communication." No 
attempt was made to quantify the contribution of each source, at least publicly. 
In the event the banks simply passed on the increased expenses through 
reduced deposit and increased loan rates to customers. This course, not open to the 
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railways whose rates were fixed by government, was made easier by the oligopolistic 
position of the banks after the amalgamation wave. While a process of rationalisation 
and mechanisation was to proceed during the interwar years, it was slow and 
apparently without great urgency. 	 Before World War One, while mechanical 
accounting methods were known, they do not seem to have been viewed with much 
enthusiasm.(81) It could be argued that a wholesale commitment to cost-cutting 
would have involved a decisive degree of delegation to full-time managers - it is a 
task which would be impossible for a part-time board, no matter how hard working, 
and was resisted for that reason. Yet the decline in bank profitability, while real, 
does not appear to have caused an outcry even comparable to that over the railways 
before World War One. From the lists at Appendix I we can calculate that the top 10 
railways' shares stood at an average of only 92.6% of their face value, while the eight 
joint stock banks in our sample stood at 350% of their face value. The banks 
therefore do not seem to have been under any particular external pressure to change 
and the relative simplicity of their operations appears to have allowed growth through 
amalgamation to proceed without the kind of stress that might lead to radical 
managerial innovation. 
5) 	 Structure and Technique in Large Amalgamated Manufacturing 
Companies: 
Part A: the Steel, Shipbuilding, Armaments Conglomerates (Vickers 
Sons and Maxim, W G Armstrong Whitworth, John Brown) 
Each of these firms by various mergers, acquisitions or partial acquisitions 
constructed themselves as shipbuilders and armaments suppliers in the last decade of 
the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century.(82) They were all multi-
plant, multi-process companies within which one might have expected great returns 
from efficient control. 	 But while technical advances were made such as the 
specification of armour plate, the firms remained too loosely integrated and controlled 
to realise their potential advantages. This looseness of control manifested itself both 
as between the separate sites and the centre and within the sites themselves. The 
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companies could survive and prosper with this type of structure and control before 
World War I but were left dangerously exposed in the inter-war years. 
Vickers(83) was established as a Sheffield steel firm for some 30 years before 
moving into armaments, which began with a minority shareholding in the Maxim 
Company in the 1880's. 	 While Albert Vickers became Chairman, "effective 
managerial supervision remained with the ebullient and cantankerous Hiram Maxim 
and in no way could Vickers have been said to control the smaller company..."(84) 
Overall financial control of Maxim was purchased in 1897. It is not clear what 
changes, if any, were made to local management in the Maxim factories when Maxim 
sold out. A shipbuilding firm in Barrow was also purchased in 1897. In 1902 a half 
share of W. Beardmore of Glasgow was acquired but the management remained 
largely under the control of the Beardmore family. The Whitehead Company which 
managed torpedoes was subsequently jointly purchased with Armstrong Whitworth. 
The relationship with Beardmore was particularly troublesome.(85) Vickers' 
substantial investment in Beardmore was not profitable, indeed the company was 
losing money, and for a while from 1906 to 1909 "Vickers had completely lost control 
of the [Beardmore] board."(86) By the imposition of a deputy managing director, 
some control over expenditure was achieved by 1910 - though William Beardmore 
still retained seniority as Chair and Managing Director. The wholly-owned acquired 
firms did not present this kind of proprietorial difficulty yet it appears that all the 
subsidiary companies were left much to their own devices until events forced them 
onto the main board's agenda. Inefficient working in the subsidiaries of Vickers 
remained unnoticed after the slump which followed the Boer War until a revival of 
demand and production delays brought it to the board's attention in 1909-1910. In 
1910 the Board became aware of slow production and high costs at the ex-Maxim 
factory at Erith. This had to be dealt with by bringing-in outside consulting engineers 
rather than using the Erith management or a task force from Vickers itself. It is not at 
all clear that the exercise was a success. A committee of enquiry led by a board 
member promoted from the senior management of the Barrow shipyard itself found it 
in a sorry state in 1912, worked "in an indifferent and expensive manner with 
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inadequate facilities for rapid production".(87) 	 Trebilcock judges that Vickers 
"moved rapidly to counter the deficiencies which the reconversion to high intensity 
work threw up"(88) but it seems just as possible to say that increased demand found 
them inefficient and unprepared not having used the period of slack work from 1903 
to 1910 to control and cut costs and reorganise. Credit must be given, nevertheless, 
for an active response by the Board once it became aware of problems. 
As far as one can judge from the available secondary sources then, the board 
did not manage its constituent parts in any detail, effectively delegating operations 
without corresponding return flows of management information or a centrally 
determined investment strategy. The institution in 1912 of detailed forecasts of 
capital investment from all branches of Vickers was clearly an attempt to control 
rising demands for investment but was nevertheless responsive rather than pro-active. 
The fallibility of a structure controlled in this way was demonstrated by the 
uncontrolled diversification and collapse of the firm immediately after World War 
One.(89) They were, nevertheless, an admired, feared and profitable firm before the 
War. 
Armstrong Whitworth had acquired a range of facilities in shipbuilding, steel 
and ordnance by 1900, rather earlier than Vickers, but on profit record Vickers were 
moving ahead of Armstrong Whitworth by about 1904-5.(90) The most likely cause 
of Armstrong Whitworth's decline was its control, from the late nineteenth century by 
a coterie dominated by the Chairman, Sir Andrew Noble and his two sons. Noble, 
unlike Vickers, resisted the importation of new blood even when this was essential to 
keep open the commercial channels between the firm and the UK government.(91) 
He clearly intended to treat the firm as personal or family property, demonstrated by 
his taking high undisclosed (and probably illegal) salaries (sic) out of the firm and the 
express intention to leave his sons in control on his death.(92) A group existed 
within the directorate opposed to Noble and with a modernising agenda but its leader, 
Lord Stuart Rendal, did not go onto the board until 1911 and died in 1913. His short 
period of influence and the subsequent effects of the War meant that "the reforms 
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engineered by Rendal never really took root and the management structure of the 
company remained largely unaltered".(93) The firm collapsed in 1927. 
The consequence of Noble's hold over the company was a structure with all 
the branch autonomy of Vickers but without the responsiveness of its board. The 
reforms initiated by Rendal are significant both because they represent contemporary 
good practice and are indicators of what had been (and largely remained) missing in 
the company. 	 Rendal made attempts to recruit new people with strong UK 
government and City connections to the board, both for commercial reasons and to 
weaken Noble's grip. 	 He also made specific organisational proposals for the 
establishment of local directors and a Finance Committee.(94) The function of a 
local director was to act as the top manager of a constituent firm with the power of a 
managing director but without an actual place on the Board of Directors itself. Its 
effect was firstly to create a single focus of authority to control tendencies towards 
departmentalism within the subsidiary and, secondly, to co-ordinate subsidiaries by 
local directors meeting together on a local board. 
The Finance Committee was established in December 1911.(95) 	 It is 
significant that its draft remit was modified by the Board at the outset in two key 
ways. The committee retained the power to supervise capital expenditure, advise on 
the level of dividends and also monitor and advise on the financial effects on the 
parent company both of subsidiaries and working arrangements with other firms. As 
originally drafted by Rendal it would have had power over "Questions of Current 
Finance, especially the proper supervision of department expenditure and the monthly 
centralisation of all departments' financial affairs" and also "Matters of Account, such 
as costs, Plant and Materials, Work in Progress, Personal Accounts, etc." The final 
version approved by the board in January 1912, however, omitted supervision of 
departmental accounts and weakened the supervision of costs to "costs of important 
orders" and other matters of account to their effect on the balance sheets. The effects 
of these changes were to drop proposals which would have allowed central financial 
monitoring at a level of detail that would have allowed management target setting (eg 
on costs) or investment planning at the departmental level. What remained was a 
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more vague expenditure control, oversight of capital required and return on 
investment at the level of the subsidiary as a whole: financial rather than management 
accounting. Proposals for departmental profit and loss accounts appear to have 
foundered in 1913 - significantly the year of Rendal's last illness and death.(96) A 
system of six-monthly capital budgets was introduced in February 1912 but control 
does not appear to have been particularly tight: the Whitworth works at Openshaw, 
Manchester, was revealed to have committed £204,000 of capital expenditure in 
November 1913 without having formal authorisation from the board. They claimed 
"verbal authorisation" presumably from the Chairman, Sir Andrew Noble.(97) No 
reports on costs of any kind were received by the Finance Committee before World 
War One and a new remit for the Committee in June 1915 dropped any mention of 
them. 
The local board proposed by Rendal in March 1910 was finally announced by 
Sir Andrew Noble at the AGM held in April 1912 with its function described as "to 
deal with departmental questions".(98) No minutes of the local Board survive. 
There are references to the "Works Board" in the Finance Committee minutes in 
1913.(99) No references have been found thereafter indicating either the demise of 
the local board or its complete marginalisation. 
Less is known about the structure of John Brown and Co but it would appear 
to have been considerably more balkanised than Vickers, owning a shipyard outright, 
a majority share in another steel firm and jointly owning the Coventry Ordnance 
Company with Cammell, Laird. Macrosty treats John Brown and Cammel, Laird as a 
"community of interests"(100) indicating a set of loose arrangements. Nevertheless, 
John Brown did have an established two-tier board structure in 1913, with a local 
Board of four.(101) 
We have some insight into the costing techniques used in parts of Vickers and 
Armstrong Whitworth from a survey carried out for comparative purposes in 1902 as 
part of a study of the State Ordnance factories by the War Office.(102) This showed 
fairly wide variations in practice between the Vickers Erith and Sheffield plants and 
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both were less well developed than the Armstrong Whitworth works studied at 
Manchester. In one respect, however, all the works visited were consistent: a 
separation was made between the works management, largely the responsibility of the 
foremen, and "Works Accounts" who gathered cost data. Works Accounts controlled 
the time records kept and the ledgers into which issued stores were entered by 
storemen against an order number. (The implications of this separation will be 
considered further in Chapter 3.) 
At Manchester, variable overhead charges for machinery were on a constant 
"depreciation per hour" basis; at Sheffield they were either calculated as a notional 
percentage of wages or by depreciation as at Manchester; at Erith they were not 
separated out at all. At Manchester the cost accounts showed the cost of any order or 
part of an order and while this was supposedly the case at Erith, if two identical orders 
came in close together costing became difficult because it was impossible to keep the 
two orders separate. (And, of course, the Erith costs would not show variable 
machine costs.) At Sheffield it was only possible to extract the costs of any order by 
going back to the primary data. Armstrong Whitworth's Manchester works stood out 
(by the end of World War One indeed it would be described as a "bright light" of 
scientific management(103)) but at the same time the finances of the Company's 
works at Elswick were being privately reported to Lord Rendal as being in a badly 
disorganised state by the firm's accountant.(104) Rendal's board resolution of March 
1910 specifically called for "the best attainable accountant" to be appointed 
there.(105) Elswick, then, appeared to be going through a crisis. 
We can only conclude that within the same firm fairly wide variations in 
practice and standards could be found at different sites within it. This is consistent 
with our earlier remarks about wide delegation to and lack of central control over 
subsidiaries. It also seems to confirm that management information did not flow 
back to the centre in any strong way; Vickers would have wished just as detailed cost 
information from Erith as from Sheffield as would Armstrong Whitworth from 
Manchester and Elswick if that had been the case. All this appears to flow from the 
view of these large firms of themselves as alliances of subsidiaries with co-ordination 
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and occasional coercion rather than management carried out by the board. Rendal's 
proposals would have tightened up and more closely managed the holding company 
structure. They would not, however, have even begun to create a coherent 
management hierarchy for the company. 
6) 	 Structure and Technique in Large Amalgamated Manufacturing 
Companies: 
Part B: Textile and Textile Finishing (J and P Coats. Calico Printers  
Association Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers, Bleachers Association 
A wave of 18 amalgamtions took place in this sector in the years from 1896 to 
1900.(106) The effectiveness and organisational form of the resulting large company 
showed variations according to the number of constituent firms. The most profitable 
and tightly-organised was J and P Coats. The company was floated on the Stock 
Exchange in 1890 and by 1896 had acquired its 3 chief rivals in the production of 
sewing thread.(107) The board of the amalgamated firm always had a strong 
majority of Coats family members before World War One.(108) The company was 
strongly expansionary and by 1913 had factories in 14 countries and some 40 
associated and subsidiary companies.(109) It was also remarkably closely controlled 
from the centre. Thread production methods and standards were kept to home quality 
in every factory. The company had "centralised policy-making for selling and the 
detailed surveillance and control of its execution" well before the flotation of 1890. 
First developed by 0. E. Philippi as Coats' foreign sales manager for markets outside 
the UK and USA, they were applied to the Central Thread Agency which was set up 
in 1889 to sell jointly the thread of Coats and its chief rivals in the same markets. 
(The Agency acted as a kind of half-way house to the merger.) The selling policies 
and controls were then applied to all markets after the amalgamation of 1896. 
As the company grew so did the power of 0. E. Philippi until in the years after 
the amalgamation, in "all except manufacturing operations he became the main focus 
of decision-making, and increasingly decisions about manufacturing came to respond 
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to his suggestions and demands. Other directors, with the exception of the chairman 
... were very specialised in their individual departments ..."(110) 	 Philippi was 
"essentially a Chief Executive Officer".(111) He was clearly one of those rare figures 
in pre-1914 UK business, an individual without a large ownership stake to whom a 
board of directors ceded plenary powers. Perhaps the nearest equivalent would be 
Edward Holden of the Midland Bank. 
As far as one is able to judge in the absence of a detailed business history(112) 
the company structure was essentially a personal one. There appears to have been a 
"flat" departmental structure with a) the home factories run by family or vendor 
directors/managers, b) foreign factories run by managers reporting to Philippi who, c) 
also held the reins of all the sales organisations which reported to him personally. It 
is nevertheless necessary to stress that Philippi remained one board member among 
many. The board was not ornamental and there were directors' committees for 
General Purpposes, Works, Finance(113) and Development(114) Philippi could 
remain as influential as he was only so long as he retained the support of his board. 
The control methods used at Coats again must wait until a full business history 
is published to be considered in detail. We are told that Philippi developed "detailed 
market analysis ... on the basis of regular, frequent and very detailed reports" from 
sales organisations both big and small. On the basis of these reports "detailed 
decisions were made, very largely by himself' on appropriate sales products, prices 
and stock levels down to the lowest level of the organisation.(115) On the other hand 
there were no cost accounting systems or systems of business planning that might pre-
figure budgetary control.(116) 
We may conclude therefore that J and P Coats may be considered best as an 
extremely well run personally managed firm before World War One. It relied on a 
working board and key individuals within it to manage the organisation directly, and 
the control systems it evolved were designed to serve that structure. It was highly 
vulnerable to the loss of those key individuals but meanwhile remained significantly 
more prosperous than its UK competitors. 
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Generally speaking, the structure adopted by the other textile amalgamations 
had to reconcile the apparently unquestioned principle that the management of the 
constituent firms remained in the hands of the ex-owners with the need for centrally 
organised consistency of practice and co-ordination. 	 Since many of the 
amalgamations were a response to intense competition and the period also saw quite 
severe fluctuations in raw material prices, central control over buying and selling was 
essential. The allocation of production to individual factories, the concentration of 
production, the closing of inefficient plant and the gathering of cost data in a form 
which allowed such decisions to be made all clearly required a significant degree of 
central authority. 
Central co-ordination was more difficult to achieve the larger the number of 
firms amalgamating and the larger the size of the board of directors. The Fine Cotton 
Spinners and Doublers (FCSD) was an amalgamation of 29 firms, the Bleachers 
Association 53 and the Calico Printers Association (CPA) 59. Generally, each firm 
would be represented on the board of directors although vendors could be bought-out 
completely or some firms could have multiple representatives. The FCSD had a 
board of 26 directors, the Bleachers Association 49 and the CPA fully 84. 
From the beginning the FCSD adopted the expedient of delegating many 
matters to an "executive board" of seven meeting weekly co-ordinating the work of an 
unknown number of managing directors who were based centrally and whose job was 
to work directly with the vendor managers. But the vendor managers were also the 
directors of the amalgamation so they were being supervised by men they nominally 
controlled. It was Macrosty's opinion that the power in the organisation lay, on 
balance with the executive. But it was "always a delicate situation and depends for 
its possibility entirely on the personal qualities of the men concerned."(117) Even in 
the most successful amalgamation, then, the structure was as much the result of a 
shareholders democracy as of commercial imperatives. 
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The FCSD was also centrally co-ordinated through a central office composed 
of a statistical department "which enables a close comparison ... of the concerns doing 
the same class of work." There were also central departments for buying, selling, 
machinery and for "the ordinary secretarial and accounts work."(118) The central 
office, which was presumably under the day to day control of the managing directors 
also controlled selling prices. 
The Bleachers Association initially had looser arrangements: 	 the board 
delegated operational matters to two general managers while attempting to co-ordinate 
matters with "mass meetings of forty-nine directors" as Macrosty puts it.(119) 
Things clearly got out of hand and in 1904 the board delegated powers to a smaller 
executive body and restricted the powers of the general managers. The result would 
appear to be a structure close to that of the FCSD. Nothing appears available on the 
functions and responsibilities of the Bleachers Association central office, thought 
there is circumstantial evidence that they were very similar to the FCSD.(120) 
The CPA's early arrangements were similar to those of the Bleachers 
Association but of a larger scale - 84 directors co-ordinating 3 managing directors. 
Chaos ensued and the CPA were unable to resolve the matter internally. The 
directors and shareholders appointed a committee in 1902 to investigate and make 
proposals for re-organisation.(121) 
The investigatory committee declared its aim to be to make the CPA "one 
concern consisting of a number of component parts, controlled by a central authority." 
The committee proposed - and the shareholders accepted - a three tier system. At the 
top was a board of 6 directors of whom three were outside directors. There was then 
an executive of three (the managing directors) and finally seven advisory committees 
drawn from the managements of constituent firms to deal with technical and policy 
matters ranging from production and its concentration to raw materials and marketing. 
For all their concern with central authority the committee emphasised the need for the 
consent of the governed. While they roundly asserted that any refusal by vendor 
managers to carry out the executive's orders would be a sacking offence they stressed 
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that "it is of the greatest importance ... that all instructions given by the Executive 
should be known to be the outcome of careful deliberation and of sound practical and 
up to date knowledge of the matters to which they refer. Unless this is the case such 
instructions would be carried our reluctantly ..." 
The advisory committees were the means whereby concensus could be 
achieved. However, despite their title they had more than advisory powers: "it will 
be the duty of the Executive to carry the recommendations of the Advisory 
Committees into effect" said the Committee, though disputes between the executive 
and advisory committees could be adjudicated by the board. Executive members 
were to attend board meetings though they would have no vote and they were to share 
attendances at advisory committee meetings between them. 
The effect of this structure was to multiply the functions covered in detail by 
the board by creating seven executives, understanding that word in the sense it was 
used by the FCSD or the Bleachers Association, where those latter organisations had 
one. Just as in the case of the railways and the banks, the desire by owners of equity 
to keep control of matters in detail resulted in a system of committees. 
The investigatory committee also recommended that the central office 
functions should include a statistical department, centralised buying, selling and 
finance. They emphasised the importance of a business policy which emphasised 
cost reduction and efficient concentration of production rather than attempts at 
monopoly pricing. They also recommended the best practical use of skilled chemists 
and engineers and new technologies. 
Interestingly, the investigatory committee considered the alternatives to its 
preferred solution of an extensive range of committees. The committee considered 
that it was "not reasonable to assume that two or three managing directors or a board 
of twelve or fifteen directors" could have the time or the range of expertise "to enable 
them to arrive at conclusions which could really be called their own." If the proposed 
structure were not adopted then the directors "would have to rely on the assistance of 
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permanent officials appointed by themselves and the casual help and advice given by 
others ..."(My underlining). As a result instructions would emanate from anonymous 
figures or those thought not to be "the most competent persons to advise and whose 
functions and responsibilities are not properly defined." These remarks appear to be 
applied to both the casual help and advice and permanent officials. There appears to 
be an in-built assumption that officials - ie managers - would not be "competent 
persons" or have "properly defined functions and responsibilities." 
These assumptions can be read in the light of the investigatory committee's 
analysis of the CPA's troubled early years. 
	 Vendor managers had disputed 
instructions by managing directors in part because they were not regarded as "the 
most competent judge of every question that would arise ..." but, the committee goes 
on: 
Even if they had been so regarded, it was well known that the time at 
their disposal was altogether insufficient to enable them to arrive at 
carefully considered decisions and that this compelled them to depute 
much of their work to permanent officials. This knowledge could not 
but increase the resistance both active and passive, to instructions 
emanating from head office ... 
Yet the one area of the permanent official's work that is specifically 
mentioned is given a considerable measure of praise - the statistical 
department. The work was new to the officials who carried it out, but even if 
it were not "from the first ... done in such a perfect manner as to escape 
criticism 
branch managers who formerly complained bitterly of the 
trouble, loss of time and expense caused by the imposition of 
extra clerical work and requests for detailed information which 
an imperfect system of book-keeping made it difficult to  
supply, are now satisfied that these statistics are not only 
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indispensable to the head office, but are exceedingly useful to 
the branches themselves for their own guidance. (My 
underlining) 
This tends to make appeals to the alleged incompetence of officials look a 
little thin. There is clearly some degree of status-panic involved in the rejection of a 
structure that involved instructions being given to shareholding vendor managers by 
non-shareholding headquarters officials - a status-panic shared by the members of the 
investigatory committee. The managerial option was not acceptable. 
We can conclude, therefore, that the amalgamations in textiles did produce 
improvements in costing, book-keeping and forms of statistical control and were the 
cause of some attention as to how these new large organisations were to be run. 
However, the resulting structures and techniques were, if occasionally with difficulty, 
controllable by the former owners, where necessary by a committee structure, and 
forced no shift of power to managers or specialists. 
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7) 	 Structure and Technique in Large Amalgamated Manufacturing 
Companies: 
Part C: Miscellaneous (Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, 
United Alkali, Guest Keen and Nettlefold 
Much more information is available for Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (APCM) than for the other two firms. 
APCM was formed by an amalgamation of 27 firms in 1900. Initially set up 
with a board of 40 ordinary directors and 16 managing directors, APCM managed 
without any apparent crisis to reduce the number so that by c.1906 Macrosty reports 
19 ordinary directors and 14 managing directors. The board met monthly. The 
managing directors met in committee weekly and also variously formed finance and 
general purposes, works and sales committees. The works committee met weekly 
and had an executive of two, who, by 1903, together with some other members of the 
works committee formed a sub-committee (also meeting weekly) to consider 
questions of capital expenditure on construction and reconstruction. 	 The sales 
committee was composed of those "who, before they joined us sold the cement of 
their respective firms." It is to be presumed that the managing directors had been 
owners of amalgamating firms. The committee structure as with the CPA served to 
provide a delicately balanced way of reconciling proprietorial claims with the needs of 
the organisation. As the chairman was to say: "there were many individual interests 
that had to be considered ..."(122) 
APCM established a single central office and adopted a single system of 
accounts. Macrosty says that the "latter was a lengthy and complicated undertaking 
... but without it there could not be obtained that ready access to statistics and that 
facility of comparison which are necessary to the control of a large business with 
many branches."(123) Cost data was evidently available(124) but there is no 
information on how this data was used in management decision-making. Efforts 
were made to find new markets for the combine's large output(125) but this seems 
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basically to have involved no more than the sales directors looking further afield. All 
in all, once the amalgamation had settled down the marketing and 
technical/managerial tasks were not complex.(126) We would not therefore expect 
(and nor do we find) radical innovations in organisational structure or control 
technique. 
The United Alkali company was formed by an amalgamation of 48 firms in 
1891. The company was weakened from the beginning by overcapitalisation and by 
its reliance on a technology that was becoming obsolescent. Interestingly, the way 
chosen out of its difficulties was innovative chemical products.(127) 
	
The 
management of the firm seems to have relied on a committee structure like other large 
amalgamated firms. No information is available in secondary sources on accounting 
or other control techniques. 
Guest Keen and Nettlefold was formed in 1902 from three firms whose 
combination brought integration vertically from iron ore and coal mining through 
steel production to bolt and screw manufacturing. Though a single board of directors 
was formed for the amalgamation, before World War One each constituent firm 
retained its own offices and "individual companies [were] allowed to continue 
functioning almost as autonomous units."(128) Co-ordination between units and 
consideration of detail was the job of five committees with membership "limited to 
directors".(129) The company history is silent on organisational structures outwith 
the board and management accounting techniques, if any. However, the loose 
structure appears to indicate that no innovative techniques may be expected. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have seen from our sample of pre-World War One enterprise some firms 
had simple integrated structures which could absorb similar organisations relatively 
easily to produce a larger version of the same structure. The brewery amalgamations 
were of this type. (See Appendix I) 
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Some amalgamating firms also attempted to control the expanded organisation 
using a single board of directors but the nature of the businesses meant that such a 
form of governance left the constituent parts barely integrated at all. Firms had 
merged or been acquired with no particular aim to achieve efficiency savings but 
rather to ensure raw materials or product outlets or market share or a comprehensive 
package of products for customers. As a consequence co-ordination between units 
was loose and intervention in constituent firms sporadic or non-existent. 	 The 
armaments conglomerates were generally of this type. There was an attempt to 
increase co-ordination between production centres at John Brown through the use of 
an "outside board" and a similar arrangement was proposed at Armstrong Whitworth. 
A more able - or at least more interventionist - board at Vickers may have felt able to 
co-ordinate without such innovation. Imperial Tobacco was also a barely integrated 
amalgamation although in their case the constituent firms did not want to integrate 
and there was no commercial reason why they should (see Appendix I). In the case 
of the armaments firms, however, attempts to create an intermediary layer between the 
board and the productive units demonstrates a perception of a greater need for 
integration and tenantive attempts to achieve it. We may note however that the 
innovation of the "outside board" did not even begin to construct the kind of HQ 
based generalist top management structure that Chandler describes in the US. The 
outside board kept the managers of productive units separate from discussions of 
overall strategy and vice versa. It also would appear to exclude production managers 
from information on financial performance (see Chapter Three). As there was no 
increase in scrutiny or management information, the effect was to increase co-
ordination rather than control. 
In the textile sector firms and the APCM co-ordination and consistency were 
commercially imperative. Here, despite the democratic tendencies among the vendor 
managers a number of key functions were centralised and a central office was set up 
gathering comparative statistical data based on unified accounting procedures. 
Powers were delegated to groups of general managers. But we have seen that when 
policy making and administration became complex the tendency was always to 
establish directors committees rather than build managerial hierarchies of officials 
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with discrete individual functional responsibilities. The committees, as the CPA 
investigatory committee made clear, were designed to avoid reliance on "salaried 
officials" without an equity stake in the company. At the heart of these structures 
then was a disjunction, a barrier between castes which acted as a prophylactic against 
the emergence of a unified managerial structure. 
The use of directorial committees as a substitute for a professional top 
management is seen at its most fully developed in the banks and railways -
particularly the railways. Taken together with the committee structures of the APCM 
and the textile sector firm they appear to present us with a common UK response by 
enterprises dealing with complexity. They do not look like transitional forms of 
control or steps in the direction of professional managerial hierarchies. Rather they 
look like an alternative to such a hierarchy, the favoured form of governance in a large 
complex UK firm. 
This is not "personal capitalism" but the form its UK transcendence took. 
Personal capitalism undoubtedly affected the ease - or lack of it - with which 
amalgamations were achieved, the high premium placed on the loss of the owner's 
sovereignty and the final organisational form adopted by an amalgamation. But once 
that amalgamation was established it was not a personally capitalist organisation. 
The CPA investigatory committee, for example, were particularly scornful of the 
appeal to "individualism" by some of the less clubbable vendor managers. The 
performance of units whether they were branch lines, branch banks or inefficient 
factories all ultimately had to be judged by commercial performance, whatever the 
internal politics involved. There was an impersonal commercial logic which had to 
be followed if the firm was to prosper. The structural form adopted by large complex 
British enterprise was thus a consequence, or, in Elbaum and Lazonick's terms, an 
institutional legacy of personal capitalism. 	 This structural form I have called 
proprietorial in that it is controlled collectively by holders of equity, the minimum 
holding of which was usually specified as large directors share qualifications, rather 
than by partners, owners or their heirs. 
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The problem with this was not that it necessarily caused firms to be badly run 
but rather that this particular form of governance imposed limits on the extent to 
which the firm could innovate, diversify in a controlled way or respond effectively to 
rapidly changing market conditions. At the same time because, almost by definition 
the structure was not good at producing skilled managerial human capital there was 
little or any skill transfer to other sectors and few managerial resources available when 
crisis forced structural change onto the agenda. 
The point of entry if the structures of UK enterprises were to begin to move 
towards a Chandlerian managerial hierarchy was the appointment of a single chief 
executive officer with significant delegated powers. As we have seen, this proved a 
sticking point on the railways and was a temporary phenomenon in the banks. Other 
firms appear to have had a "co-ordinate" structure of joint managing directors or direct 
management by the board. As we shall see in Chapter Three, the reluctance to 
appoint single chief executive officers was conscious and the consequence of a 
distinct proprietorial theory of the organisation of the firm. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROPRIETORIAL THEORY OF THE FIRM AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
Introduction 
The systems of ideas that lie behind common assumptions on what constitutes 
correct social action are rarely explicit. This is as true of company organisation as it is of 
any other sphere. Such assumptions are culturally formed and the systems of ideas 
behind them are implicit in conventions of behaviour and thought. Perhaps such systems 
can only become clear and explicit when they are in crisis and partially or wholly 
superseded. For example, the doctrine of laissez-faire "drew its sustenance from many 
different rivulets of thought and springs of feeling"(l) and was never blessed with a 
definitive canonical text. One of the clearest summaries of the doctrine was made by an 
author who declared it dead - J M Keynes in The End of Laissez-Faire. 
It is not surprising therefore that there was no contemporary explicit summary of 
the system of ideas behind the organisation of the late Nineteenth Century/early 
Twentieth Century UK joint stock company. But this does not imply that there was no 
such system or that any such system was not coherent, though in order to demonstrate a 
coherent whole it is necessary to gather together partial expressions of an implicit system 
of ideas. The structure of companies was very much a matter of public concern and 
private dispute. In consequence statute and case law gave particular emphasis and clarity 
to certain aspects of what was considered the "right" way to run a company. The matter 
was also discussed in the specialist press on the occasion of changes in the law etc - for 
example, the first recognition of managing directors in the 1908 Companies Act. 
Practical handbooks for accountants and others give explanations of company structure 
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from their own partial viewpoint. The picture that emerges from these different sources 
shows considerable consistency. 
2) 	 The Prorietorial Theory of UK Firm Structure 
The large firm by the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was in the 
vast majority of cases a joint stock company. The governing body of a joint stock 
company is a board of directors and it is with the ascribed role and powers of the board 
that we must start. Under the Companies Acts "management is almost always entrusted 
by the Articles [of Association] to the directors and they exercise all the powers for the 
conduct of the business possessed by the company"(2), (my underlining). The legal 
position of a director is one of trust rather than trusteeship. That is to say that their duties 
are not laid down in detail as are those for a trustee but are conditioned by the particulars 
of each situation: the specific Articles of Association, a general requirement to act with 
honesty and "some degree of both skill and diligence"(3) appropriate to the 
circumstances, and also the way in which it is agreed that tasks are to be distributed 
between directors and employees. The directors' duty of trust is to the shareholders to 
whom they must account for their stewardship "as commercial men managing a trading 
concern for the benefit of themselves and of all the other shareholders in it"(4). Thus the 
powers of directors were very great and their somewhat ambiguous responsibilities made 
criticism of their performance difficult without considerable knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of the firm. 
The early assumption was that the large powers given to the directors would be 
balanced by the democractic rights of the shareholders as a whole exercised in general 
meetings. These included, as shown in Table A of the Companies Acts, the power to fill 
vacancies caused by the compulsory one-third annual retirement of directors, the power to 
• fix the remuneration of directors and (after 1908) the power to end the appointment of a 
director to a manager's or managing director's post. This principle of democratic control 
by shareholders "was an implicit assumption of the law after 1862 and so continued as 
late as the Act of 1908"(5). In reality, however, the exercise of these powers was 
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undermined by changes in the nature both of shareholdings and shareholders. According 
to J B Jefferys from the 1880s onwards there was a tendency towards holdings of a 
decreasing individual size in any company in the hands of an increasing number of 
shareholders and "the interest of the shareholders was being concentrated on the rate of 
dividend and the market-ability of the shares. Direction and control was delegated to the 
Board of Directors..."(6). 	 The re-election of retiring directors was rarely opposed. 
There was an increasing tendency among investors towards the actuarial approach of 
portfolio building which intrinsically tended away from attempts at active influence. 
Shareholder attendance at general meetings declined. The ability of shareholders to 
oppose a large joint stock board composed of directors possessed of substantial qualifying 
shareholdings was limited without organised joint action of which no evidence has been 
found.(7) As a result of these tendencies, control by the directors of a joint stock 
company was strong and became stronger as they increasingly became self-perpetuating 
oligarchies. 
	 Despite this decreasing shareholder control and increasing directorial 
autonomy, the theoretical justification for the large powers of boards of directors 
remained their role as a group of proprietors standing for the proprietors as a whole. This 
had a number of consequences for the way in which the job of director was perceived and 
carried out. 
While directors were expected to be stakeholders they were 
not expected to be expert, full-time or close supervisors of 
the business. 
ii) the division of roles between the directors and salaried 
managers was emphasised. 
iii) the appointment of chief executive officers was hedged with 
conditions and checks and balances. 
As shareholders' representatives directors were expected to be significant financial 
stakeholders. In this respect practice was more insistant that the law. Table A required 
no share qualification in 1862 and from 1906 asked only that a director hold "at least one 
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share in the company" but it was normal practice to make appointments as a director 
conditional on substantial qualifying shareholdings. £1,000 (1993 equivalent £21,000) 
was not an uncommon sum.(8) It was current expert opinion that "one of the main 
elements of success" of a public company was "the presence upon the directorate, and the 
management, of men holding a substantial interest in the ordinary or unprotected 
stocks."(9) J B Jefferys quotes the Economist as urging shareholders to test the 
soundness of their investment by examining the share registers of their company to check 
that their directors were not selling shares.(10) 
But if directors were expected to be stakeholders they were not expected to be 
experts. 	 As we have seen, this was a complaint of nineteenth century railway 
shareholders. (See above p31) The Economist wrote in 1912: "... there is still a feeling 
that directorships call for no particular skill or knowledge and that anyone with a 
reasonable amount of application may fill a seat at a board with credit and 
responsibility."(11) The Accountant stated in 1930: "... directors of great commercial 
undertakings ... need have no qualifications save the ability to subscribe for the requisite 
number of shares as provided in the company's articles of association ..."(12) Indeed, 
there was even apparently hostility to the idea that experts be appointed to the board at all, 
as demonstrated by the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade 
in 1915: 
the opinion of businessmen is that if you have an expert or two experts 
on a board of directors they practically command the situation ... and a 
number of businessmen prefer on that account to be able to take their 
counsel without having their counsellor a co-director when he would be 
practically in a position to give orders.(13) 
The board of directors exercised its authority as a collective body at intermittent 
meetings. Directors were not expected (nor did they expect) to take any individual 
responsibility for management of parts of the business. Case law established that an 
individual director "is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his 
company".(14) The consequence was that the role of director qua director was part-time. 
Prior to 1908 the implied disapproval of directors taking "any other office or place of 
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profit" in the company was apparently taken seriously: the articles "usually renders the 
office [of Director] vacant" under these circumstances according to a contemporary 
guide.(15) The law thus permitted and even encouraged a situation where boards were 
composed of people giving the minimum of time and attention that the law required. 
This minimum was not onerous. 
Directors, then, were not expected to be full time, expert or exert close 
supervision. But if this was the case, who was to run the business? It was inevitable 
that tasks had to be delegated to full-time managers and there was nothing in law to stop 
this. The general principles we have outlined above were applicable to such. delegations. 
A director was safe from the law if he could demonstrate that the delegation of tasks was 
"reasonable ... in the circumstances, and ... not inconsistent with any express provisions of 
the Articles of Association."(16) The oversight of such delegated tasks by directors was 
expected to be carried out with reasonable care compatible with the skills of the director 
but the honesty of managers could be assumed unless there was evidence to the contrary. 
Case law held that directors were not required to check the correctness of information 
given them by managers unless there were grounds for suspicion.(17) The law was at its 
most emphatic where oversight of payments was concerned (18) but no continuous 
oversight of managers was required, supervision being carried out by the intermittent 
meetings of the board or its properly constituted committees. 
Potentially therefore there was no reason why delegations to management should 
not have been extensive. However, the praxis of the period demonstrated by the firms 
surveyed in Chapter Two and in the pronouncements of the period was generally 
considerably more restrictive. As a direct result of the board's ascribed role as 
shareholders' representative the roles of directors and managers were seen as sharply 
separated: 
The constitution of a joint stock company is democratic and is composed 
of the shareholders who elect the administrative [ie the directors] who elect 
(sic) and supervise the executive [ie the managers]. If the latter two are 
mixed up there is no protection for the former and it is most essential that 
the distinction between administrative and executive should be jealously 
guarded.(19) 
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The directors were to establish general policy and the managers were to carry it out. As 
the Economist put it in 1912 
... the common theory of a director is that he acts more or less like the head 
of a Government Department bringing a sound general knowledge of 
business to the conduct of a particular concern, taking the advice of 
permanent officials but deciding broad questions of policy for himself.(20) 
Even for the post World War One advocate of scientific management, L Urwick, 
the separation of the duties of directors and managers along these lines was of key 
importance: 
... it is of particular importance to define the activities which properly 
belong to a Board of Directors and those which form part of the duty of a 
Manager and are concerned with the executive control of the enterprise. 
One definition which has been suggested reads: "Administration is the 
function of industry concerned with the determination of the corporate 
policy, co-ordination of production, finance and distribution, the settlement 
of the compass of the organisation and the ultimate control of the 
executive." 	 Over against this are set the duties of management. 
"Management is the function of industry concerned with the carrying out 
of policy within the limits set up by administration and the employment of 
the organisation for the particular objects set before it."(21) 
Yet the theoretical separation of policy and execution had to deal with the 
practicalities of running a business. Delegation and co-ordination to an extent necessary 
to achieve commercial success could clearly be in tension with the part-time directors 
desire to keep control. As one might expect, the solutions to the problem varied between 
different firms and different sectors. Yet it should be noted that this tension and the 
organisational forms that it produced appears to have had a strongly prophylactic effect on 
the emergence of the Chandlerian managerial hierarchy. Thus it can be suggested that 
the various organisational forms are to be read as the consequence of proprietorial and 
commercial imperatives operating in tension rather than organisations potentially open 
and responsive to the opportunities available which might lead to Chandler's mass 
producing, mass transporting, mass retailing managerialism. This interpretation appears 
to be confirmed by the examples given above and those which follow. 
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One solution for the board was to appoint one or more of their number as 
managing directors with delegated powers. Managing directors had become established 
by the time of the large scale amalgamations of the late Nineteenth Century but they had 
no mention in statute until the Companies Act of 1908 allowed them in Table A. (This 
did not mean that previous managing directors had been illegal but that the articles of 
association of a company had to specifically allow their appointment.) By delegating 
power to one of their own the directors kept power within the board. In so doing, 
however, they raised immediate problems over the principle of directors collective 
responsibility. A correspondent in the Economist in 1911 was prepared to accept such a 
position under restricted circumstances: if the managing director devoted more time to 
the business or "relieves gilded absentees of the burden of their duties", had special 
knowledge or is a retired "chief of the executive" rewarded for long service. But if 
"active service is required involving new risks or expenditure, or for which the other 
members of the board are responsible to the shareholders or extra pay or commission is 
involved then 
the managing director may become a somewhat dangerous person. He 
may be a sort of mayor of the palace, in nominal subjection but actually 
holding the reins of government.(22) 
We should note that the matters left to a managing director if he is prohibited from 
"new risks and expenditure" or matters for which shareholders may hold the board 
responsible are nothing but routine and technicalities. Another Economist correspondent 
wrote 
... only in exceptional circumstances, and under restrictive conditions 
should the head of the executive be a director at all - least of all, a so-called 
managing director. The effort should be made to avoid confusion of 
function and this being done, we shall hear less of the paralysis of boards 
occasioned by the usurption of function by an officer of the executive in 
the administrative household.(23) 
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The emphasis is slightly different in each of these two points: in the first case the 
position of managing director is given to an existing director in the second case the "head 
of the executive" is given board powers. The fundamental point is, however, that in both 
cases the power to run a joint stock business is given to an individual. In the UK it is 
clear that such an action was seen as the overturning of the natural order of things, even 
an invitation to criminal acts. L R Dicksee, Professor of Accounting at the LSE, felt able 
to say in a text book for his students published in 1910: 
... cases are by no means unkown in which very large powers have been 
vested in the Managing Director, but as a rule with no great measure of 
success. So far as this country is concerned, at all events, the cases in 
which the all-powerful Managing Director comes most to the front are 
when the company has failed under such circumstances as to involve a 
somewhat protracted enquiry on the part of the Official Receiver. 
Possibly for that reason we are inclined to look askance at anything 
approaching plenary powers being granted to any one individual ...(24) 
Thus while large de jure or de facto delegations to a single managing director or 
even a single manager did take place (25) such delegations were seen by an apparently 
unchallenged majority as dangerous not least because they were a potential legal liability 
given the large powers and ultimate responsibility of the directors. (Cases were known 
where desultry directors were found liable for and consequently bunkrupted by the 
activities of their managers.(26)) As a result, where managing directors were appointed 
by reputable firms, they were not allowed to be all-powerful but were constrained by 
oversight and checks and balances. As we have seen in Chapter 2, plural co-equal 
managing directors were appointed and/or were subjected to oversight by board or 
"advisory" committees. Even in such striking cases as that of Sir Edward Holden who 
became combined Chairman and Managing Director of the Midland Bank, the tenure was 
personal only. At his death not only was the combined role broken up but no single chief 
executive officer was appointed. Even when Holden held his "presidential" postion he 
was more constrained than a US president through the system of board committees and 
was, it is said, "extremely reluctant to usurp the authority of his own board of 
directors".(27) 
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If delegations to managing directors were constrained this applied a fortiori to 
general managers who were not directors. As a result of the constraints placed on the 
managing director and the wide powers assumed by the board the scope allowed to 
salaried managers was narrow. The management writer John Lee compared UK and US 
practice in 1922. In the US, he says administrative and executive tasks are undertaken 
by the president and his general managers. However in the UK 
where there is a differentiation between administrative and executive, the 
line [between policy and execution] is often drawn rather lower down than 
in America: that is to say, the manager becomes an immediate works 
manager rather than a principal executive officer, so that a managing 
director ... undertakes more executive functions than his American 
prototype. In some cases this is certainly overdone. That is to say the 
chief direction does not content itself with judging by managerial statistics 
or by summed results and afterwards with allowing the chief executive a 
considerable range of liberty of action, but he discusses questions of 
individual remuneration and of methods of work in detail in a way which 
must rob the executive of some authority and, indeed of some dignity, and 
what is more to be regretted, of some responsibility.(28) 
Sometimes, indeed, it appears that the managing director, who like his fellow-directors 
could be part time, dispensed with a chief of the executive altogether in the way we have 
seen on the railways resulting in, for example, 
a factory with sales manager, production manager, labour manager, chief 
technical engineer, finance manager, and education officer, all working 
quite separately and happily at their own specific tasks, without any 
executive co-ordination whatever by a general manager. 	 There are, 
indeed, many factories in Great Britain attempting to work along these 
extraordinary lines, usually because the managing director is so incapable 
of delegating authority, and so busy with other preoccupations, that he 
imagines that the necessary co-ordination of the efforts of his various 
subordinates can be achieved at a weekly board meeting ...(29) 
The author L Urwick claims that by the time of writing (1929) "The businesses 
which lack a full-time managing director or general manager in charge of the executive 
side of their work, grow steadily fewer."(30) He does not indicate the extent of the 
phenomenon or the rate of its decline in any numerical ways. We may argue, however, 
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that it is not the incapacity of the individual managing director which causes the lack of 
delegation but a general theory of the firm that made delegation difficult, even dangerous. 
The discussion of UK corporate governance so far may be summarised as follows: 
the organisational principles which determined the structures of UK joint stock companies 
centralised power in a board of directors who were expected to be stakeholders but did not 
need to be expert or exert close or continuous supervision of managers. Delegations to 
managers were inevitable yet directors nervous of their liabilities and prerogatives were 
unwilling to delegate beyond the minimum. Boards would create directors committees 
rather than delegate to managers. Single chief executive officers were appointed from 
time to time but either temporarily or under constraints which made wider delegations to 
managers minimal. Though the capacity of the board to manage and co-ordinate the firm 
was limited by time spent on the task or possibly through lack of expertise, the grip of the 
board on the organisation was firm in its power to block initiatives or spending or to limit 
the power of managers to make decisions.(31) 
We have also seen that boards of directors were largely unassailable and were 
possessed of wide powers and discretion but with few specific duties. Taken together 
with their part-time nature the way was open for an etiolated and ossified role which some 
observers found general in the 1920s. Take, for example, the well known passage from 
Britain's Industrial Future, whose authors included J M Keynes: -f- 
	
I Ur J,. rcTio  
A large part of our company system has grown up quite recently out of 
conditions in which the directors, or at any rate the governing group of the 
Board, were either themselves the proprietors of the concern or the direct 
and responsible representatives of the proprietors. We have carried on 
practices which would be reasonable and proper on such assumptions into 
conditions in which frequently these assumptions are not satisfied ... a 
director once appointed, though nominally requiring re-election every few 
years, considers himself entitled to the office for life ... a director would 
consider himself greatly aggrieved if he were to be dropped merely 
because he was elderly, useless or without special qualifications for the 
work ... Since the duties are indefinite and the privileges agreeable, the 
way is open to various kinds of jobbery. The pay is often high in relation 
to the work done; though for directors who take their duties and 
responsibilities seriously, it may be too low. Some individuals hold 
dozens of directorships. A director on resigning frequently expects to be 
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succeeded by his son. A directorship is, therefore, too often considered as 
a pleasant semi-sinecure and a desirable vested interest for the loss of 
which conpensation is expected as a matter of course. Directorships are, 
in fact, the "pocket boroughs" of the present day.(32) 
There appears to have been a fairly widespread sense of decadence in the 1920s: a 
reviewer in the magazine Business Organisation and Management could remark in 1928 
that "A cynic recently declared that half the company directors neglect their duties and the 
other half haven't the remotest idea what they are ..."(33) Abuse of the director's postion 
was possible because the UK system of corporate governance made it an easy position to 
abuse. It is not a part of the argument of this thesis, however, that such abuse was the 
cause of the pervasive UK failure to build management heirarchies in its enterprises. 
Even if the system of governance worked to its highest potential, a system which 
separated policy and execution in the way it did, reserving the powers of co-ordination 
and management of the enterprise as a whole to a part-time board, no matter how expert 
or dedicated that board might be, would not build top management and would constrain 
any general management that reported to it. 
There were also effects on organisations at levels below the top tiers of 
management. As this discussion and the example of the railways and others in Chapter 
Two have shown that there was a tendency to separate technical functions into watertight 
departments. 	 We shall now see that this prevented the development of general 
management skills within the lower ranks of the enterprise. This was particularly the 
consequence of the separation of engineering and accountancy. As a consequence these 
professions were kept as repositories of relatively narrow technical skills and not 
permitted to develop their full managerial potential. 
3) 	 Divide and Rule: Keeping the Experts Under Control 
If management's task is merely the slavish execution of a policy decided 
elsewhere, the selection of managers was simply a matter only of observing "those who 
obey, to discover by some means of elimination those few who are the most efficient in 
their obedience"(34) as one Chairman was to put it. However, in the event of any 
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extensive management structures developing to integrate and co-ordinate new large-scale 
firms there were really only two groups of people who were part prepared for the role: 
engineers and accountants.(35) Both, in varying degrees, routinely managed men and 
processes and gathered numerical data as a means to that management. It is undoubtedly 
the case that in the UK both professions needed to add considerably to the scope of their 
work before they became full-blown Chandlerian managers but both possessed key 
component skills. The roles assigned to engineers and accountants within UK firms are 
important, therefore, because they demonstrate how competent the professionals were to 
take on any expanded role and how ready their employers were to let them do so. 
In the USA the engineer had the key role in the development of the new corporate 
management. David Noble has shown that modern management hierarchies emerged 
when engineers were given the power to apply engineering principles to the business 
enterprise as a whole: "Modern management was ... not simply the creation of engineers; 
it was the product of engineers functioning as managers." Because engineers were "the 
first people in industry to apply sytematically the intellectual methods of science to 
questions of business management ... the literature of the management movement between 
1880 and 1910 is found exclusively in engineering journals ..."(36) The pioneers of 
modern management on the US railroads were all trained civil engineers(37) and thus can 
claim both the creation of modern divisional corporate structures, cost accounting and the 
first use of the budget. The further development of cost accounting seems to have been 
the preserve of mechanical engineers in the US.(38) Accountants appear to have played a 
lesser role but nevertheless an important one in developing the higher financial controls 
for large firms and developing the theory of budgetary control.(39) But it was the 
engineer in the US from whom evolved the ideal type of the general manager: 
The rise of the engineer as an organiser and manager has been a natural 
evolution covering the last half century. The concern of, industry has 
advanced from isolated tools and processes to an organic conception of 
production and service as a whole, in which pure mechanics could not be 
segregated from financial, legal, marketing and personnel problems, so that 
the engineers in his planning, is dealing quite as often with money and 
men as with material and machines.(40) 
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The role of the engineer and the accountant within the UK enterprise was narrow. 
We will take the engineer first. The training of the engineer was narrow in two senses. 
It was purely technical and based in systems of apprenticeship/pupillage. In the 1880s 
external training was opposed by employers on the grounds that trade secrets would be 
revealed.(41) 	 The Civil and Mechanical Engineers were opposed to qualifying 
examination at this time, too.(42) These obstacles to a more broadly based training lifted 
only slowly. College studies slowly gained a higher profile. The mechanical engineers 
instituted their first qualifying examinations in 1913. But neither college education nor 
qualifying exams included any organisation, management or cost accounting matters.(43) 
The apprentice/pupillage training of the engineer was circumscribed by the 
engineers role in production: 
In this country the opinion has prevailed that in [technically based] 
industries the problems which present themselves fall under two separable, 
distinct and independant heads viz the "technical" and the "administrative" 
... engineers are supposed to deal especially with the former. 
Every other "financial, commercial or administrative problem" was outside the 
engineer's sphere.(44) It would appear that the engineer as such was excluded from 
many aspects of production such as labour hire and fire, job sequencing, progress control 
and quality control which were the foremen's respnsibility. Rate-fixing and cost 
accounting were carried out by specialist clerks.(45) This left the engineer with the 
drawing board and the machines. 
There was a natural career progression for the engineer into works 
management.(46) Engineers were not prepared for management by their training which 
did not include administrative matters or labour management: "the art of managing men 
... is usually regarded ... by Capital as a sort of customary by-product of technical ability", 
as one observer put it, to be learned, like engineering, on the job.(47) By the end of 
World War One it was clear that engineers were aware that professional narrowness had 
weakened their ability to manage.(48) The war had revealed a generally low level of 
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management ability: an engineer whose war-time duties had taken him to many factories 
was to say 
... the weak spot throughout these factories has been the works 
management and the business side in general. It is painful sometimes to 
see how little ability the management has shown. I think one could hardly 
have found a direction in which our education is more lacking than in that 
of getting what is, after all, only common sense into our engineers.(49) 
It is important to stress that a significant number of engineers were able to seize 
on the opportunities provided by the war to put into practice that for which private study 
and in some cases US experience had prepared them.(50) The impetus from within the 
engineers themselves for an integrated approach to production including process planning 
and control, costing, works layout and labour organisation found its expression in the 
formation of the Institution of Production Engineers in 1921 but it was small and grew 
slowly: the Institution had 140 members in 1925, 10 years later it had 1,200.(51) 
The explanation for the slow growth of an expanded role for the engineer - an 
expanded role which seems to have been unquestioned in the USA - must lie with the 
external conditions laid upon them by the employers. In particular engineers and works 
management generally were excluded from access to cost data. Costs and cost systems 
were regarded by manufacturers as trade secrets.(52) A textile accounting book advised 
its readers that "the stock and cost books hereinafter described may be kept by the 
overlookers or managers of departments, or, if secrecy is desired may be written up in the 
counting house from returns made by them. The prices and cost calculations may, if 
preferred, be entered in cipher."(53) A leader in an engineering magazine in 1893 spoke 
of the "rigid precautions adopted by manufacturing engineers to confine all knowledge of 
the costs department to the staff of clerks engaged in the work [which] renders it 
impossible for the young engineer to learn anything of the system during his 
apprenticeship."(54) A chemical engineer employed by the Ministry of Munitions wrote 
in 1918; "... until comparatively recently ... it was customary at many plants to keep the 
chemists in complete ignorance not only of the costs at these plants but also even of the 
efficiencies."(55) 
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The separation of costing information from the managers of production was quite 
deliberate. Two well-regarded books on management are explicit on the matter. J. 
Slater Lewis in The Commercial Organisation of Factories (1896) has an organisation 
chart which shows costing staff reporting to the general manager rather than the works 
manager. E.T. Elbourne in his Factory Administration and Accounts (1914) has the 
works accountant responsible primarily to the financial manager who in turn is 
responsible to the board rather than the general manager. Sir Herbert Austin, speaking to 
the Cost and Works Accountants in 1920 made it clear that the cost accountant was the 
managing director's policeman.(56) 
Before World War One engineers appear generally to have accepted their narrow 
role. Some may even have gloried in it. Commenting on his fellow engineers lack of 
commercial attitude, a local chairman of the electrical engineers said in 1917, "It is more 
charitable to ourselves to say that engineers have been absorbed and engrossed by the 
"mechanical" interest in engineering to the neglect of its "business" requirements than to 
say that we have ignored and looked askance at anything so ordinary as commercialism 
..."(57) Another could say "Thirty years ago I had a contemptuous feeling for anything 
connected with the commercial side of engineering ..." and could describe a distinct 
general tendency to despise commercial work.(58) The existence of such attitudes could 
only reinforce and prolong the retardation of the process of turning engineers into 
managers. 
If accountants were to become managers they too had to overcome the restrictions 
imposed by a narrow professional role. Accountancy as a profession grew first as a result 
of insolvency work and then through the audit of company accounts.(59) Both these 
roles were external to the day to day running of the firm and were not the consequence of 
demands from owners for their services. Both roles were the result of legislation largely 
inspired, it appears, by the principle of providing shareholders with sufficient information 
to ensure control and/or the prevention of fraud. Accountants' insolvency work waxed 
and waned with the provisions of the Bankruptcies Acts. Their audit work grew from the 
mid-nineteenth century under various provisions that brought compulsory audit to an 
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expanding number of enterprises. 
	 The culmination of the process was the 1900 
Companies Act which made the audit of all registered public companies compulsory. A 
by-product of the process appears to have been the widespread introduction of double 
entry book-keeping necessary to prepare accounts in an auditable form to firms whose 
accounting was primitive. It also appears outside accountants often prepared the 
accounts and audited them, the in-house skills of the firms remaining relatively 
unsophisticated.(60) 
This "outside" status of accountants with their focus on financial accounting 
determined the training and professional mind-set of accountants. 	 Management 
accounting, the use of accounting to aid management decision making, to appraise 
processes and monitor performance against expectations, was not considered part of an 
accountant's training.(61) As with engineers the method of training was by pupillage as 
an articled clerk though the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
(ICAEW) did have qualifying examinations from an early date. This ensured that a 
syllabus of study was covered but it largely excluded management accounting. 
By the turn of the century increasing numbers of qualified accountant's clerks 
were taking up positions as accountants and secretaries "to companies and other 
commercial concerns".(62) The scope of these appointments was limited and appears to 
have been the consequence of bringing the preparation of accounts in an auditable form 
in-house. 	 Generally, the attitude of business to accountants and accountancy was 
grudging. L.R. Dicksee, Professor of Accounting at the LSE wrote in 1915: 
.., in general, a knowledge of accounts is not considered any part of the 
necessary education of a business officer, who accordingly is often quite 
ignorant of the uses that accountants have for him. On the contrary he is 
usually obsessed with the fixed idea that accounts are a necessary evil, that 
money spent on them is a sheer waste.(63) 
But if their employers were grudging, the accountants employed by them were, 
according to Dicksee, quite content with a narrow role consistent with their training and 
the orientation of their profession: 
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In too many cases the Accounts Department of a manufacturing business is 
entirely out of touch with practical requirements. Not infrequently it 
seems to glory in its isolation. In the majority of cases those connected 
with it seem to take a pride in dissociating themselves from the practical 
side of the business, and express a lofty contempt for it and its methods. 
their ideal, and their sole ideal, is too often to build up annual accounts for 
submission to shareholders in general meeting ...(64) 
The picture presented, then, is of a specific niche for financial accountants within 
the firm created by external legislative and possibly shareholder pressure. It may be that 
the isolation of this niche was emphasised by the hostility to interference of 
manufacturing departments. 	 A text book on accounting for textile manufacturers 
introduced a section on "Mill or Factory and Warehouse Books" in the following way: 
We are now to explore a region usually regarded by the skilled book-
keeper as terra incognita and where, moreover, he would esteem himself 
wholly as a trespasser ... In many manufacturing concerns the mill books 
consist almost entirely of rough and ready records of the overlookers or 
heads of departments, who write down only what is absolutely essential for 
the purpose of their supervision and not infrequently sturdily oppose any 
increase to this branch of their duties ...(65) 
L R Dicksee describes the hostile attitude of managers to financial accountability 
on the grounds that "departmental accounts were invented for the sole purpose of 
embarassing heads of department and getting them into trouble with their chiefs. "(66) A 
common attitude among manufacturing departments to cost accountants was that they 
were spies.(67) Ultimately, however, the reason why financial accountants employed by 
manufacturing firms did not become involved in management accounting can only be that 
they were not required to do so by their employer. 
This did not mean, however, that UK firms did not apply some kind of accounting to 
manufacturing. But in contrast to US practice, UK firms kept costing - the basis or 
starting point of management accounting - organisationally separate from both the 
production and financial accounting departments. The origins of this separation appear 
to be the two main uses to which costing was put, namely estimating and a particular form 
of supervision. John Mann, an early UK costing expert and practitioner, described 
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estimating as the original purpose of costing.(68) Given the commercial sensitivity of 
prices and profit margins it is not surprising that the principals of firms would wish to 
restrict access to the information. The second use of costing was, as John Mann put it, 
"the basis of any supervision and criticism of the details of management. "(69) His 
meaning is made clear in a monograph he co-authored where a system of cost accounts 
are recommended "to finally present the broad facts which the directors should have 
before them while permitting close scrutiny of all details."(70) The point of the exercise 
was to "throw up items of excessive or over-average cost and thereafter point the way to 
inquiries as to the cause whether unavoidable or due to carelessness, inefficiency, waste 
..."(71) this use of costing, as an instrument of control of the directoral "administrative" 
over the managerial "executive" could not easily be delegated to the financial accountants 
without creating a de facto top management. 
The result was that in British manufacturing (it would appear uniquely) costing 
was put in a separate department. These departments were staffed by specialist clerks 
whose low pay(72) is indicative of the relative level of skill required. When World War 
One brought costing to a new and greater prominence, some cost accountants were 
emboldened to attempt to professionalise this niche between engineering and financial 
accounting. The result was the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants (ICWA) 
founded in 1919. The ICWA was concerned from the beginning that membership should 
indicate competence and qualifying examinations were established for those not already 
in some fairly senior cost accounting position.(73) It may be taken as an indication of the 
relatively small number of positions of that kind or the relatively low demand for their 
services that ICWA membership was small and rose slowly (526 members in 1923, 1,172 
in 1939) and always represented a very small percentage (circa three percent)of the 
"costing and estimating clerks" employed in industry.(74) 
There appears to be general agreement by informed observers before World War 
One that costing in UK manufacturing might be fairly widespread but generally had not 
developed beyond the most basic level. A.H. Church, a pioneer in the development of 
cost accounting said in 1900, "the majority of firms of any size have some sort of cost 
method which enables them to tell how much labour and what value of material have 
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been expended on any particular job. Between this elementary stage and the next there is 
a very wide gap which is bridged over by comparatively few firms ..."(75) In 1917 L.R. 
Dicksee said "In many cases what are called "Cost Accounts" are calculations, made at 
arbitrary intervals - when specially called for - estimating or guessing the cost of some 
article or service ... 	 In other cases, where something called "Cost Accounts" is 
continually compiled, I have found, upon enquiry that it is a record as to cost of labour 
only, or (still more rarely) a record of the cost of labour and materials ... the whole 
question of overhead charges ... being disregarded ..."(76) Mark Webster Jenkinson said 
in 1907 "Many books have been published on the subject - many excellent books; many 
lectures have recently been given ... many hours of study have been devoted to the matter 
by competant men: yet at the present day but few of the manufacturers who have any 
efficient costing system in operation."(77) We may note the variation in emphasis 
between these writers, but the common diagnosis is clear. The scope of most UK 
manufacturing costing was limited and unskilled. 
However for the tasks of estimating or general supervision it was not abolutely 
necessary to do much more if the tasks are carried out at a minimal level. Estimating 
need not take account of overhead charges if machinery was heavily depreciated and the 
commercial environment is heavily competitive - all that is required is the knowledge that 
at the price obtainable some contribution will be made to overheads - or even to profits -
over and above the cost of labour and material. Similarly if the ambitions of directoral 
supervision were no more than to compare department with department(78) or 
departmental performance from quarter to quarter(79) to detect anomalies in the broad 
facts laid before them, then inspection did not need to be more than cursory. 
That the inspection could be cursory is confirmed by the observation of an 
accountant who visited "scores" of firms during World War One that, leaving aside those 
firms whose cost findings were "practically useless", even when firms had "quite passable 
methods ... many directors and executives made little or no use of the individual results; 
never troubled to compare them; and, in not a few cases, the works management pooh-
poohed the costing as sheer nonsense."(80) Such a situation only really makes sense if 
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the purpose of costing as an independent check on production is understood. As a result, 
the position of the cost accountant could be less than comfortable: 
... with regard to the majority of cost accountants in this country ... you 
will find that the cost accountant is debarred on the one side from 
knowledge of the financial accounts and on the other side from a proper 
knowledge of works processes and works organisations. The result is, you 
will fmd, the works and cost accountant has put up a certain set of figures, 
and he is slammed on one side by the works and on the other by the Board 
of Directors, so that between the two the majority of cost accountants do 
not know whether they are standing on their heads or their heels.(81) 
Indeed one cost accountant suggested in 1923 that the system was deliberately 
adversarial: "The old manager's axiom was "Divide and Rule". It was a very safe game 
to play in those days to always pit one department against another. ..."(82) There was 
certainly encouragement to keep the various finance roles separate. An English disciple 
of the US "efficiency engineer" Harrington Emerson could write in 1919: 
An accountant should be kept in his place ... accounting is a definite job 
which has to do with records only, and not with methods, loans, 
operations, policies or management ... Accounting has on one side of it 
costing and on the other financing but there is a "twilight zone" between 
accounting and costing and also between accounting and fmance and 
consequently the accountant sometimes gets out of his place and meddles 
with costing and finance, sometimes to the extent of monopolising all three 
jobs. This ... is a very serious matter as the average accountant is quite 
unfit to handle costs or finance. Make your accountant stick to his 
Ledger; hire a special clerk for Costings and consult your banker on 
Finance. (83) 
There is clear evidence, then that the engineering and accounting professionals 
employed by UK manufacturers were organised in a way that kept them separate, with 
jobs that were narrow in scope and at times adversarial. It seems clear that this was the 
consequence of the "proprietorial theory of the firm" we considered in the previous 
section of this chapter. In the particular case of management accounting there is a good 
case for seeing the uses to which it was put and the manner in which it was carried out as 
the result of a desire for commercial secrecy and a particular proprietorial form of 
supervision. But we can also suggest that there is a strong resemblance between the 
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narrow scope and compartmentalised role of professionals and the water-tight 
departments of the railways that we considered in Chapter Two. The common factor is 
the proprietorial desire to reserve to the board the co-ordinating and other top 
management functions rather than delegate them to managers. 	 Such structural 
constraints not only limited the role of managers and limited the potential managerial role 
of the professionals but limited the ability of organisations to both produce innovative 
management techniques and to produce managers. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
We can see from our discussion in this chapter that the structures of the firms 
surveyed in Chapter Two were not historically contingent but were a clear consequence of 
a theoretical model of how firms should be managed. Particularly important results 
flowed from the prescribed split between the roles of managers and directors. Because 
control of the enterprise as a whole was reserved to the Board there was next to no 
development of top mangement, functional departments were rigidly separated and the 
scope of the technical professional's work was narrow. For the longer term the part-time 
role of the directors limited their scope to manage creatively and set limits to the scale of 
enterprises which could be managed under this form of organisation. As a worst case, 
the almost unassailable power of the directors combined with bad or desultry management 
on their part produced an almost irreversible decline of the firm. 
We have suggested that the various structures actually adopted by large UK 
enterprise before World War One were the product of a tension between the proprietorial 
requirement that the firm be controlled by the directors and a commercial necessity to 
delegate to managers. This explains why, for example, when the perceived commercial 
necessity of delegations diminished, power would be resumed by the board. It means 
that delegations to managers at this time were not the start of a Chandlerian progress 
towards the managerialist enterprise. In particular we have noted how the appointment of 
chief executive officers was frustrated or hedged around with checks and balances when 
they were made. The appointment of a chief executive officer with extensive delegated 
powers was the starting point for the kinds of US corporate structures outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis. UK enterprise was not yet becoming corporate. 
Furthermore, left undisturbed by further diversification or amalgamation the 
structure of firms surveyed in Chapter Two remained remarkedly unchanged for many 
years. Graham Turner in his Business in Britain published in 1969 describes numbers of 
large companies which were essentially the same post World War Two as they were pre 
World War One, notably J and P Coats, English Sewing Cotton, Calico Printers 
Association, GKN and brewing companies generally. We may conclude, therefore, that 
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the proprietorial form of governance was not a transitional, shortlived form as long as the 
complexity or scale of the management task was within the capacity of the structure to 
cope with it. But how easy would it be for companies to transcend the pervasive 
proprietorial Weltanshauung if they chose the path of diversification and expansion in the 
interwar years? At some stage the process would test the limits of the proprietorial form 
to breaking point. Some companies reached breaking point and, like Vickers, simply 
broke. But what of the others? The transcendance or otherwise of the limits of the 
proprietorial firm is the subject of part two of this thesis. 
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PART TWO 
STRUCTURE AND TECHNIQUE IN LARGE BRITISH 
ENTERPRISE IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
118 
CHAPTER FOUR 
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
The discussion in Chapter One demonstrated that it was now generally 
accepted that there had been a pervasive failure by large UK companies to build 
managerial hierarchies before World War Two. In Chapter Three it was proposed that 
a major reason was the particular role ascribed to the directors of joint stock 
companies and the consequent subordination and fragmentation of professional 
management. In Part Two an attempt will be made to establish the extent to which 
the more developed large UK enterprises were able to move towards the Chandlerian 
modern business enterprise in the interwar years. In contrast to the survey of 
enterprise structure and practice carried out in Part One for the pre-World War One 
years, Part Two is largely composed of four case studies. A survey approach is 
appropriate for Part One because the considerable reliance on secondary sources that a 
survey requires does not affect crucial areas of interpretation. Pre-World War One 
UK companies were not, nor have they been claimed to be, managerial in the 
Chandler sense. However, there have been claims that some companies achieved the 
status of Chandlerian modem business enterprise in the interwar years.(1) These 
claims have been made on the basis of the business histories of these companies but 
these histories do not deal with corporate structure and control technique in sufficient 
detail to allow a clear comparison with the Chandler model. In order to make a clear 
comparison it is necessary to deal with the primary sources. This approach in turn 
has constraints placed upon it by the limited space available and a sampling approach 
becomes inevitable. 
The case studies selected are the London Midland and Scottish Railway 
(LMS), Austin Motors, ICI and Unilever. These case studies have been selected 
because they display particularly noticeable characteristics of size, leadership, sector 
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or progressive reputation in the context of the general development in large UK 
enterprise in the interwar years. 
The London Midland and Scottish Railway was a huge company in terms both 
of capitalisation and number of employees. 	 From late 1927 it was run by 
Josiah Stamp holding the combined position of Chairman and Chief Executive. This 
overturned the longstanding objections to a single chief of a British railway. Stamp 
himself was well read in the literature of management and accountancy and had 
experience in both the private and public sectors at senior level. To all appearances, 
in opportunity, ability and power to act he was in an exceptional position to transform 
a traditional industry. 
Austin Motors was the second largest motor manufacturer in the UK in 1939. 
The motor industry is a key element of the "second industrial revolution" requiring 
advances in, and integration of mass production and marketing. Austin Motors had 
probably the most advanced budgetary control system of any large firm in the UK in 
the interwar years. In addition, after a financial crisis in the early 1920s, the firm's 
creditors imposed full time directors for production and finance on the owner, Herbert 
Austin. Thus unlike, say, Morris Motors, Austin Motors was a firm with a partly 
achieved managerial takeover. 
ICI by sector, size and repute(2) was one of the most important, if not the most 
important result of the interwar merger movement. It amalgamated a large part of the 
British chemical industry which it ruthlessly rationalised. It has been put forward as 
the first truly multi-divisional structure in the UK. Unilever is less feted as a pioneer 
of corporate structures but possessed a budgetary control system and was a pioneer in 
marketing. In its rationalisation of half of the UK soap industry it had to balance 
economies of production and selling against the goodwill of the consumer to a far 
greater extent than any of the other three case studies. 
As summarised here, the achievements of these firms are more modest than 
the US enterprises described by Chandler. Nevertheless, the UK companies selected 
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must be seen against a general background of large UK enterprises which were 
resistant to change. UK enterprises had suffered considerable disruption in World 
War One which had, nevertheless, been accompanied by useful lessons in mass 
production, costing and new organisational structures. The interwar years brought 
further political and economic changes; slumps of great severity, a world of rising 
tariff walls and increased international competition, the growth of the industries of the 
"second industrial revolution" and a government prepared to tolerate widespread anti- 
competitive practices. 	 This is the general picture that emerges from the now 
extensive literature on UK business history and the general surveys of it, particularly 
Chandler's Scale and Scope.(3) These studies find that companies did grow by 
amalgamation in the interwar years but their structures were generally loose holding 
companies. Very few attempted to control their large structures by constructing a 
denser and more integrated management structure. A rather larger minority of 
companies appear to have achieved a new mastery of large scale production. The 
literature does not, however, appear to sufficiently emphasise the lessons of the war or 
the availability of new techniques - and to a lesser extent new structures - to large UK 
enterprise in the interwar years. 
World War One broke in on the enterprises we have described in Part I with 
considerable violence. For reasons of space it is not possible here to give a detailed 
account of the changes the War brought. In broad outline the huge intervention by 
government, particularly through the Ministry of Munitions(4), brought firstly the 
imposition of costing systems on private industry and demonstrated a hitherto 
unknown sophistication in the way they were used. Secondly, as the Ministry rapidly 
grew into what was effectively an industrial conglomerate of unprecedented size, it 
evolved a divisionalised structure with line and functional management close to the 
Chandlerian pattern. Thirdly, the managerial scope allowed to accountants and 
engineers was much increased and demonstrated that the technical/administrative 
skills necessary to service complex managerial hierarchies were capable of being 
produced in short order if the demand was there.(5) Fourthly, the example of the 
Ministry was available to private industry through the 90 or so prominent 
businessmen who were brought onto the Ministry staff and the large numbers of 
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accountants and engineers who were also involved. On the face of it, then, the impact 
of the experience of the war on British enterprise should have been considerable. 
Direct influence from the Ministry on private industry is however almost 
impossible to discern once the war ended in terms of radical changes in organisational 
form or widespread improvements in control technique. At the war's end "the 
magnificent services and experience represented by various wartime departments of 
supply gave place after the Armistice to an almost indecent haste in returning to an 
isolated and aggressive individualism."(6) Under these circumstances, of course, the 
relevance of war experience could be thought to end with the war. 
The experience of the war does seem, however, to have had an influence of a 
more indirect kind. Private industry realised the potential for greater production 
flows and larger firms. Manufacturers who were prepared to learn could say at the 
war's end "We had learned the art of mass production ... The war had clearly shown 
how ... a million articles can be produced cheaper and of a higher quality than can a 
thousand similar articles by ordinary processes."(7) C G Renold of the Hans Renold 
Company later wrote that in World War One the company "learned the technique of 
mass production and 	  quality control".(8) The explosives companies admitted 
without prompting that Ministry of Munitions' rationalisation and the way it shared 
information and staff "has had a striking effect on the output, quality and costs."(9) 
McGowan of Nobels was to say that their war experience - the experience of Ministry 
control - had shown "that it is possible more scientifically to handle our factories than 
ever before."(10) 
Care is needed, however, in assessing the extent to which possible courses of 
action became reality. The Board of Trade Report on the Engineering Trades after 
the War published in 1918(11) based on a survey of larger firms made clear the 
crucial role of the State as "chief customer as well as controller of the works" in 
improved methods and in standardising, co-ordinating and concentrating 
production.(12) The report was unsure what the outcome would be when that 
controlling hand was removed but noted that there were no practical industry-based 
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initiatives to preserve these benefits. It was noted that the machines imported for war 
production would be of little peacetime use. It was also noted that widespread 
changes in production methods were unlikely because "remodelling of works under 
present conditions does not seem generally possible while the energy and capital are 
lacking to adopt the American system of scrapping old works in favour of a total 
reconstruction on the most modern lines.(13) 
The limited effect of war production on peacetime methods is confirmed by a 
survey of British manufacturing by a US writer just after the war. In a tour that 
appears to have been aimed at the larger, or more progressive, plants (eg Hans RenoId, 
Metropolitan Vickers, Lever Bros.) he finds that the US practices of progressive 
machining and "progressive assembly with the chain conveyor" were restricted to a 
minority, even of his selected firms.(14) The use of systems of executive control 
using cost and other statistical data (for example on inventory,production levels) was 
confined "principally to a few bright lights".(15) Any general interest in costing 
aroused by the war proved evanescent. Two official reports, one published in 1918, 
the other in 1929, have a remarkably similar tone and content: the best firms had 
good costing systems, the majority had bad systems or no systems.(16) We have an 
indicator of the very slow rate of change: the Institute of Cost and Works 
Accountants was founded in 1919, by 1930 it had less than 800 members, by 1939 
less than 1,200.(17) Initiatives in the immediate post war period to raise the profile 
of costing in the main financial accounting bodies faded away.(18) The simplest and 
most obvious explanation appears to be that there was little demand for costing 
services at a professional ouniddle management level. 
Nevertheless, in what appears to be a relatively small minority of firms a sense 
of technical/financial mastery appears to have been achieved in the interwar years. 
Firms such as Hans Renold or Critalls which we have already touched on and Austin 
Motors and the workshops of the LMS were able to combine flow production with 
financial and statistical control. In these cases the firms involved were able to draw 
the lessons of their war experience and apply them. 
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The relation between the size of the firm and the use of new methods had been 
emphasised by the 1918 Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy After the 
War and its contituent committees.(19) It was generally urged that manufacturers 
"should be encouraged to work together in larger units, either by amalgamation or by 
joint working, by pooling of resources and by specialising production."(20) The 
intention was therefore that amalgamations should provide the resources to build 
production units able to take advantage of mass production. Whether or not the 
process was helped by this benign official attitude, there was a spectacular 
amalgamation boom in the 1920s.(21) It is not at all clear, however, that large 
production units and investment in new technology were the intention or the result. 
The war experience of strengthened cartels built through the trade associations 
prompted by the government for ease of negotiation had probably encouraged closer 
working.(22) The Ministry of Munitions had also provided a form of experimental 
cohabitation for 
officers of ... companies seeing for themselves, as members of 
government control boards, the advantages of consolidation. One such 
director of a large steel company told me for an hour of his experience 
as head of such a board and it was quite evident that many industrial 
Bourbons had learned something and that many lone wolves had been 
taught co-operation.(23) 
A major motive for combination was undoubtedly the desire for monopoly or 
near monopoly in an increasingly protected market.(24) That the amalgamation 
movement did not result in larger units of production may be seen from figures 
provided by Hannah which show that there was no increase in the proportion of 
production from large plants between 1924 and 1935.(25) 
That there were no particularly new organisational problems thrown up by 
these amalgamations - indicating neither Chandlerian problems of increased 
production flows or radically increased integration of amalgamating firms - may be 
inferred from the lack of public discussion of this type of issue. There was a medium 
for such discussion in the shape of business journals such as System (retitled Business 
from March 1928) and Business Organisation and Management. Both magazines 
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have a great deal of material on works, departmental or office organisation for retail 
and manufacturing companies during the 1920s and 1930s but very little on the 
structure of the firm seen as a whole and nothing on the structures of the new large 
amalgamated firms. There was no use of the ready-made sources of material in the 
USA.(26) No reviews of the structure of the Ministry of Munitions appeared in the 
business magazines or in such journals as Public Administration. 
The most obvious explanation of this silence on the problems of large scale 
organisation is their lack of relevance to the contributors who were largely 
businessmen or consultants. In turn this lack of perceived relevance appears to stem 
from the structures actually adopted by large enterprise and the perceptions of those in 
power. Lyndall Urwick, one of the few Englishmen to wrestle with the problems of 
large scale enterprise and a successful consultant wrote that where large companies 
were the result of one man's enterprise "the corporate form served only to expand and 
disguise a control which was, essentially, individual. Such a rule does not lean 
towards principles of administration."(27) Where amalgamations of firms were 
involved they generally began "with an arrangement for financial unity which leaves 
the question of executive unity shrouded in the mists of convenient obscurity. 
The word convenient is not too strong. The writer once ventured to 
suggest to a partner in a leading firm of chartered accountants who 
have been responsible for many mergers, that any financial grouping 
which was unaccompanied at its inception by clear and logical 
arrangements for the organisation and administration of the new 
combine, was doomed to a period of futility and disaster. His reply 
was a full admission of the diagnosis, accompanied by the caveat that it 
is, in practice, quite impossible to discuss organisation in advance if 
most mergers are to go through at all. A vague understanding about 
the distribution of directorships on the new board is the most that can 
be undertaken. Once the directors of the merging companies start 
talking about their own and their relations' executive positions, the 
odds against the negotiations proving successful are very heavy. 
Thus at the outset there was "a refusal to contemplate the problems of 
organisation and administration which mergers present ..."(28) But as Urwick makes 
clear elsewhere, these problems of organisation and administration depend for their 
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severity on the extent to which merged firms are integrated.(29) Close integration 
was not greatly pursued in UK mergers, the same preference being shown for the 
holding company form in the interwar years as before World War One.(30) Thus the 
preservation of proprietorial prerogatives avoided creating conditions under which 
detailed consideration would have to be given to the structures proper to integrated 
large scale enterprise. 
Yet interestingly Urwick suggests that a kind of organisational time-bomb was 
ticking away and that failure to resolve the problems faced by large organisations 
would effectively lead to crisis. 	 In a loose company structure following 
amalgamation "there are obvious possibilities of economy in concentrating the 
production of certain articles in the most efficient works, in eliminating transport 
costs, and in creating comparative records of efficiency. But when such obvious 
economies have been realised there remains a network of questions, upon which 
depend in the long run the efficient conduct of the combination considered as a 
unity."(31) Such areas as buying, selling, advertising, research, the balance between 
economy of operation and commercial success all these require "the most detailed 
analysis." 	 The problems could not be solved by simply centralising planning and 
control.The large size of the new organisations made some decentralisation of 
authority necessary though this had to be achieved without loss of the central power 
required to co-ordinate the organisation. Central authority was also required to 
ensure consistency in the increasing number of technical functions and this ran 
counter to the need to decentralise. Achieving an optimum solution was therefore a 
complex problem. 
This ...is the problem which faces all enterprises of any size under 
modern conditions. They must decentralise executive responsibility; 
formal authority must be given in large measure to those responsible 
for subsidiary units of organisation. On the other hand the growth of 
scientific knowledge in the past half century and its application to 
every facet of social life has increased enormously the degree of 
specialisation necessary to the effective conduct of any enterprise. 
The proper use of such specialised knowledge is essential to efficiency. 
But this postulates the introduction of a degree of technical authority 
which runs directly counter to the tendency to decentralise executive 
responsibilty and complicates co-ordination.(32) 
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Thus the combined issues of optimal decentralisation and the correct balance 
of authority between line management and specialist functions required conscious 
clarity of thought. If the issues were not clarified and dealt with "the failures in co-
ordination" which result "will present themselves as a series of isolated difficulties to 
be dealt with empirically."(33) Results might be achieved "somehow or another, 
though with greater effort and at increased costs."(34) It is implicit in Urwick's 
interwar writings that UK enterprises would have to face these problems either 
consciously or not and overcome them whatever the cost. But Urwick's approach is 
ultimately to state the problems rather than suggest how they may be overcome. In 
his published writings he does not deal with particular cases, makes no reference to 
US material or corporate experience and does not conceptualise problems of large 
organisations in a way which helps find solutions. In particular the model of the 
divisionalised organisation with combined line and functional management which had 
emerged in the US finds no place in his work. The only mention of such a structure 
in the interwar years appears to be a single fragment by Oliver Sheldon.(35) The 
conclusion one is driven to is that the structure of firms was not felt to be a pressing 
issue as far as most enterprises were concerned. Management writings on the issue 
could see potential problems but had little influence on UK enterprise. 
If there appears to be a general failure to build large integrated managerial 
hierarchies in the interwar years it is not surprising that the technique evolved to 
control such complex structures - the technique of budgetary control - was not widely 
adopted. Budgetary control is a general term used for methods which attempt to 
direct the activity of an organisation by predicting income and planning expenditure 
and comparing actual periodic results with them. Variation between prediction and 
out-turn is used as an investigatory tool which results in modifications to either the 
budget or the actions of the organisation. 	 In one sense, of course, this can be 
subsumed under the heading of entrepreneurship: 	 the astute judgement of 
opportunity and risk. However, the point comes in the life of a growing enterprise 
when this judgement must attempt to become a science: quantified in its predictions 
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and out-turns and standardised in its accounting methods, procedures and periodicity. 
The process must become explicit in this way because it has become collective and 
subject to a managerial division of labour. 
It is important to stress that the production of a budget does not mean that a 
system of budgetary control has been introduced. A budget can be little more than a 
list of permissions to spend. For budgetary control the budget has to be used in a 
feed-back loop in which prediction and out-turn are continually examined to find 
ways of achieving greater certainty of outcome. The process not only brings about 
attempts to improve techniques of prediction but also focusses attention on 
information flows and the performance of different parts of the organisaton. 
Budgetary control therefore is both a planning technique and an instrument for 
integrating and driving organisations. 
In this discussion we shall only consider revenue budgets.(36) Revenue 
budgets deal with sales and the breakdown of these sales by product and their costs of 
production and cost of sales. The evolution of the revenue budget into a system of 
budgetary control seems to have a simple logic. In its simplest form the revenue 
budget sets spending limits as a result of predictions of future sales. A second stage 
comes when future sales are seen as a target to be met within set resources. The third 
stage comes when target-setting is matched to the structure of the firm and assigns 
responsibility for meeting targets to departments, sections and, if necessary, 
individuals. Only the second and third stages can properly be called systems of 
budgetary control since only when targets are set can the feed-back loop of prediction 
and out-turn be established. Each of these three stages gives progressively wider 
opportunities for delegations. The first stage effectively gives batches of permissions 
to spend, rather than each being given individually. The second stage, the budget as 
target, had the potential to allow managers a more pro-active role in the achievement 
of goals within given resources without supervision of the process. The introduction 
of the flexible budget(37) allowed further delegation since it showed variable expense 
limits as sales varied. 
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However, it was only at the third stage - where budget targets were 
consciously linked to the organisational structure - that the full organisational 
potential of the budget system could be realised. In these circumstances, budgets 
could be built up from information supplied by different parts of the organisation 
acting as cost or profit centres, centrally assessed and restructured then passed back to 
the cost or profit centres as targets. The responsibility for the accuracy of the 
information supplied and for meeting their targets rested with clearly identifiable 
section managers. This combination of delegation and responsibility allowed an 
extensive cascade of progressively sub-divided delegations and responsibilties down 
through the organisation as a whole. This was the practical solution to the problem of 
delegation without abnegation and imposed no theoretical upper limit on the size of 
the firm to which it was applied. 
Before such a system could be introduced certain pre-conditions had to be met: 
it was essential that the organisation had a top management capable of understanding, 
installing and using such a system. Second, the organisation had to have sufficient 
clarity of structure for it to be possible to sensibly apportion responsiblities down an 
established hierarchy. Thirdly, the information on past performance (eg costs, 
margins) had to be sufficiently accurate and detailed to allow meaningful targets to be 
established for the future. Fourth the staff and other resources necessary to gather 
data of actual performance had to be found. We may say that given what has been 
written so far it would be likely that there were but few UK enterprises which met 
these pre-conditions. But as with other questions of organisation and technique 
examples were not wanting, had UK enterprise wished to study them. 
The first text on budgetary control was published by the American 
J 0 McKinsey in 1922.(38) He appears to have been the first to make the explicit 
link between the delegation of tasks and the use of the budget to make sure the tasks 
were being carried out. McKinsey was not, however, the inventor of the budget. 
Revenue budgets (predictions of income and expenditure) were in use on some US 
railroads by 1881.(39) W H Lever had already evolved a form of trading budget 
when he was working at the Wigan branch of his father's business in the 1880s. He 
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was to use elaborated versions of this system in his own business as it grew.(40) (No 
other example of the use of budgets has been found in the UK prior to World War 
One.) By the early twenties, budgets do, however, appear to have been an established 
feature in the better managed US firms.(41) The first published article in the UK on 
the subject appears to be in August 1921 advocating a version of the flexible 
budget.(42) 
The first publicised UK budgetary control system was that of Austin Motors. 
More detail on the development of this system will be given below.(43) 
Significantly, the Austin and Lever systems predated the publication of J 0 
McKinsey's book which can be accounted a major source of later UK initiatives.(44) 
Austin's system was established in time for it to be set out in a series of articles in the 
Cost Accountant between September 1922 and February 1923.(45) The second post 
World War One budgetary control system appears to be that of the Hans Renold 
Company which was evolved between 1925 and 1928.(46) It is possible that the 
Renold system was more or less contemporaneous with that of Standard Telephone 
and Cable Ltd whose budget officer published a series of articles between December 
1931 and February 1932 based on his experience there.(47) He claimed that "several 
firms in the electrical and "newer" industries - particularly those with transatlantic 
connections - have adopted the budget plan with considerable success."(48) The 
Institute of Cost and Works Accountants (ICWA) published material in its journal the 
Cost Accountant some of it from US sources.(49) The ICWA's Cost Conferences in 
1925 and 1930 were devoted to budgetary control. There were thus practical 
examples and published texts available on a wide enough scale to enable UK 
enterprise to take advantage had it wished. 
An indicative, though by no means complete survey of contemporary budget 
practice was made through the Management Research Groups and presented to the 
Sixth International Congress for Scientific Management held in London in 1935.(50) 
Because the subjects were drawn from the Management Research Groups there was a 
real sense that they represented a self-consciously "progressive" group. On the other 
hand significant sectors and firms were omitted.(51) Twelve firms from different 
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sectors were considered.(52) All the firms surveyed claimed they were gaining 
benefits from the use of budgets. In half the firms, however, the advantages claimed 
were not really to do with the use of budgets but incidental improvements in 
management accounting or expenditure control or increased co-ordination.(53) In the 
other half of the sample the use of a budget had introduced a feedback loop allowing 
faster response and greater control. Here we may say that some form of budgetary 
control had been established. Only in two firms, which appear to be Dunlop and 
Austin Motors, were budget targets linked to individual manager's performance, 
though no mention is made of systems of delegations of responsibility. In the 
opinion of the maker of the survey, only two firms, which appear to be Rowntrees and 
Austin Motors, were going "a long way towards full exploitation of the underlying 
theories" of budgetary control.(54) For a self-selected group of progressive firms this 
is not impressive. 
We may conclude from our survey that World War One had only a limited 
effect on UK enterprise. The war undoubtedly encouraged a wave of amalgamations 
but these were not accompanied by widespread qualitative changes in production 
technique, fmancial control or corporate structure. 	 A small minority of firms 
mastered the combined financial and technical control problems of mass production. 
A small minority of firms adopted some form of budgetary control. There was 
almost no interest at all in the general questions of large scale corporate structure. 
This modest picture provides the context for our four case studies. The elements of 
corporate development we have considered in our survey - corporate structure, 
financial control and, to a lesser extent, mass production - are of varying significance 
for each of the case study firms. For some of them mass production had important 
implications, for others it did not. For some corporate structure was an important 
issue for others it appears to have been irrelevant. The various elements involved in 
the development of each firm in the interwar years are therefore accordingly given an 
appropriate greater or lesser emphasis. In all cases, however, the assumed 
comparator is the ideal type of the Chandlerian corporation with its overlaid line and 
functional structure and its system of budgetary control. In other words, the different 
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routes taken by these four large UK companies are significant insofar as they bring the 
firms more or less close to the Chandlerian corporate form. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STRUCTURE AND TECHNIQUE IN THE LONDON MIDLAND 
AND SCOTTISH RAILWAY, 1923 - 1939 
1) 	 Introduction 
After World War One a decision was made by the UK government to 
amalgamate the railway companies into four large groups which were, as far as 
possible, to be non-competing. 	 This decision represented a sea-change in 
government attitudes towards commercial competition and was encouraged by the 
experience of co-ordinated action during the war.(1) Of the four groups created in 
1923 under the Railways Act of 1921, the London Midland and Scottish Railway 
Company (LMS) was the largest. In fact, it was "much the largest non-Government 
business in the United Kingdom" and bigger than any US corporation "with the 
possible exception of one commercial concern." And, according to one railway 
historian, the LMS at its inception was also "loosely knit, inefficient in many respects 
and not far from being a tottering tower 	 "(2) Added to the internal problems of 
the LMS the railways generally faced increasing competition from road transport, 
ending the railway's previous effective monopoly of inland transport. 
Competition from road transport was severe. The total volume of goods 
transported by all methods grew in the interwar years. One estimate shows that in 
order to keep pace with this increase in volume the tonnage carried by rail would have 
to have increased by 27% from 1924 to 1935. In fact, tonnage fell by 25%, indicating 
that by 1935 approximately 50% of the tonnage that could be carried by rail had 
moved to the roads.(3) The immediate and obvious reasons for the switch were the 
greater flexibility of road transport and lower rates. Nevertheless, there was scope for 
the railways to mitigate the effects of road competition. Considerably more than 
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marginal improvements were possible in such areas as transhipment and integrated 
road and rail services. Rates were somewhat more problematical since they were 
governed by legislation and regulation. They were published which allowed road 
hauliers, who were not similarly regulated, to compete by setting rates marginally 
below those of the railways. Legislation also enshrined principles which skewed 
railway rates illogically to favour road transport for large consignments and full loads 
and favour rail for small quantities of packaged goods. Compared, however, with the 
rigid regulation of US railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)(4), 
UK railways did have some leeway for changing charges and for making special 
negotiated rates with large customers specifically to meet road competition. 
Legislation was also changed to meet some of the railway's grievances. While 
legislation capped the railways' total gross profits this did not make improvements in 
profitability a zero sum game: in the interwar years the railways never achieved more 
than 80% of the allowed amount. Overall, then, it was possible to 'answer road 
competition and increase profitability by cutting costs, by quasi-political pressure on 
the rates structure and improved services and marketing. But such an approach 
required a considerable knowledge of costs and a strategic approach which could 
identify those areas of activity which promised the best returns. 
Cost awareness and a strategic commercial approach were not traditionally 
associated with the railways but the new and unfamiliar competitive environment 
made adaptations essential and increased the potential for radical organisational 
change. It put a premium on a new type of business leadership able to operate in the 
political as well as the strategic and marketing sphere. The LMS appeared to have 
found this new type of leadership with the recruitment of Josiah Stamp, first as chief 
executive then in the dual role of chairman and chief executive. Stamp was at that 
time in the UK perhaps uniquely qualified for a radical pioneering top management 
role. Josiah Stamp spent the first 20 years of his working life at the Inland Revenue 
rising rapidly up the career ladder from boy clerk to senior management. He also 
took an external Economics degree at the LSE between 1908 and 1911, following this 
with a DSc which was to be published as British Incomes and Property in 1916. 
During World War One he was the architect of the Excess Profits Duty - the first time 
141 
companies, as opposed to individuals, had been subjected to a form of income tax. 
His activities in connection with the Duty brought him to the attention of industrialists 
which led, in 1919, to his recruitment as Company Secretary to Nobel Industries Ltd, 
an amalgamation of explosives companies.(5) 
By the time of this appointment Stamp had acquired skills in taxation, 
company finance, statistics, and financial and cost accounting - the latter skill 
developed through work on the Excess Profits Duty which relied on assessments of 
costs. Stamp's grasp of finance quickly profited Nobels and he was appointed a 
director with considerable responsibilty for financial matters. 
	 In this role he 
demonstrated further financial skills producing the first set of consolidated accounts 
for the amalgamation - described as pioneering work.(6) With an accountant as co-
author, he published Business Statistics and Financial Statements in 1924 
demonstrating his grasp of systems of financial oversight of business. Stamp's work 
at Nobels also brought him privileged knowledge of US management methods and 
structures through that company's cartel arrangements with Du Pont and its 
investments in General Motors.(7) 	 Stamp's published articles show that he 
understood the practical problems involved in amalgamations and rationalisation and 
could offer broad strategic solutions.(8) 	 He understood, for example, the key 
importance of costing, of inventory and production control through budgets, the use of 
"varying demand against price" data for marketing and the use of scientific research. 
And he also understood the need for management structures capable of using this 
information effectively.(9) It does not seem too much to say that when Stamp arrived 
at the LMS he had the potential to be a philosopher king not only in his new company 
but for any UK movement for modern management methods. 
Yet, once he became "virtual dictator"(10) of the LMS from October 1927, 
Stamp does not seem to have pursued a particularly radical course. 	 Both 
organisationally and technically his innovations were generally modest. 	 The 
inception of one area of radical innovation, the application of mass production 
methods to rolling stock manufacture and repair, predated his arrival. His one major 
contribution was the application of costing to that manufacture and repair. Because 
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of the structure adopted by the LMS, Stamp was the sole source for radical change 
across the company as a whole as opposed to groups of departments, yet he showed a 
lack of focus and urgency once the early years were passed 
	 In 1927 Stamp declared 
that his first tasks were to "devise a form of organisation 	 "(11) and to "realise some 
of the economies of amalgamation in an earnest endeavour to justify some of the 
glibly given and blithely estimated promises of politicians."(12) Once the 
organisation was in place and sufficient economies were achieved, it appears that he 
set himself and the company no, further goals. 
This cannot be unconnected with Stamp's wide outside interests which, if 
anything, appear to have widened with his LMS appointment. Following a fallow 
period from 1924 - 29, Stamp published 12 books on a range of financial, taxation and 
social topics between 1929 and 1939 plus at least 14 further substantial lectures and 
articles.(13) In 1929 he was a director of the Bank of England, President of the 
Abbey Road Building Society, a member of the German Reparations Committee, Vice 
President, Joint Honorary Secretary and Editor for the Royal Statistical Society, 
General Treasurer of the British Association, member of the council of "half a dozen 
societies", Governor of three colleges and two schools(14) and in 1930 he was made a 
member of the government Economic Advisory Council.(15) However much the 
conservative traditions of the railways may have conspired to blunt the radical 
potential of Stamp's appointment, it seems clear that Stamp did not apply his 
undoubted skills and energy to the LMS in the single-minded way that, say, Alfred P 
Sloan or Pierre Du Pont applied themselves to their businesses. 
2) 	 Organisation 
The changes in structure on UK railways following amalgamation were the 
subject of intense interest in the technical books and journals in the inter-war years. 
This interest, seen from 60 or so years later, seems out of proportion to the actual 
changes made and must be accounted for by the shock of even minor change in a very 
traditional industry. Changes to the LMS organisation came in three broad stages. 
The first stage between 1923 and 1926 was a period of what have been called "sterile 
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struggles" between the factions representing the former companies making up the 
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amalgamated body with limited changes in structure.(16) The second stage, from 
1927 to 1931 saw a new organisational structure introduced by Stamp reach its settled 
overall form. The third stage from 1931 to 1939 produced some minor departmental 
rearrangements. 
In the first period the LMS constructed a much enlarged version of the pre-
amalgamation departmental structure. There were a series of chief departmental 
officers who, under the leadership of the General Manager, reported to 18 committees 
of the board.(17) By the 1920s the power of general managers appears to have grown 
over the engineering sections compared to the pre-war position, but the separate 
access of chief functional officers to board committees still remained a significant 
dilution of that power. (See the discussion in Chapter 2.) In any case the sheer scale 
of the new organisation and the pressures brought on by power struggles after the 
amalgamation made the exercise of that power rather difficult. An organisation chart 
of the LMS in this first phase, has been constructed from various sources and is shown 
at Figure 5(18) 
When Josiah Stamp arrived on 1 January 1926 a general manager remained in 
post and Stamp appears to have spent some months examining the questions of 
organisation and financial control. He is said to have visited America and to have 
brought back the idea of a structure using Vice Presidents from a study of the US 
railroads.(20) This may or may not be the case: suggestions for an anglicised Vice 
Presidential structure appeared in an organisation chart published in the Railway  
Gazette in 1921.(21) Stamp's proposals were, in fact, closer to these suggestions than 
to any US line and functional divisionalised structure. These proposals took as a 
starting point the almost impossible task set for any single chief executive of an 
organisation like the LMS. As Stamp put it: "No one man could possibly undertake 
the work. The solution was found in the appointment of four Vice Presidents, each 
responsible for a section in which he is an expert."(22) The structure simply involved 
the splitting of the general managers job among the Vice Presidents: "Each Vice 
President will take the place of the General Manager in relation to a group of 
departments, representing them on the [Executive] Committee."(23) 	 The sitting 
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general manager retired and the new structure commenced on 1 January 1927. 
(Faced with a similar problem of overload on the general manager the London and 
North Eastern Railway (LNER) created a divisional structure with three divisional 
general managers reporting to a chief general manager. See Figure 6.)(24) 
The areas of responsiblity covered by the four LMS Vice Presidents were 
accounting and service departments, works and ancillary undertakings and two Vice 
Presidents covering traffic operating and commercial undertakings.(25) Another 
source describes these two latter officers as covering Operation and Goods, 
respectively.(26) That being so, examination of Figure 7 will show that the Vice 
Presidents' groupings did not involve any internal rearrangements of departments. 
The directors' departmental committees also continued as before. The new structure 
has been reconstructed at Figure 7. 
In 1931 the number of Vice Presidents was reduced to three and the engineer 
E J H Lemon was placed in charge of both Traffic (also responsible for passenger 
work) and Goods departments. Some moves had already been made to decentralise 
commercial activities to bring them closer to customers.(27) Under Lemon this was 
taken further; the posts of Chief Goods Manager and Chief General Superintendent 
were abolished, passenger and goods commercial activities were run from 20 centres 
by Area Commercial Officers reporting to a Chief Commercial Manager while a 
centralised control structure for traffic operating and station working was set up under 
a Chief Operating Manager.(28) Treated by the Railway Gazette as something of a 
radical innovation this separation of commercial activity from traffic operating had 
been introduced on the North Eastern Railway by Sir George Gibb in 1902. In fact, 
the control of passenger services by the Superintendent of the Line - the officer 
responsible for traffic operations - had been considered anomalous by the Chairman of 
the Railway Shareholders' Association before World War One.(29) Nevertheless the 
separation of the marketing function gave the opportunity to professionalise it and add 
certain staff functions which would contribute towards business planning. However, 
while business development was pursued, no initiatives in such areas as business 
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forecasting seem to have been undertaken (see below). The new structure of 1931 is 
shown at Figure 8. 
These structures show that the LMS remained a departmental structure, the 
effect of the changes being only that the departments were grouped under the 
supervision of Vice Presidents. The Vice Presidents are not completely top managers 
in the sense that Chandler uses the term: managers without day to day functional and 
line responsibilities. On one hand, they are without such responsibilities in relation, 
say, to the oversight of the relatively autonomous engineering functions under the 
Vice President for Works and Ancillary Undertakings. On the other hand, however, 
the Vice President for Traffic Operating and Commercial is the only officer who can 
routinely resolve problems arising between the operating and selling sections under 
him. But every Vice President had some line management responsibilities thrust on 
them because disputes between officers in different Vice Presidents' jurisdictions 
could only be resolved at Vice Presidential level. Examples are problems arising 
between cost accountants and engineers or the traditionally stormy relationships 
between mechanical engineers and locomotive superintendents. The only full-time 
manager without line responsibilities was the President. In Chandler's terms the LMS 
had established "truncated top management". 
This situation was inevitable in a departmental structure. 	 The various 
departments lay alongside each other and co-ordination between one departmental 
hierarchy and another could only finally be enforced at the top. 	 Only in a 
decentralised divisional structure where functional management overlaid a line 
management structure was it possible to delegate line and functional co-ordination to 
lower tiers of the organisation as we have seen from the example of US railroads.(30) 
It is worth noting that the LNER divisional structure shown at Figure 6 puts traffic 
and some other functions in divisions but it is a simple decentralisation without a 
management structure for the decentralised functions overlaying the line structure for 
traffic. It would thus have taken some kind of combination of LMS and LNER 
structure for UK railways in the inter-war years to have begun to approach 
151 
divisionalised US railroad structures. There is no evidence that Josiah Stamp ever 
contemplated such a depth of management. 
We can also see from the charts that the board did not simply connect with the 
management structure through the single figure of the President but had pervasive 
contact through committees of the board. Certain officers, the Company Secretary, 
the Legal Advisor and the Chief Executive for New Works and Parliamentary 
Business were not grouped under a Vice President. Prior to 1927 their responsibility 
was soldy to the board but this independence was over-ridden to some extent by their 
inclusion in the Executive and the subordination to the President that this implied. 
However, these officers still had independent access to the board through committees 
and the Secretary to the board ex officio. The directors' committees also cut across 
the authority of the Vice Presidents in a number of ways. Functional officers who 
were in a tier below and responsible to Vice Presidents reported directly to "their" 
board committee. Thus a strong element of dual control existed despite the use of a 
formula that officers reported to board committees "with [the Vice President's] 
approval".(31) The directors' committees also covered separate areas within one Vice 
President's area of responsibility. For example the Vice President for Works and 
Ancillary Undertakings was responsible for locomotives, carriages and wagons, civil 
engineering and shipping. Each of these activities was covered by a separate board 
committee. There was a degree of committee concentration - the Locomotive and 
Electrical Committee combined with the Carriage and Wagon Committee in 1931 -
but the shipping and civil engineering committees still continued their separate 
existence.(32) On the other hand, one board committee covered parts of two separate 
vice Presidents' jurisdiction: the Land and Rating Committee which was attended by 
the Land and Estate Agent (reporting to Vice President for Traffic) and the Rating 
Agent (reporting to the Vice President for Finance). We may finally note that the 
hotels business of the LMS was only connected to the organisation through a board 
committee. It was as if the board completely disregarded the Vice Presidential 
system though it was not possible for the Vice Presidents to ignore the board 
committees. 
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Furthermore, whether deliberately or not, there was a certain imprecision 
about the role of the President with respect to the board. The President and Vice 
Presidents of US railroads were executive directors. The LMS Vice Presidents were 
functional general managers with a status equivalent to that of the previous single 
general manager. As such, they could not also expect to be board members according 
to the traditions of the UK railways. The President's position however was new. 
Was it to be part of the "collective general manager" as it might be put, or was the 
position to be the equivalent of a UK managing director or a fully empowered leader 
of the business on the US model? 
In practice, the answer was never clearly given. Once Stamp had passed what 
was essentially a period of probation(33) the LMS proceeded to take steps to lift the 
prohibition on directors holding any "office or position of trust or profit" in the 
company's articles of association. This required an Act of Parliament which was 
presented as a Bill in November 1926 and received Royal Assent in June 1927.(34) 
But the sole use made of this new power was to appoint Stamp both a director and 
Chairman from November 1, 1927.(35) As Chairman and chief executive combined 
Stamp's powers were wide but the issue of the powers of an executive director vis a 
vis the rest of the board were sidestepped: railway chairmen had always been 
powerful figures and the power that Stamp exerted could fall under that traditional 
authority. There was no discussion in the board minutes of the constitutional position 
of the President either at the time of Stamp's appointment or in 1941 after Stamp's 
death in an air raid when the roles of President and Chairman were separated. By this 
time the uncertainties of the war followed by a nationalising Labour Government 
rather reduced the longer term importance of the issue. 
It is not possible to describe in detail how the Executive Commitee worked in 
practice. The minutes of these meetings have not survived apart from odd copies. A 
general picture can, however, be derived from Stamp's biography and the 
recollections of former LMS officers.(36) Once the Vice Presidents had been 
reduced to three in 1931 the personnel did not change and a routine became 
established. Stamp appears to have relied heavily on the Vice Presidents to manage 
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the areas for which they were responsible and appears to have seen his role as one of 
co-ordinating chairman. He was seen as a remote figure by his staff and was not seen 
as a source of radical initiatives once the Executive Committeee had reached its final 
form in 1931: "It would 	 be impossible to separate and isolate his contribution 
from that of his colleagues."(37) Stamp it would appear declined to make full use of 
the power his position gave him. 
In summary then, we can say that the LMS made few changes to traditional 
UK railway structures. There may have been some shift of power from directors to 
managers but suggestions that the directors were merely a token presence for the 
benefit of the shareholders were mistaken.(38) The directors remained, as they had 
always been, embedded in the company power structure through the system of board 
committees. There were some technical changes to the management structure but no 
development of top management beyond Stamp's appointment and no development of 
a line and functional structure. The separation of the marketing function did not lead 
to a marketing-led business planning or budgetary control system as we shall see. All 
these factors were related. The directoral committees pre-empted the formation of a 
more dense top management without which complex management tools which would 
integrate the company as a whole could not be properly developed. As a result 
innovations tended to be departmental and their lessons applied slowly if at all to 
other areas of the business. This can be seen in the case of the innovations in the 
mass production techniques used in the production and repair of rolling stock. 
3) 	 Rationalisation and Mass Production(39) 
After amalgamation in 1923 the LMS possessed a great duplication of rolling 
stock production and repair shops. These were matched by a great variety of items 
produced - for example there were 393 different types of locomotive.(40) The 
response to this situation was radically innovative, applying methods learned during 
the war and developed prior to amalgamation by the Midland Railway to the greater 
volumes required by the new amalgamation. 
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World War One brought mass production techniques to the attention of UK 
railway mechanical engineers. Considered as engineering manufacturers alone, the 
UK railways were among the largest.(41) Inevitably they were directed into war 
production.(42) In the process all the major companies appear to have had some 
experience of high precision, high volume repetition work on shell production. 
Generally, however, the railways appear to have been used as jobbing shops providing 
a wide range of products: an official record in 1920 "gives no more than a list of the 
separate items of 	 work undertaken 	
 yet the said list of items extended to no 
fewer than 121 quarto pages 	 "(43) Thus the companies were exposed to mass 
production techniques and could learn from them if they wished but it was a 
relatively small part of their war contribution and was not applied to production for 
railway use. A writer in the Railway Engineer in 1920 summed up the situation as 
follows; 
One of the lessons learned from the war is that very great possibilities 
exist of accurately working to standard dimensions and given limits for 
component parts. There is undoubtedly a future for development in 
	  interchangeable and repetition production 	  with the standard 
locomotive looming 
But he concluded that this required considerable work and the current 
situation remained unsatisfactory.(44) Nevertheless, some railways had learned the 
lessons of the war and had started on the path towards mass production. 
The first steps on UK railways towards mass production for peace time use 
appear to have been taken by the South Eastern and Chatham Railway who had 
achieved full interchangeability of parts and assembly using jigs in wagon building 
some time in 1919.(45) They were followed rapidly by the Midland Railway (later a 
constituent part of the LMS).(46) The carriage and wagon works were reorganised 
between May 1918 and December 1919.(47) In August 1919, the Chief Carriage and 
Wagon Superintendent, R W Reid, was sent to the US by his directors to study 
railroad methods "of construction, repair and administration".(48) He introduced a 
system where automatic machinery, repetition work, interchangeable parts and jigs 
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were combined with assembly of whole wagons by specialist gangs. The assembly 
was not yet progressive. As a consequence of the new methods with no increase in 
manning levels, it would appear(49), between December 1919 and January 1921 they 
were able to increase production from 50 per week to 159 per week.(50) Thereafter, 
production fell away as a result of the collapse of the post World War One boom, 
thought the methods pioneered for wagons were being applied to a new standard type 
of carriage by April 1922.(51) 
When the LMS amalgamation took place, Reid was appointed Carriage and 
Wagon Superintendent for the new business. The need to rationalise the large 
number of carriage and wagon production facilities, the increasing internal demand 
because of poor state of wagons in Scotland and external demand because of 
increasing coal-field activity were conducive to a further move into mass 
production.(52) At the ex-London and North Western Railway carriage and wagon 
shops at Wolverton the next logical steps were taken, probably in 1923-4.(53) Here 
the assembly of carriages and wagons was made progressive. That is to say that the 
layouts for both sub-assembly and final assembly were designed to follow the 
sequence of operations with the minimum of handling. There was an assembly "line" 
in that the first assembly operation was the placing of underframe on bogies and 
thereafter the vehicles were rolled along on their wheels from operation to operation. 
In order for this system to work the control of the process had to be more 
intense. Previously, if there was a shortage of any component, it was possible to 
stockpile part assembled vehicles up to the point at which the component was needed. 
Under the new system of progressive construction it is, however, 
impossible to do this, and with very few exceptions a shortage of any 
one part holds up the whole of the line. In order, therefore, to make 
absolutely certain that the manufactured parts are always ready and on 
hand, and further, that there is a sufficiency of raw material and parts 
in all stages of completion following up some form of stocktaking is 
necessary, and this stocktaking must be kept up to date from day to 
day, and even hour to hour.(54) 
156 
The consequence was that control of all the processes of manufacture: 
individual components, sub-assemblies and final assembly, was centralised in a 
Progress Office which had both a planning and supervisory function. With the 
introduction of flow production under the control of a central office, the decisive step 
into mass production was taken. In December 1924, E J H Lemon, who had been 
the Derby carriage and wagon works manager was moved to become Divisional 
Carriage and Wagon Superintendent at Newton Heath and Earlestown where the 
progressive system was introduced during 1925-6 to wagon building and carriage 
repairing.(55) Here a further control over the process was added by the use of timed 
intervals for sets of operations. Thus the progressive system had now removed shop 
floor control from both job process and job speed.(56) The use of the progressive 
system also put a premium on standardised production on each assembly line and 
Reid established a policy of concentrating production of each type at specific sites: 
"at Earlestown the Company would produce mineral wagons; at Derby general 
merchandise wagons ... he was of the opinion that by specialising in this manner the 
Company could afford to put down a specialist layout with a view to obtaining a 
greater output at a reduced cost."(57) 
The effect of these innovations seems to have been rapidly felt. The savings 
from concentration of production and closing works for carriage and wagon building 
were given as £40,000 per annum in October 1926, when the process was far from 
complete.(58) Neither concentration nor works closure would have been possible 
without the increased production that the progressive system achieved from a reduced 
number of shops. The lesson cannot have been lost on Josiah Stamp. When the 
appointments of Vice Presidents was made in late 1926 Reid was made Vice 
President for Works and Ancilliary Undertakings and thus responsible for all the 
Company's mechanical engineering. The methods pioneered by Reid and Lemon 
were now applied to the LMS locomotive works.(59) 
The progressive system of engine repairs was introduced at Crewe in 1927 and at 
Derby in 1928.(60) The key features of the carriage and wagon innovations were 
preserved and added to. A central office recorded and controlled the movement of all 
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locomotives scheduled for or under repair. 	 Regular inspection of working 
locomotives was made at set intervals and the condition of component parts noted. 
This allowed accurate scheduling of repairs and the stocking of adequate numbers of 
new or reconditioned parts, particularly the expensive and time consuming boilers. 
On stripping the engine parts were examined by specialist inspectors against centrally 
determined standards to assess retention, renewal or repairs. Repair work was given 
a standard time on a component by component bases which was used to schedule the 
repairs process, set stock levels and cost the repairs carried out. (See next section.) 
The re-assembly of locomotives was carried out on a master schedule with timed 
stages which set the scheduled times for the arrival of repaired or renewed 
components. The engines were passed through a series of workstations where gangs 
carried out specific tasks.(61) 
As was the case with the carriage and wagon shops, flow production in the 
final assembly led back to flow production of components. This was applied first to 
locomotive boilers as part of the 1927 reorganisation at Crewe and by 1931 at 
Derby.(62) By January 1935 as a direct result of the speed-up of locomotive repairs, 
axle-box repair had also been reorganised on a line system.(63) By 1932 the 
accumulated lessons learned had been applied to a new layout at the Derby Carriage 
and Wagon Works.(64) 
The application of the methods described in the preceding paragraphs was not 
only radical in the context of UK railways but placed the LMS at the cutting edge 
internationally in the application of mass production techniques. At a meeting of the 
Institute of Transport in 1930, Josiah Stamp remarked that he had discussed mass 
production at the LMS works with a visiting party of US manufacurers "who had 
been carrying out these processes in America on a wide scale 	 ". their verdict was, 
he said, that "the best principles which America could suggest had been carried as far 
or further in those [LMS] works than anywhere else they had seen in Europe." 
Another speaker quoted Henry Dennison, a pioneer of scientific management in the 
US(65), as saying that "he had travelled throughout America and Europe in 
connection with an investigation into the question of workshop organisation and 
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management and he put the LMS carriage shops at Derby at the head of the list of 
well organised works."(66) 
A general trawl of the Railway Engineer and the Railway Gazette in the inter-
war years give no indication that private rolling stock manufacturers or the other 
amalgamated companies had achieved anything like the advances of the LMS. 
The savings brought about by the "progressive system" were substantial. We 
have seen those for carriage and wagon shops earlier. For the locomotives, it had 
been normal practice to have some 10% of a company's stock under repair at any one 
time. After the progressive system was introduced the figure fell to 3-4%.(67) The 
time locomotioves spent in the workshops fell steadily. Different sources give 
different figures but by 1932 it was some fifth - even an eighth - of the time 
previously taken.(68) An early estimate of the savings arising from the progressive 
system at Crewe alone was £50,000 per annum and this was largely made up of 
interest on the capital which would otherwise have to be spent on locomotives 
required while others were under repair.(69) No account was taken of savings due to 
closures resulting in staff dismissals or interest on capital for works no longer 
required as a result of the new system. The savings on locomotive department staff 
before 1931 (when slump conditions begin to distort the picture) and savings on now 
un-necessary works at Crewe alone indicate savings of £484,000 per annum, some 
11% of locomotive renewal costs in 1930.(70) The rationalisation process may be 
said to be complete by about 1932 and as a result further savings of some 15% over 
1930 costs would be made by 1935/6 on both locomotives and carriages and 
wagons.(71) The progressive system was therefore a triumph both of efficiency and 
economy and an internationally recognised example of scientific management. 
In 1931 with the rationalisation programme almost completed E J H Lemon 
was appointed Vice President not for Works but for Railway Traffic Operating and 
Commercial. The appointment of an engineer to run the Traffic departments was a 
considerable innovation.(72) 	 We may assume that the intention was that the 
innovations with which Lemon had been closely involved on the mechanical 
159 
engineering side of the company would now be applied to the operating side of the 
company. And indeed under Lemon there was a systematic engineering approach to 
running sheds (where coaling, removal of ash and light repairs took place) to 
signalling and the layout of goods yards. His approach to organisation was also 
clear, demonstrated by the separation between operating and commercial activities. 
However, the tools which would have made rationalisation of traffic operations 
possible - costing of operations, costing of alternatives leading to a strategy of cost 
reduction - were denied him. Accounting (including cost accounting) was separated 
from both Works and Operations under a Vice President for Finance who was hostile 
to the concept of costing operations in the Traffic departments. The consequence 
was that the solutions that were applied to operations problems remained engineering 
rather than managerial solutions because there was insufficient financial information. 
That is to say, the principles applied were those of rationality, order and ergonomics 
rather than financial efficiency. 
All the evidence appears to show that this approach was insufficient to ensure 
efficient operation. The global indicator of efficiency in the traffic department was 
man-power levels, the great majority of the LMS's near quarter of a million staff 
being employed in these departments. The reductions in manpower numbers in the 
slump were sharp, large numbers of them from the workshops.(73) As conditions 
eased in the middle 1930s, manpower numbers increased until, in 1937, they were 
almost back at 1930 levels.(74) Since the reduction in workshop costs was absolute 
between 1930 and 1938 (see footnote 71) this appears to indicate that operational staff 
numbers grew as jobs were lost in the workshops. No explanation is offered in the 
Economist LMS supplement in 1938, though the rise in numbers is noted.(75) 
Significantly the ratio of expenditure to receipts barely changed from 1924 to 
1937.(76) For all the saving that any one scheme might show in a board report and 
for all the savings in the workshops, the overall indicator of efficiency showed that, 
just as with Paish's study of the pre-World War One railways, as traffic increased so 
did costs. We will examine the issues of costing and financial planning more closely 
in the next section. 
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Costing And Budgetary Control 
Before World War One, costing systems on UK railways were applied only to 
the manufacturing workshops. Here the systems allowed the costs of jobs to be 
picked out from the books but the system was essentially supervisory rather than a 
systematic guide to management decision making.(77) It has not been possible to 
establish precisely what effect the War had on railway costing practice. We can 
assume, however, that as large manufacturers involved in war production they would 
have dealt with "cost plus" contracts, Excess Profit Duty and possible also Ministry of 
Munitions cost returns. But as we have seen in the case of mass production, it seems 
safest to assume that costing of a more sophisticated type was brought to the railway 
companies' attention but not forced on them particularly as far as normal railway 
activity was concerned. 
The coverage of costing in railway journals between the end of the war and 
the amalgamations was limited but does give us some indications of what was 
considered best practice. The Railway Engineer, for example, gave an account of the 
Midland Railway costing system set up in connection with its new methods of 
manufacturing carriages and wagons at Derby.(78) This system used tight inventory 
control to give accurate material and scrap costs, labour costs were taken from piece-
work tickets and these prime costs were compiled on master job cards to give costs 
for each component by order number. However, no indication is given of how (or 
whether) these individual component costs were built up into costs for sub-assembly 
and final assembly. Furthermore, works overheads were charged to components as a 
simple percentage of labour costs. This made it almost impossible to quantify the 
costs and benefits of various layouts, processes and machines. The Midland system 
therefore left an unexplored gap between the prime costs of components and global 
figures for the Carriage and Wagon Department that the accountant might gather. 
Costing in this way did not allow the assessment of the efficiency of systems. 
The consequences of this may be seen after amalgamation in discussions in 
the LMS Carriage and Wagon Committee of the financial consequences of the new 
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mass production techniques. In June 1926 a discussion of how performance could be 
measured looked at numbers of staff employed and average output per head. But 
different kinds of items were being produced and it was not possible to differentiate 
the labour input into each item. Furthermore, it was not possible to differentiate 
between work on repairs and new stock or to separate out any effects of variations in 
material prices.(79) Similarly, in a discussion in March 1928, the only measure of 
improved performance put forward by R W Reid is a large reduction of carriage and 
wagon staff as compared with 1913 without reference to output levels or capital 
investment.(80) 
Josiah Stamp was to introduce far more accurate measures of efficiency. In 
1926 with no obvious organisational role because the General Manager was still in 
post, Stamp appears to have busied himself with questions of financial control in the 
largest areas of capital expense. This led to the establishment of an unprecidentedly 
complex system of cost records for locomotives which recorded the mileage, coal 
consumption, minor and major repairs for each of the more than 10,000 locomotives 
used by the LMS. This system was imposed despite "abundant" arguments against it, 
among them that it "could at best only be used for managerial criticism as distinct 
from shop working" and "the detailed clerkage would interfere with workshop 
production and organisation". W V Wood, who was responsible for the 
implementation of the system, comments that these objections were not really to the 
new system but to "past costing methods which had been developed largely for 
accounting reasons".(81) 	 That is to say that in previous systems imposed on 
manufacturing departments the purpose had been recording and auditing costs rather 
than helping the manufacturing managers made decisions. (We may also add that the 
accounting systems set up by the Midland engineers at Derby did not have the 
sophistication to do this either.) 
The new system, introduced in January 1927 was, as Stamp put it "a novel 
dissection of locomotive outlay to enable the various types of locomotives to be 
brought to the common focus of cost compared with value or performance. 	 The 
main object of the data was 
	  to provide a financial guide to design problems."(82) 
162 
(At amalgamation the LMS ran over 300 different types of locomotives and guidance 
was clearly needed on which to keep, which to scrap and which features to retain in 
future designs.) Stamp reported that the outlay on the system had been recovered by 
1931 as a simple consequence of the attention focussed on "the costs of repairing 
particular locomotive parts."(83) As a result of the data built up by 1931 they were 
able to set the optimum repair life of components and by using limit gauges were able 
to standardise "scrap or repair" decisions when engines were stripped down.(84) At 
an early stage, therefore, engineering decisions were modified by information on cost 
in use. Any opposition from the engineers rapidly fell away and requests were made 
for greater details for specific items.(85) Information was provided quickly to 
managers through the use of Hollerith and other accounting machines. The system 
was extended to bring "an identical method of unit costing of manufactures 	 to all 
departments" and "works costs committees" were set up to consider cost results and 
manufacturing methods.(86) It seems clear that the new costing system was regarded 
by directors, managers and outside observers alike as an unqualified success. 
Yet the costing system was accompanied by an administrative division of 
labour which presented no obstacles in manufacturing but which had significant 
implications for wider applications of management accounting. Specifically, all 
accounting, including cost accounting, was placed under the Chief Accountant and he, 
in turn came under the Vice President for Finance. In the manufacturing units any 
problems with the separation of powers was readily overcome with the cost 
accountants providing a responsive service to the engineers. 	 But the wider 
application of costing within the LMS relied on the will and the expertise in the sole 
hands of the Vice President for Finance. If Stamp did not insist, as he had in the case 
of locomotive costing, the matter rested with W V Wood, first Controller of Costs and 
Statistics, later Vice President for Finance. 
Wood was hostile to attempts to cost the traffic functions of railways. It was 
his opinion that the exercise was futile because even in such broadly defined 
categories as passenger and freight working, while "certain expenditure can be 
allocated with reasonable accuracy 
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by far the greater part of railway expenditure is incurred without 
reference to any one class of traffic and the amount attributable to each 
class is not ascertainable. Many elaborate formulae have been devised 
to make such divisions but apart from a few basic figures, they consist 
of a series of arbitrary assumptions which produce figures of no 
definite value."(87) 
He goes on to say that even "if it were possible to obtain actual figures for the 
current expenditure in connection with the movement of particular traffics, there still 
remains to be found the factor of service of capital expenditure in respect of such 
traffics before the cost is ascertained."(88) That is to say that either the interest on 
the cost of the capital equipment being used or alternatively the depreciation must be 
brought into the cost calculation "and the difficulties are increased, if an impossibility 
can be rendered more impossible."(89) But even if all this could be done "the 
question will still remain whether any practical use can be made of the figures 
obtained 
Costs are, of course, compiled by every railway company, particularly 
as regards units of maintenance and manufacture of materials and 
rolling stock, but these services are not transportation operations and 
the ordinary commercial methods are applicable to them.(90) 
This is a fairly comprehensive denunciation. There are two key arguments. 
The first is that any system of allocation of the high fixed costs is arbitrary and 
therefore useless. The second is that interest on capital employed or depreciation has 
to be included in costs and that this is difficult. The first argument is answered by not 
allocating fixed costs and by treating the surplus of revenue over variable cost as a 
contribution towards fixed costs, the maximisation of this contribution being the goal 
of the business. This approach, known as "marginal costing", considered as a self-
conscious school was only to emerge fully in the 1930s.(91) But the origins of this 
school lay in a long standing recognition of precisely the difficulties that W V Wood 
raised and they were, for example, treated as far back as 1887 in Factory Accounts by 
Garke and Fells.(92) As for Wood's second point, that depreciation is difficult to 
assess and apply, Stamp's costing initiatives were already providing the answer. The 
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life cycle costs of locomotives, carriages and wagons were increasingly available in 
great detail. The application of costing to traffic operations presented a challenge in 
terms of scale but in no other area - unless it was the will to attempt it. Neither Wood 
nor Stamp had that will. 
The consequence was that the major area of controllable expenditure was not 
subject to management accounting. For British railways as a whole in 1928 the 
figures were as follows: 
£m 
Use of way and works 	 23 
(ie permanent way maintenance) 
use of working stock 	 27 
(ie rolling stock maintenance) 
Operating Expenditure 
Labour 	 70 
Fuel 	 16 
Other 	 9 
General Expenditure 
(eg rates, etc) 
Capital Charges 
Source: W V Wood(93) 
Thus operating labour costs were over 70% of total operating expenditure, 
almost 50% of controllable costs and 33% of total costs. Without some system of 
management accounting, control of these costs was almost impossible. 
95 95 
15 
50 
 
210 
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It must be said that the traditions of the railways in the UK were resistant to 
cost control in the traffic departments, traditions which Stamp and Wood either 
compounded or reflected. Writing in 1928, C E R Sherrington says 
In a country where development came early it is not surprising to find 
that with the construction of strongly competitive lines greater 
attention was paid to the growth of traffic than to the reduction of 
operating expenses. Thus the revenue-producing departments have 
always possessed greater power on British railways than on those 
abroad, where the general tendancy has been to concentrate attention 
on the reduction of costs 	  in Great Britain it has too often been the 
case that the added traffic has occasioned a proportionate addition to 
operating costs.(94) 
Sherrington goes on to say that no UK railway had a position equivalent to a 
US Vice President of Transportation "who is responsible for co-ordinating the 
revenue-producing and operating expenditure sides of railway work 	 "(95) He 
comments that in 1928 the LMS approached this most closely. After 1931 E J H 
Lemon occupied precisely this position, being in charge of traffic operation and 
commercial activities. We have seen that he was not able to carry out any radical 
change to operating efficiency and we have suggested that this was because he had no 
means of measuring the costs he might wish to reduce. 
Thus a combination of tradition and personal preference (which may, in 
Wood's case at least, be a preference formed by tradition) left the operational side of 
the LMS without a financial strategy or the means to quantify the achievement of any 
strategy they might adopt. - The comments of inter-war railway managers collected by 
Bonavia show that there was commitment to improvement in service to customers, 
particularly faster delivery but that cost reductions were attempted largely by efforts 
"to screw down both the wages and the grading of the staff' rather than by "obtaining a 
reduction in the total work-load by a systematic review of departmental 
procedures."(96) 	 Innovations in the operating departments designed to radically 
reduce labour numbers were largely post World War Two developments, but there 
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was, it was admitted, no intrinsic reason apart from traditional thinking why they 
should not have been applied in the inter-war years.(97) 
We can be aware of Bonavia's remark that "One danger besetting [railway] 
historians 
	  is that of criticising a failure to employ techniques that scarcely existed 
in the 1920's and 1930's."(98) But, as we have noted earlier (page 37ff), techniques 
of traffic costing had long been developed in the USA. The point should also be made 
that the LMS was perhaps uniquely placed to pioneer such methods rather that simply 
employ methods developed elsewhere and chose not to do so. The same point can be 
made about the apparently evanescent LMS experiment with budgetary control. 
Budgetary control was practiced on some US railroads but was hardly known of in the 
UK in 1930, though Stamp, in a radio broadcast in November of that year, showed that 
he had been aware of the deveopment of budgetary control almost from its inception in 
the US: 
In the past ten years, corporations like General Motors have developed 
their budget system to a very fine pitch of accuracy. Each of the many 
units of the far-flung selling organisation reports what is anticipated in 
its area as sales 	  for each month of the year, and the aggregate 
forms the selling side of the budget. This forms the monthly target of 
every department, which makes the nicest possible adjustment to it, so 
that the year's budget lies ahead in great detail 	
 This budget is not 
merely an interesting statistical exercise, with monthly excitement and 
departmental emulation in accurate prophesy; it is a guide to policy 
and a means of departmental check and control 	 The budget system 
is being extended to business of many different types.(99) 
The chief problem for the US railroads was the prediction of "sales" - the 
market for a railway's services is much more complex than for a manufacturing 
company. For this reason their budgetary control fell short of the "very fine pitch of 
accuracy" at General Motors. The railroads were using predictions of income on a 
monthly basis to control spending on capital items, maintenance works and stocks of 
materials and these separate budgets were brought together to construct a cash-flow 
forecast for a quarter ahead, adjusted monthly. Despite the lack of even medium term 
predictability of income the lesson drawn from US practice was that "the preparation 
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of the budget is an inherant part of the management job as a whole" which stopped 
tendencies to departmentalism.(100) 	 The use of budgets had also speeded up 
accounting processes to provide both estimates and out-turns as quickly as possible. 
The LMS introduced a budget in 1931 though details are sparse and it gives a 
straightforward appearance of draconian cash limiting in response to the slump. 
Speaking at the Annual General Meeting in Feburary 1932, Stamp announced that the 
Company had cut expenditure to the extent of 89% of the fall in receipts; 
We owe a great deal of the large economies of the past year 
	 to the 
introduction of a provisional form of the budget system 	
 It sets a 
goal of assumed gross and net revenue with periodical review and the 
breaking up of this into departmental budgets, leaving the officers to 
sub-divide their allocations between districts and different subjects of 
expenditure. While often yielding at different points artificial results 
it has, at any rate, given a definite detailed goal to relatively junior 
officers which has had a different psychological effect from a more 
general exhortation to economise.(101) 
Stamp also remarked that, with the high unpredictability in the market, it was 
difficult to take the system further but when conditions became more stable the budget 
system could be "carried to its logical implications and give its most productive 
results. "(102) 
No budget document is to be found in LMS Reports to the Board. No figures 
or general principles are discussed at board meetings - or at least the minutes are silent 
on the matter. There are no changes in the way financial results are reported to the 
board: income and expenditure for the year to date continue to be compared with the 
results of the previous year rather than with a budget figure for the current year. 
There was no change to the way in which item by item approvals for expenditure were 
given in board committee papers, no reference being made to budget figures. The 
method of auditing capital expenditure remained the same: investigators from the 
Costs and Statistics section of the Chief Accountant's department would check 
expenditure and savings against the amounts authorised and estimated. Items were 
treated individually. No attempt was made to provide totals for periods of time, for 
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departments or for classes of projects (eg signal modernisation). As a result the sole 
activity of cost accountants outside the manufacturing sections remained the traditional 
one of "criticising the details of management" through "what really amounts to a 
Director's independant audit".(103) None of their reports(104) make any reference to 
budgets. 
It may be that in the Executive Committee and among senior officers much 
information that has not survived was circulated. 
	 But while Board and Board 
committee minutes can be somewhat opaque and developments are often more fully 
covered in the Railway Gazette, both sources are silent apart from Stamp's speech and 
reference to it. It seems safe to assume that the reason why the budget did not find 
expression in a wide range of financial or other plans and reports was because the 
budget was the simplest form of cash limiting by top management based on global 
assessments of income and expenditure. In the crisis conditions of the slump such 
emergency methods may have been necessary. If the budget system was to develop to 
give, as Stamp put it, "its most productive results" then further steps had to be taken 
which would have to find expression in every area and level of operation. In general 
the actual and potential market would have to be assessed, the alternative means of 
servicing that market would have to be known and costed and a marketing strategy 
with projected financial results produced. The difference between this approach and 
the 1931 cash limiting exercise is that it requires qualitatively different market 
information and a great deal of co-operation at all levels between commercial, 
operating and financial staff to plan, optimise resources and monitor results. In other 
words, the budget process becomes a way of integrating management both down and 
across the company. 
We have seen that in one key area, costing, that co-operation was not 
particularly forthcoming. It is worth noting however that the means existed to build a 
marketing strategy on the commercial side. When the split of the Traffic departments 
into Commercial and Operating departments came into effect in 1932 the brief to the 
new Chief Commercial Manager was to: actively sell LMS services; set out the 
services required for passenger and goods business; develop new traffic and quote for 
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services.(105) In 1933 a series of detailed commercial surveys were produced for the 
commercial districts covered by the LMS.(106) These were clearly designed to 
analyse current traffic and the potential for further traffic. A system of sales 
canvassers was developed and extended with 429 full-time and 200 part-time salesmen 
by 1939. Each salesman, district or station was given a target: 
The objective was the estimated total of revenue which could be 
obtained from passenger, goods or coal class traffic in the light of 
assessable charging conditions 	  and in order that constant interest 
might be encouraged the amount allotted was apportioned in quarterly, 
monthly, weekly and daily quota which were recorded on suitably 
prepared calendars 	 (107) 
The system clearly had the potential to provide senstive market information 
which could be fed back as realistic sales targets. But, oddly as the means to establish 
a budgetary control system of some sophistication were developed, the motivation 
from top management, or more particularly from Stamp, began to fade. Some sort of 
budget system was still in operation in 1933.(108) In 1935 he reported to his board in 
a tone markedly different from that of his broadcast of 1930 or his speech of 1932 on 
the experience of budget systems on US railroads. Many budget systems had broken 
down during the depression, he reported and concluded that "in general, the budget 
system has been hard put to it to afford real assistance and little stress was put on it as 
a force for progress."(109) A diametrically opposite view was taken by the Vice 
President for Way and Works, Harold Hartley, who reported that the companies who 
had developed budget systems further than others, like the Pennsylvania or the 
Baltimore and Ohio 
all said that they found monthly budgeting indispensible during the 
past three years and that although the budget had required more 
frequent adjustment there had been no difficulty in using it as the basis 
of management. It was clear that they regarded the monthly budget 
meetings as most valuable, both for the effective control of 
expenditure and for the free and informal discussion of the problems of 
each department by all of the chief officers directly and indirectly 
concerned 	 (110) 
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It seems safe to assume that Stamp and Hartley were using the US experience 
as a proxy for their own positions on the future usefulness of budgeting on the LMS. 
No further references to budgets have been found after this exchange in 1935 except 
for some to relatively minor sums for the Advertising Department. It would appear 
that Stamp's view prevailed and budgeting exercises for the LMS faded away. 
5) 	 Summary And Conclusions 
The LMS represents an uneasy mixture of Chandlerian managerialism and the 
British railway tradition. In terms of structure the LMS remained essentially a 
traditionally departmentalised railway. The innovation of the Executive Committee 
composed of a President and Vice Presidents was no more than the institution of a 
collective general manager. The split between commercial and operating functions in 
the Traffic departments was not new and was not followed through with the 
application of costing and budgetary techniques which would have maximised the 
effectiveness of the arrangement. The committees of the board continued to oversee 
functions at departmental level with direct contact with second tier departmental chiefs 
and in the case of the Hotel Department, the Hotels Committee seemed to be the sole 
contact between the department and the rest of the LMS. 
On the other hand the LMS demonstrated radical innovation in the application 
of mass production technique to rolling stock production and repair and the application 
of costing to manufacture, repair and design. Yet the radicalism of the manufacturing 
sections did not communicate itself to the rest of the organisation despite the move of 
an engineer from manufacturing to the head of the traffic side of the business. 
Budgeting was introduced then faded away. Marketing was developed sufficiently to 
allow income prediction and target-setting down to individual salesman level but no 
information on cost of services was produced with the result that no financial strategy 
could be produced for the traffic departments. The consequence was, as had long 
been the case, that the traffic functions showed no change in efficiency, expenditure 
rising and falling as a more or less fixed percentage of income. 
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In part, the explanation for the failure to accomplish what the appointment of 
Stamp, an exceptionally able and experienced man, appeared to promise lies in the 
personal preferences of Stamp and the Vice President for Finance. On the other hand, 
the sheer inertia of UK railway tradition surely played its part. One example might be 
the use of accountancy as an audit function for the directors. Another example might 
be that the function of the traffic departments was to get business rather than to ensure 
it was profitable. 	 Such attitudes were validated and preserved by a system of 
"watertight" departments whose boundaries were more or less guaranteed by the board 
committees that supervised them. This departmentalism could only be overcome by a 
greater depth of top management and budgetary control. The former would ensure the 
introduction of HQ functional staff requirements in such areas as costs and stores(111), 
the latter would integrate the management structure and give the organisation common 
purpose. Both changes however would take away the function and power of the 
directors' committees by delegating departmental supervision and the power to make 
decisions within the parameters of the budget. No shift of power was suggested let 
alone attempted on the LMS. The traditions that played a large part in bringing only a 
patchy application of new technique to the LMS were upheld by the central traditions 
of directorial power. 
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[PRO RAIL 418/24]. Closure of Newton Heath Carriage and Wagon Works: 
Locomotive, Electrical, Mechanical Civil Engineering Committee 
25 May, 1925 PRO RAIL 418/49. 
Railway maintenance costs were based on a renewals accounting system 
which meant that the costs of new rolling stock were shown as maintenance 
costs up to the point at which depreciation was covered and the value of assets 
equalled the capital shown in the accounts. Beyond that new rolling stock 
was added to capital. Otherwise capital was written down. The consequence 
is that it is difficult to clearly separate capital and maintenance costs as 
understood now. The expedient has been adopted of deriving a total cost of 
renewal, replacement and repair of locomotives and carriages and wagons per 
100 train miles, or engine miles as appropriate, giving a measure of the cost in 
use of rolling stock. Figures have been taken from PRO RAIL 421/237 and 
RAIL 421/238 which are handbooks of statistics issued by the LMS. 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Locomotive 
Maintenance costs £m 
4.56 3.92 3.59 3.63 3.43 3.69 3.86 4.06 4.04 
Costs per 100 engine 
miles 
2.00 1.81 1.71 1.63 1.65 1.66 1.68 1.73 1.77 
Index 1930 = 100 100 91 86 82 83 83 84 87 89 
Carriage and Wagon 
Maintenance Costs £m 
4.71 4.15 3.92 3.75 3.78 3.88 3.96 4.31 4.24 
Costs 	 per 	 100 	 train 
miles £ 
3.08 2.81 2.72 2.60 2.50 2.52 2.51 2.67 2.65 
Index 1930 = 100 100 91 88 84 81 82 81 87 86 
The reason for the increasing costs in 1937 and 1938 is not known. 
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72) See eg the remarks in the Railway Gazette, Vol 55, p.708, 1931. 
73) Josiah Stamp at AGM 26 February 1932 (Railway Gazette 4 March, 1932). 
74) LMS employees 1930-1937  
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
Salaried 42,300 41,892 40,6513 39,655 39,942 40,506 40,734 41,725 
Waged 191,275 189,115 181,439 176,382 182,978 186,446 185,787 190,501 
Totals 233,275 231,007 222,090 216,037 222,920 223,952 226,521 232,226 
Figures are for 31 December of year shown. 
Source: director's diaries at PRO RAIL 421/13. This information was 
discontinued after 1937. 
75) Economist LMS Supplement,2 July, 1938, p16. 
76) Proportion (%) of expenditure to receipts. 1924-1937 
1924 1929 1932 1934 1936 1937 
Proportion 	 Expenditure 
to Receipts (%) 
80 80 85 83 81 81 
Source: Economist, LMS  Supplement 2 July 1938, Table V, p15. 
77) Appendix V to Organisation and Accounts of Ordnance Factories (1902) at 
PRO WO 33/240 includes material on the LNWR workshop costing at Crewe. 
78) Railway Engineer August 1922 pp289-294. Interestingly the article only 
acknowledges the assistance of the Carriage and Wagon Superintendant, 
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R W Reid, no reference being made to any accountant. Also A E Howell 
"Modern Production and Costing Methods in Locomotive Shops" Railway 
Engineer October 1922, which discusses costing at the Armstrong Whitworth 
locomotive shops including the use of punched card systems. Also Col. 
O'Brien "The Management of a Locomotive Repair Shop" Railway Engineer 
January 1921 on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway practice which 
discusses the return on capital for new machinery. It also shows that costs 
were only available when called for ie they had to be picked out of the detail 
of the records. 
79) LMS Carriage and Wagon Committee Minutes, 23 June, 1926, PRO RAIL 
418/23. 
80) Ibid 28 March, 1928. 
81) W V Wood "Development of Costing Methods on LMSR" Modern Transport 
28 May 1932. 
82) Report No. 19, October 1931, PRO RAIL 418/104. 
83) Ibid. 
84) As footnote 80 
85) Ibid. 
86) Ibid. 	 Individual cost records for coaching stock were instituted from 1 
January, 1933. (LMS Board Minutes, 24 November, 1932, PRO RAIL 418/8) 
The standard costing system had been introduced by July 1930 into the 
carriage and wagon works when the Costs Committee had been established "a 
few months" (E J H Lemon, Railway Gazette, 11 July 1930. 
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87) W V Wood in W V Wood and Sir Josiah Stamp Railways, London 1928, 
p237. 
88) Ibid p.239. 
89) Ibid pp 239-40. 
90) Ibid p.240. 
91) See R H Coase "Business Organisation and the Accountant" in D Solomons 
(ed) Studies in Costing, London 1952, p.146. 
92) See the discussion by Solomons in (ed) Solomons as footnote 91, pp33-37. 
93) Wood and Stamp op cit, tables pp.37 and 92 reworked. 
94) C E R Sherrington op cit p.24. 
95) Ibid p.25. 
96) M R Bonavia Railway Policy Between the Wars Manchester 1981, pp.46-7. 
97) Ibid pp45-6. 
98) Ibid p141. 
99) Sir Josiah Stamp "The Management and Direction of Industry" in Criticism 
and OtherAddresses, London 1931, pp192-3. 
100) H Bruere and A Lazarus Applied Budgetting, Chicago and New York 1926, 
Chapter IV for this paragraph, Quotation from p.72. 
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101) "LMS Annual Meeting" Economist, 5 March 1932. 
102) Ibid. 
103) For "criticising the details of management" see the objections to the proposed 
costing scheme at Crewe, this Chapter p149. For "Directors independent 
audit", this is how the exercise is described at Report No. 16, PRO RAIL 
418/106 p2 para 4. 
104) Report No. 3, March 1929 PRO RAIL 418/102 
Report No,12, July 1929, PRO RAIL 418/102 
Report No.31, November 1929, PRO RAIL 418/102 
Report No. 9, February 1930, PRO RAIL 418/103 
Report No. 20, July 1930, PRO RAIL 418/103 
Report No 14, June 1930, PRO RAIL 418/104 
Report No. 19, October 1931, PRO RAIL 418/104 
Report No. 16, October 1933, PRO RAIL 418/106 
Report No. 11, May 1934, PRO RAIL 418/107 
Report No. 5, February 1935, PRO RAIL 418/108 
Report No. 23, October 1935, PRO RAIL 418/108 
Report No. 9, May 1936, PRO RAIL 418/109 
Report No. 22, November 1936, PRO RAIL 418/109 
Report No. 14, July 1937, PRO RAIL 418/110 
Report No. 8, June 1938, PRO RAIL 418/111 
Report No. 8, June 1939, PRO RAIL 418/112 
105) See introductory section of "A Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation 
PRO 
and its Achievements, 1932-1939", 1940, at RAIL 418/209. 
i)Q-0 
106) A collection of 20 reports in RAIL 421/119. 
107) As footnote 105 p15. 
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108) At the 1934 AGM Stamp announced that "The actual expenditure finally 
worked out at 99.6 per cent of the budget fixed early in the year ..." Economist 
33 March 1934. This indicates that no income targets were included and that 
again this was a cash limiting exercise. 
109) PRO RAIL 418/108 Report No. 13. 
110) PRO RAIL 418/108 Report No. 25 (October 1935). 
111) The LMS Chief Stores Superintendarit did not control stores for Bridges, 
Stations, Catering or Coal Stocks. See Minutes LMS Stores Committee 27 
January 1932 and 26 October 1932 in RAIL 418/72. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (ICI) 
Introduction 
ICI created a single organisation from a merger of four companies(1) which 
were themselves mergers of some 60 companies in all. Though other inter-war 
mergers were undoubtedly difficult, in terms of the range of products manufactured, 
the technical complexity of its research and development, the problems of integrating 
development with marketing and bringing the whole organisation under fmancial 
control, ICI was in a class of its own. The problems of building a new unitary 
organisation were made more difficult by the fact that no particular thought had been 
given to them before the merger took place. Despite having access to and knowledge 
of the new corporate structures of Du Pont and General Motors in the US, senior 
managers at ICI produced a structure which was far less effective. The company was 
tightly centrally controlled financially and commercially, with decentralised divisions 
with manufacturing and product development functions. The result was a company 
that was paradoxically both over-centralised and loosely controlled. 
	 Lines of 
financial and commercial control soon centred on Sir Harry McGowan who 
dominated ICI until after World War Two. But ICI was simply too big to be 
controlled in this way. The central control was too rigid to allow the divisions to act 
as autonomous business units but the decentralised manufacturing and product 
development functions were too disconnected to allow central product and business 
planning. The consequence was technical and commercial under-performance. The 
Second World War weakened central control and allowed the divisions to become 
autonomous businesses but this did not solve the problems of central planning. 
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ICI is now examined in three sections which consider the evolution of the 
company's structure and its consequences, costing and financial control and finally 
technical and commercial development. 
2) 	 ICI: Structure and Consequences 
The merger which produced ICI was not carried out to achieve an efficient 
business structure. W J Reader says that the merger was actually "brought about by 
force of circumstances - international chemical politics". The merger was seen as a 
defensive move by the firms concerned who were afraid of international competition 
while the state wished to secure and strengthen an industry which produced 
munitions. The merger "was not made because the participants believed in the 
superiority of a large combine from the point of view of organisation; nor had much 
preliminary thought been given as to what sort of an entity ICI was to be."(2) 
The organisation of ICI reached a stable form in 1931 after a period of 
experimentation following the 1926 merger. The evolution of this structure was 
entirely internally generated and took, as far as one can see, no account of the new 
models of organisation emerging in the USA. In particular, no use appears to have 
been made of Nobel's long-standing contacts with Du Pont and subsequent 
investment in General Motors despite such precedents as a study by a Nobel executive 
of Du Pont's structure in 1919.(3) While this visit was before Du Pont's divisional 
reorganisation in 1920-21 and cannot be taken to indicate that the divisional model 
was clearly before them, it does show that access to the innovative US models was 
freely available. Indeed, once ICI reached its stable form its executives were sent to 
study Du Pont on several occasions.(4) The ICI merger itself, however, seems to 
have made reference to no outside model or indeed any model at all. 
The new body had to resolve two broad problems in making a coherent whole 
out of an agglomeration of 60 firms. (The word "agglomeration" is just: of the four 
merging partners, only Nobel had an orderly holding-company structure.) Firstly, a 
way had to be found to rationalise ownership structures and production facilities. 
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Secondly, an appropriate structure had to be found to direct and develop the new firm 
as a whole. While in practice these two issues had to be addressed in parallel, they 
can be more clearly dealt with separately. 
The problems of rationalising production facilities and ownership structures 
were related. The interests and concerns of legally independent boards of directors of 
subsidiary companies might very well differ from those of ICI as a whole on such 
issues as the transfer of assets to other companies or the closure of works. The 
disruptive potential of the boards of subsidiaries was therefore considerable. Despite 
the important of the issue it was not until after the merger had taken place, in January 
1927, that it was considered "not 	 premature to consider how 
	 majority control 
[of subsidiaries by ICI] will be made thoroughly effective in practice."(5) It was 
proposed that ICI be made "sole Director and Manager" of the subsidiaries though 
existing directors would be re-appointed as local directors with "the same emoluments 
and other financial rights" for three years to ensure continuity and as a form of 
compensation. This suggestion was evidently adopted but at this distance it does 
seem extraordinary that such a crucial issue should be decided after and not before the 
merger took place. 
With the appointment of ICI as sole director and manager of subsidiaries 
power was effectively centralised. However, the shares of subsidiaries were often not 
completely held by ICI even when they had voting control. Thus the possibility of 
legal action by minority shareholders, in pursuit of sectional interests, remained. 
This danger seemed threatening enough for ICI to successfully lobby for the inclusion 
of a provision in the 1929 Companies Act allowing compulsory purchase of minority 
shareholdings when a majority owner held more than 90% of the shares.(6) 
Without centralised power reinforced where necessary by the power of coerce 
minority shareholdings it is difficult to see how two reorganisations which took place 
in 1929 and 1931 and subsequent liquidations of subsidiaries could have taken place 
so relatively smoothly. 	 The basis of these reorganisations was the common 
management of the production of the same or related products and this could not have 
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been achieved if it had not been relatively easy to switch the ownership of works from 
one 
191 
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company to another. Common management of different works making similar figure 
products meant that it was easier to concentrate production in the most efficient plants 
and close down excess capacity. These reorganisations (which we will consider in 
more detail below) appear to have been the culmination of a process of works transfer 
and closure in 1928 and 1929. The acquisition of minority shares proceeded as soon 
as the 1929 Finance Act became operative.(7) 
In 1929 the liquidation of subsidiary companies was being suggested and was 
being carried out by 1931.(8) This appears to have been initially for those cases 
where they somehow got in the way, later it was as settled general policy. In 1931 
Coates wrote: 	 "Arising from the group concentration and the concentration of 
manufacture 	  the necessity or desirability of retaining the identity of several 	  
subsidiary companies disappeared and steps were taken to liquidate them."(9) By 
1932, however, it was being said that the newly registered ICI (Explosives) Ltd would 
"act as a holding company until, following the gradual liquidation of the subsidiary 
companies of the Explosives Group, it becomes the main (and ultimately the sole) 
operating entity of the Explosives Group."(10) The converging logics of establishing 
control over subsidiaries and rationalisation of production led finally to a form of 
divisionalised structure. 
It is important, however, not to present too tidy a picture of ICI in the 1930s. 
It continued to acquire or set up subsidiary companies. Despite the steady liquidation 
of companies - 67 subsidiaries disappeared between 1926 and 1939 - ICI's number of 
subsidiaries rose to a peak of 125 in 1938.(11) An interesting "ownership chart" was 
published by the Economist 19 January 1935 and is given at Figure 10. It can 
usefully be compared with the organisation charts at Figure 11 and Figure 13 below, 
to show that the process of rationalisation of ownership and formal divisionalisation 
was somewhat less complete than the organisation charts appear to suggest. 
Nevertheless, the key to the Economist chart (12) shows many of the Group 
subsidiaries to be 100% owned and thus easily liquidated at will. There are still, 
however, a significant number of ICI majority shareholdings which are below the 
"coercible" 90% level. 
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Overall, however, it would appear that once established a "sole Director and 
Manager" of a subsidiary, it was possible to proceed with rationalisation and 
concentration of production relatively untroubled by the problems of tidying-up the 
formal remaining subsidiary company structure. The General Chemicals Group, for 
example, could announce in 1936 that it had reduced the number of works in the 
Group from 30 to 7 and declare that "the process of concentration was nearly 
complete."(13) Meanwhile the winding-up of two of the 100% owned companies 
was still being carried through in 1940.(14) 
But if the logic of control over subsidiaries and of concentration of production 
pointed ICI in the direction of a form of divisionalised structure the particular form 
such a structure should take was by no means pre-determined. Indeed, ICI was 
created without any apparent organisational intentions at all. It may be as W J 
Reader has suggested that the founders of ICI were concerned with international 
chemical politics. Alternatively, it may be that "it is, in practice, quite impossible to 
discuss organisation in advance if most mergers are to go through at all 	  Once the 
directors of the merging companies start talking about their own and their relations' 
executive positions, the odds against the negotiations proving successful are very 
heavy."(15) Whatever the reason, ICI started life with a board of directors, two 
managing directors (McGowan and Mond, who were also respectively President and 
Chairman) and an Executive Committee of six full time directors, three from Nobel, 
three from Brunner Mond. From that foundation everything remained to be built.(16) 
The first response was to place the Executive Committee collectively in charge 
of HQ functions. They were also individually ICI representative board members of 
the (60) subsidiary companies. The Executive were also expected to advise the 
Chairman and President on a range of technical and organisational issues through a 
growing range of ad hoc committees. It was a heavy burden. A reorganisation 
scheme in December 1927 increased this burden. It now gave specific HQ functional 
responsibilities to the Executive Directors individually and produced a more elaborate 
board committee structure. The Executive Directors or their deputies continued to 
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represent ICI on the boards of the subsidiary companies. An organisation chart is 
given at Figure 11. 
This structure was unsatisfactory in a number of respects apart from the near 
impossible expectations it laid on the Executive Directors. As a structure it was an 
uneasy half-way house between a holding company and a departmental type. There 
were over-lapping jurisdictions over subsidiaries between Executive Directors in their 
departmental or ICI Board capacities. The headquarters structure was again the 
consequence of mixed holding company and departmental tendencies with co-
ordinating committees on the one hand and functional directors on the other with the 
added effects of the personal power exerted by McGowan and Mond. These were 
demonstrated in an Executive Committee distinct from, below and responsible to the 
two managing directors and a separate and secretive Finance Committee. 
Subsequent organisational changes were not the consequences of attempts to 
achieve organisational coherence, however, but rather the desire of McGowan and 
Mond to have more of their Executive Directors' time and counsel.(17) Though, as 
we have noted, the logic of the rationalisation process was pushing forward some 
form of grouping by product - reinforced perhaps by a desire for orderly book-
keeping.(18) - the model for a new structure arose quite contingently. Nobel's had 
owned a non-ferrous metal company with subsidiaries to which further companies 
were added after the ICI merger. It was decided in 1928 to group these companies 
under a single delegate board and a single management committee which "greatly 
reduced the duplication of_work and the amount of detail which arose for the ICI 
Directors who belonged to both bodies."(19) 	 Some of the features of this 
reorganisation were then applied to ICI generally as a whole in 1929. 
The Group's reorganisation of 1929 grouped companies according to product -
General Chemicals, Dyestuffs, Explosives, etc, under largely ornamental Delegate 
Boards ("to retain local goodwill"(20) but also, presumably, to work out the three year 
local director arrangement) and an Executive Board. The latter had all the power and 
was to have officials from the various works and headquarters officials representing 
etc.  etc 
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DIRECTOR 
FUNCTIONAL 
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GROUP 
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the technical, commercial and labour directors of ICI. The Executive Directors (with 
the Chairman and President) were ex officio members of the Executive Boards but did 
not have primary responsibility for representing ICI, this now being delegated to 
nominated officials. 
	
The 1929 scheme thus represents a transitional structure 
between the departmental and divisional structure though somewhat obscured by the 
use of a governing executive board rather than individuals. This structure may be 
represented schematically as follows: 
FIGURE 12 The 1929 re-organisation of ICI. 
This structure has a strong resemblance to the transitional form used on the 
Pennsylvania Railway before the final establishment of a true divisional structure.(21) 
There is direct management of the Groups through control by functional directors of 
their functional nominees on the Group Boards. To move to a true US divisional 
model a line management structure needs to be added, giving a command structure 
from an ICI chief executive through group chief executives. The 1929 Groups 
structure is important therefore as a potential key step towards the Chandlerian 
divisional structure. It was a step that was not taken. 
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Problems remained after 1929. The precise balance of power between the 
headquarters departments and the Groups had not been defined and there were 
disagreements.(22) The Group Boards were too big, headquarters officials had "so 
many other duties to perform that they must find it difficult to attend the Executive 
Board meetings regularly 	 " which had the "disadvantage that the Group Boards 
cannot be alongside the position of the moment 	 "(23) The Groups also generated 
volumes of minutes which contained far too much detail to be useful to headquarters. 
A further reorganisation in 1931 made rearrangements at both headquarters and at 
Group level which were to fix the ICI structure more or less up to World War Two. 
The 1931 structure is shown at Figure 13. Following Mond's death in 
December 1930, McGowan was made Chairman and sole managing director. The 
headquarters structure shows graphically how strongly McGowan controlled 
headquarters' functions through his control as Chairman of the Finance and the 
General Purposes Committee and his managing directorship. This bottleneck, as 
Reader calls it(24) was fed pre-sorted information from headquarters departments and 
subsidiary groups largely through the Central Administration Committee which was 
also used to pass on the requests of McGowan to the Groups. Particularly significant, 
however, is the way that the Executive Directors are removed from functional 
responsibilities. 	 The rationale seems to have been the earlier one of freeing 
Executive Directors to provide advice and guidance to the managing director 
individually through advisory committees.(25) Effectively this made the Executive 
Directors less like executives and more like traditional directors with collective 
responsibility but no individual function. In so doing, it emphasised the power of 
McGowan as managing director and reduced the possibility of opposition from 
executive directors with a functional power-base. It emphasised a director/manager 
split of responsibilities. More generally, positions equivalent to those of functional 
Vice Presidents in US corporations had been removed. 
The 1931 re-organisation significantly altered the position of the Groups. The 
scheme published by McGowan in February 1931 declared that its purpose was to 
"delegate all possible authority and responsibility to the Group Delegate Boards 
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"(26) While there were real delegations they were not as fulsome as this might 
suggest. The Delegate Boards were to be executive boards of expert officials with 
numbers restricted "to the very few", as McGowan put it. They would not be 
attended by Executive Directors or HQ officials. There were to be none of the old 
part-time directors on the Delegate Boards and the separate decorative boards were 
abolished. Each Group was to have a Chairman based at HQ with a seat on the 
Central Administration Committee. A Managing Director was appointed for each 
Group based largely at Group offices. One of the Delegate Board members was to be 
responsible for technical matters, production and research, another for selling. These 
were expected to keep in close contact with their relevant departments at HQ. 
However, headquarters departments were no longer executive as far as the groups 
were concerned but were service departments. This was a direct consequence of the 
removal of the Executive Directors from control of HQ functions which meant these 
departments' powers became purely advisory. The Groups were expected to keep 
records and make returns to the Secretary or Treasurer in the form laid down by these 
officials. 
But the rather wide freedoms which this structure gave the Groups was 
significantly modified by other provisions. Most importantly, the Groups had very 
little commercial freedom. A Commercial Department had been set up under the 
Executive Director, J G Nicholson, in 1927 and his department remained in place after 
the 1931 reorganisation.(27) The "sales machine" controlled by this department was, 
with a few exceptions, to sell the products of the Groups. Prices were supposedly 
arrived at after joint consultation between the Group and the head of the sales 
machine, but after 1931 as before, prices were "largely controlled at 
headquarters".(28) Any pretence of consultation was dropped after 1933.(29) Raw 
material prices were not under the Groups' control but provided by the Central 
Purchasing Department at headquarters. Wage rates were largely determined by the 
Labour Department.(30) In effect, therefore, the Groups' influence over their 
commercial performance was limited to production efficiencies and in the longer 
term, new product development. 
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The commercial role of the Groups was further limited by the restriction of 
information which made the financial judgement of production efficiency more 
difficult. Sales figures were reported to the Groups and "detailed product charts 
showing the quarterly progress of trading and profit [were] prepared for the use of the 
group executives" by the Treasurer's Department.(31) Their use, however, was 
restricted: the ICI Finance Committee decreed in November 1932 that Group Boards 
should set up finance committees of three or four people only to consider "profit 
statements and finance figures" and that figures should not be pre-circulated but "the 
Group Accountant should produce the statements at the meeting and collect them 
afterwards."(32) Group Chairmen were not allowed to know the gross profits of 
other groups or of ICI as a whole.(33) The Sales Committee, which included Group 
representatives, set up in 1933 to, inter alia, set or recommend prices, did so without 
access to profit figures.(34) Furthermore, as we shall see below, the system of 
costing established by ICI centrally was designed for HQ oversight and was of limited 
use to the Groups. 
But if the Groups had no commercial autonomy their technical autonomy was 
almost complete. Where there had been no institutional separation(eg sales) or 
specific supervisory responsibilities (eg finance) HQ departments under the 1931 
reorganisation had no powers to compel observance of their requirements. The 
consequence was that the departments concerned with technical functions at HQ -
Technical, Research, Development - tended to be disregarded by Groups and rather 
withered on the vine during the 1930s.(35) As we shall see, the result of this was 
weakness in the planning of investment in and the development of new products 
particularly where more than one group was involved. Group technical autonomy 
was a considerable obstacle to the concentration and rationalisation of the 
development, production and marketing of new products which was ironic given that 
that Groups had emerged as a mechanism for rationalising existing production. 
The oddity of the 1931 reorganisation was the lack of management structure -
understood as an institutional power structure - between HQ and the Groups that the 
previous paragraph points up. While the Groups had been given a managing director 
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and functional and geographic managers, there was no line or functional management 
relationship between the Groups and HQ. The functional responsibilities of the 
Executive Directors had been withdrawn. The Chairmen of the Groups were 
members of the Central Administration Committee which was a co-ordinating body 
with limited powers designed to clarify issues and options for the Finance and the 
General Purposes Committees. In these two bodies the members appear to have 
acted as advisors to McGowan, whose decisions were the sole authority across the 
company. But it was simply not possible for one man to manage a company as large 
and as complex as ICI, though he might dominate it. Whether as a deliberate strategy 
or not, ICI after 1931, was effectively a system of checks and balances which 
guaranteed McGowan's power at the price of a failure to develop a coherent 
management structure. When a Board revolt in 1938 limited McGowan's power to 
the extent of removing his power as managing director, the result was a complex 
system of further committees to co-ordinate the Company rather than manage it.(36) 
All in all, whether in its pre or post 1938 form, ICI may be typified as a divisionalised 
holding company. This description seems to capture best the central financial control 
of otherwise semi-detached subsidiary groups. We may also find this description 
supported by the purpose and character of the financial control mechanisms that ICI 
deployed. 
3) 	 Costing And Financial Control 
We have seen how the Groups system, ostensibly a form of decentralisation, in 
reality left the Groups as manufacturing bodies with other activities and decisions 
channelled through headquarters. 	 The costing and financial control systems 
introduced by ICI reflected and re-emphasised this centralised control. We will 
consider the topic under three broad headings: costing, capital expenditure and 
budgetary control. 
Nobel's Treasury Department was transferred to ICI in September 1927 and 
included a costing section.(37) From the start the orientation of ICI's costing was 
towards the financial supervision of subsidiaries. 	 This orientation was further 
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emphasised by the need for central financial supervision in the early years of ICI. 
The tasks of rationalising production and achieving an efficient organisation required 
financial information provided independently of constituent firms upon which 
organisational decisions could be made. 	 A list, made in 1930, of special 
investigations carried out by the Costing Section shows that providing cost 
information for rationalisation decisions had been a major part of their work.(38) It 
was also inevitable that cost information from subsidiaries should be on a centrally 
determined basis to ensure comparability and an equitable basis for inter-merger 
trading prices.(39) There were compelling reasons, therefore, why costing should be 
an important headquarters function in the period leading up to the Groups 
reorganisations of 1929 and 1931. 
These considerations, however, did not require that costing should remain 
centralised nor that it should remain solely an instrument of central control once the 
Groups structure was established. Attempts were being made to standardise cost and 
other financial returns after the 1929 reorganisation and the issue of costing and its 
purposes was the subject of some discussion. Reader says that "the Brunner people 
considered costing very much more from the technical side ie as a way of controlling 
works processes; Nobel's were concerned with costing as part of the financial 
statistics."(40) This is, perhaps, too narrow an account of the differences. Alfred 
Mond, for example, appears to have seen costing as part of the process of evolving 
technical and pricing policy, while the senior managers at Nobel saw it as a tool for 
supervision and discipline of subsidiaries.(41) While Mond's influence before his 
death in 1930 was sufficient to bring about some changes in the standardised cost 
system(42) essentially the Nobel view prevailed. Managers at the old Brunner Mond 
site at Wilmington complained bitterly in 1930 but could not alter the system: 
The different views on the costing system appear to arise owing to the 
fact that the costs are being utilised for two purposes, the first purpose 
being that of financial control at Head Office, and the second being 
that of technical control at the Works. The present system has been 
devised primarily from the point of view of financial control at Head 
Office in order that a broad view of the position may be ascertained 
quickly, without the position being obscured by temporarily disturbing 
factors. In order to achieve this the temporarily disturbing factors 
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which are useful from the point of view of technical control at the 
Works have been reduced to a standard level each period.(43) 
The usefulness of the system to technical or works managers was further 
reduced when the frequency of reports was reduced from monthly to quarterly in 
October 1930. This was done to further iron out temporary fluctuations. The 
scheme was designed to provide reports at group and senior HQ level but to an extent 
fell between two stools: one manager commented "they are not sufficiently detailed 
to assist anyone who is really controlling a product while on the other hand they do 
not present a simple enough picture for those who are merely reviewing it."(44) 
More to the point the system did not actually provide an effective instrument for 
supervision and discipline of the groups. This is shown by a number of examples. 
Firstly, it was not possible to use the returns to establish whether changing 
costs were the responsibility of the Group (eg changes in efficiency) or were caused 
by factors out of their control - like sales volume, wages or material costs all 
controlled from HQ. This question only seems to have been understood and 
addressed in 1938, some eight years after the system was established.(45) By this 
time at least two Groups - Alkali and Dyestuffs - appear to have developed systems of 
standard costs and benchmarks for technical efficiencies for their own use.(46) 
Attempts were made to incorporate these systems into a system of central control but 
the Groups do not appear to have been particularly helpful.(47) 
Secondly, the costing system, because of its inflexibility, at least in the earlier 
years appears to have encouraged a dysfunctional response, particularly in 
encouraging plant managers to produce excessive amounts for stock "to shew good 
costs".(48) This in turn seems to have resulted in an equally unconstructive response 
from HQ officials - one comments that the issue of large stocks "is probably a fruitful 
source of embarrassment [to plant managers] at the present time."(49) 
Thirdly, because the costs were in a form that was not particularly useful to 
them, the plants and Groups had no powerful motivation to make sure that the costs 
were as accurate as possible. Rules of thumb might provide data on a consistent 
204 
basis but could be significantly inaccurate: one product (electrolytic chlorine) costed 
on the same basis since 1928 was recosted in 1939 under the threat of Government 
investigation and showed increases in costs of between 12% and 19%.(50) Perhaps 
the clearest example of costs not giving an accurate picture of reality was the debacle 
over selling costs in 1936. The sales "machine" set up in 1931 was subject to some 
modifications in 1933-34 to locate some sales activity within the Groups while 
retaining control at HQ.(51) In November 1935 alarm was expressed at an increase 
in selling expenses from £1.5 to £2 million and an investigation was set up under J G 
Nicholson.(52) Nicholson's report was devastating. 
	
 from the available figures useful comparisons of expenditure are 
impossible between Groups and also between years, as in practically no 
instance is it possible to compare like with like 	 much of the assumed 
increase from 1932 to 1934 is, in fact, not a real increase of total 
expenditure by ICI but can be accounted for by the varying methods in 
presenting the figures and by the inclusion of items which are, in truth, 
not actual outgoings.(53) 
Conversely "important items of expenditure have not been included by some 
Groups at all 	 "(54) 
Moves were subsequently made to standardise the interpretation of what had 
previously appeared clear instructions as to how returns were made. But what is 
important about this episode and the other examples given is that systems and figures 
giving the appearance of control were illusory. This was easier to see in some cases 
than in others but raises questions about the whole approach. The system of cost 
control designed for HQ supervision did not encourage self-checking within or 
between Groups because the Groups did not depend on the system or its results. On 
the other hand the central Costing Section depended on the Groups to make accurate 
returns but was not represented in the works or the Group offices and did not deal 
with the primary sources of information. There were no officials such as a Vice 
President for Finance whose role included oversight and audit of procedure, there was 
no line structure that enforced consistency. Once the system was established it took a 
crisis or new interest by an Executive Director for it to be altered. 
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Control of capital expenditure, on the other hand, was more reliable. It was 
taken on an item by item basis, estimated results being subject to audit. The problem 
here was that when the pressure for capital expenditure grew from the mid-1930s 
onwards the lack of any mechanism for making investment on a strategic basis 
became an increasing problem. Elements of a planning approach began to emerge 
during the thirties but the problem had not been resolved adequately by the end of the 
1940s. 
The Groups were required to submit requests for permissions to spend more 
than £2,000 to the General Purpose Committee (GPC) via the Central Administration 
Committee (CAC). The CAC could approve items up to £5,000 and recommend 
them to the GPC, amounts above this being passed straight to the GPC.(55) In 
addition the Groups were required to submit budgets for Research, Staff and Labour 
Welfare and Advertising. In effect, then, "the Groups had to get authority from 
Millbank (ICI HQ) for any important development" and "everything important 
	  
[came] up before McGowan who was Chairman of the GPC."(56) The scrutiny 
became more intense during the 1930-32 slump with items between £1,000 and 
£2,000 from Group boards being brought to the GPC by October 1932.(57) 
To this detailed committee scrutiny of individual proposals was added an 
estimate and audit system similar to that instituted by Stamp on the LMS. From 
1929 onwards, requests for capital expenditure had to be accompanied by estimates of 
profits or savings which would result. These went to the HQ Costing Section for 
initial scrutiny before being passed to the GPC. Once the sum agreed had been spent 
and results were available the profits or savings were audited and the results passed to 
the GPC.(58) In February 1934 it was further decided that any capital expenditure 
proposals that would result in increased production would have to pass the scrutiny of 
the Sales Committee "as to there being an adequate market for the product and as to 
the probable selling price."(59) In the 1938 reorganisation, a Technical Committee 
was set up which appeared to be intended to start central technical appraisal of 
proposed capital investment but this development was overtaken by the war. 
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A system of estimate and audit for capital expenditure on an item by item 
basis was not, however, a system of investment planning. 	 Even when sales 
appraisals and technical appraisals were added it remained an item by item approach. 
As a system it simply could not cope with the rapidly multiplying problems of 
planning and priority that ICI began to face in the second half of the 1930s. With 
war looming the capital programme was £4 million for 1937 while for 1938 it was 
nearly £7 million.(60) The impression one gains is that ICI HQ was simply 
overwhelmed. It had no headquarters department devoted to planning or priorities. 
The spending approval system had simply been that the Groups proposed and the 
GPC (or more specifically McGowan) disposed. The whole system was designed for 
restraining and controlling not for leading the organisation. An Executive Director, 
Gaskell, was put in charge of spending priorities in 1937 but, presumably because 
there were no administrative resources at HQ to do the job, worked through the Group 
Chief Engineers.(61) "This attempt by Gaskell to contain Group expenditure through 
the Group Chief Engineers" remarks Reader "can hardly be regarded as central 
planning 
And in the war conditions which followed, the Groups forged along 
with little control from the centre. Most projects were for war 
materials and for this the planning was really in the hands of the 
Government and the Groups.(62) 
We can thus see that ICI had no investment planning procedure linked to a 
form of longer term business planning. Nor did it have any shorter term financial 
plan or system of budgetary control which could link capital expenditure to priorities 
determined by estimated profit margins. There were, it is true, annual budgets put 
forward by the Groups for Research, Welfare and Advertising. 	 The amounts 
involved were relatively small, however, and the process was really no more than a 
form of expenditure control rather than one of planning. For a system of budgetary 
control to emerge it was necessary for an organisational structure to exist both able 
and empowered to plan across the span of corporate activities from marketing, 
through production to development and investment. The structure of ICI as a whole 
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was too fragmented to carry out such a project before World War Two. The Groups, 
on the other hand, had neither the marketing function nor the financial information 
before the war to allow them to do it for themselves. 
It took the war and the relative autonomy which it brought to the Groups to set 
the pre-conditions for systems of budgetary control to develop. The Dyestuffs Group 
is particularly noteworthy. We have already seen that Dyestuffs had developed its 
own costing system by the late 1930s. By 1933, whether because of the transfer of 
some sales activity to Groups or through local initiative, the Dyestuffs Group had 
developed market forecasting and sales intelligence techniques. In that year they 
could claim that the system was 97% accurate and it allowed them to match 
manufacturing orders closely to demand. The accuracy was attributed to daily sales 
reports by salesmen, a technique borrowed from Du Pont. 
We have been able definitely to regulate manufacture before the altered 
rate of demand has become serious, instead of as in the past observing 
that there has been an increased or decreased turnover and then 
enquiring the reason from the Area Sales Offices before amending our 
forecasts.(63) 
They had thus established the essential feedback loop from market to 
manufacturing. The system could not become one of budgetary control, however, 
without control over prices and full financial information on Group overhead costs 
since essential questions concerning production volume and profitability at different 
price levels and investment strategy could not be properly addressed, 
	 These 
conditions were met by the transfer of full responsibility for sales to the Groups 
during World War Two. In consequence, Dyestuffs were able to develop a budgetary 
control system which covered projected turnover, expenses, profits and return on 
capital invested.(64) These developments were clearly something of a revelation to 
W H Coates, the Executive Director having responsibility for Finance, at the War's 
end. He enquired whether "other Divisions prepare budgets on these lines" and stated 
that "there would be great advantage in extending this system as far as possible."(65) 
This is eloquent testimony to the distance between Group and HQ that the War 
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brought. It also demonstrates clearly how the structure of ICI before the War had 
prevented the Groups acting as proper divisional businesses. 
But if the War brought the beginning of fmancial planning to the Groups there 
could be no planning for ICI as a whole until the structural relationship between HQ 
and Groups was established on new lines. This task was only really tackled during 
the 1950s and is outside the scope of this thesis.(66) The failure of ICI to develop a 
true divisional structure and effective systems of financial planning and control before 
World War Two was not merely a failure to meet the theoretical requirements of an 
abstract normative system. The consequence of its structure and control systems was 
a very real commercial and technical under-development which had clear adverse 
financial effects. These issues will be discussed in the following section. 
4) 	 Technical and Commercial Development 
As an organisational function "development" can be used in a wide or 
restricted sense. Used widely, it refers to planning for families of products, or 
divisions or the company as a whole. Used in a restricted sense it is the process of 
bringing a new product to market or an older product to a new market. While in the 
early days of ICI, development in its wider sense was a real concern of some senior 
HA officials it was pushed aside largely, it would appear, as a result of the Groups 
reorganisation of 1931.(67) As we have seen, this reorganisation gave research and 
manufacturing functions to the Groups and sales and financial control to HQ. The 
designation of headquarters functions as "services" meant that while there might be 
concerns expressed or initiatives made, HQ had no real purchase on the process that 
took products from research to full scale production. Where new products, similar to 
those already produced within a Group, were developed there appears to have been no 
problem in bringing it to a stage where it was marketable. Where similar new 
products were being developed in different Groups co-ordination was difficult and 
progress slow and where outside agreements were involved it was more difficult still. 
As a result we shall see that if ICI's performance is compared with Du Pont, ICI 
performed significantly less well. We will now spell these issues out in more detail. 
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At the formation of ICI the Nobel Development Department was transferred to 
the new company. It saw its remit in wide terms as a corporate planning body. A 
Forecasting Section was also set up and played a complementary role, looking at 
developments in the UK and world wide chemical industry and giving a context for 
any strategy that the company might develop. After the 1931 re-organisation, the 
Group Chairmen took an independent line, as they were now entitled to do, and 
declared in 1932 that; 
they considered the responsibility for watching and studying new 
outlets for their products or diverting the supply thereof to a stage 
nearer the ultimate consumer lay with Group Managements and that 
these questions were constantly before them and were receiving 
intensive study ...(68) 
The head of the Forecasting Section warned that "under the present 
organisation sales development and market research were being neglected."(69) The 
head of the Development Department urged that "we should find some way of 
adapting the Group organisation so that we have a well-defined technical-cum-
commercial policy regarding each of our products whether existing or projected."(70) 
He also attempted to have a HQ Development Committee established "to work out a 
logical and economical forward policy.."(71) This attempt was unsuccessful and 
from 1931 the Development Department, together with the Research and Technical 
Departments, were grouped under the general umbrella of Executive Directors 
unsympathetic to such wider aims. Their role became an advisory one. 
A new attempt was made to provide a focus for forward policy by Coates in 
1932. A Commercial Research Department was set up bringing the Development 
Department together with sections for Commercial Intelligence, Forecasting, Statistics 
and Economics. This Department had a range of expert officers and tried to be 
proactive, requesting Groups to appoint Development Managers, holding meetings 
with Group Research Managers and publishing papers and reports.(72) By 1934 
however, McGowan had apparently decided that the Commercial Research 
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Department "had failed at least in its function of positively encouraging and 
controlling new developments."(73) This judgement seems harsh. The Department 
had no executive powers and could not compel the Groups to co-operate with HQ or 
each other on development matters. In 1936 the Department was taken from Coates 
and put under a new Commercial Committee where it appears to have quickly faded 
into insignificance. It does not seem to have been part of the sales responsibility to 
develop technical/commercial policy. 
As far as the Groups were concerned, despite restrictions in the slump on 
research to projects which could show a return of 15% per annum(74) which would 
tend to restrict projects to familiar ground, and despite a perception of the Groups as 
"parochial"(75) it is remarkable how much research the Groups carried out. Where 
circumstances allowed, this research could be quickly turned into saleable products. 
In the three years, 1933-35, the Dyestuffs Group added 87 new products to its range 
and a further 912 were developed and approved for manufacture.(76) The Alkali 
Group invented polythene in 1935 and it had been developed into a marketable 
product by 1937.(77) Where products were being developed in several Groups, 
however, progress was far slower. For example, three Groups had developments in 
plastics other than polythene. They appear to have been prepared neither to co-
operate with each other nor to hand-over development to another group. None of the 
Groups were obviously so far in advance of the others that they could claim a 
leadership role. The result was drift. 
... no natural home or centre of development had been provided for 
plastics in the original organisation of the company, nor was there 
anyone at the centre who had strong reasons to feel any particular 
concern for them. Once the original ICI organisation hardened into a 
network of vested interests as it did very quickly, the situation became 
very difficult to alter.(78) 
In pesticides, there were also three Groups involved with the further 
complication of competition with an outside firm, followed by agreements and joint 
selling. The situation showed, says Reader "the absence, in ICI, of any unified 
organisation capable of taking charge of the projects coming forward, in the organic 
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field in the late nineteen-thirties."(79) In order to control matters between the Groups 
there was "an intricate network of committees, an arrangement which pleased none of 
the Groups and hindered rather than helped development since no Group felt inclined 
to put its whole weight behind a project which it did not wholly control."(80) In 
plastics, ICI set up "the quaintly named 'Plastics Division'. It was not a Division at 
all 	
 but a Committee, and not a very powerful one, since it had neither executive 
authority nor financial resources."(81) It took from 1933 to 1938 for this "Division" 
to become a formal Group. 
The situation in both plastics and pesticides shows that the worries of the 
heads of the Development and Forecasting departments had been well founded. The 
absence of any central authority able to enforce organisational change was not the 
only problem. Re-organisation needed to be both technically and commercially 
coherent and required a central authority capable of mobilising centrally based - that is 
non-partisan - technical and marketing expertise. It needed to be able to plan for and 
quantify the returns it could expect on its investment under different organisational 
arrangements. Because there was very little HQ based expertise on the technical side 
one important element was lost. But it was also the case that the skills required to 
maximise commercial returns were not available at HQ either. 
This is demonstrated by the case of Lightening Fasteners. This company was 
a subsidiary of the Metals Group and had been hugely successful in terms of dividend 
received compared to the original investment. Yet a new Executive Director of ICI 
could suggest in 1941 that this was the wrong way to look at the matter: 
... it is only in recent months that we have come to the conclusion by a 
careful study of the past that that Company might have achieved 
infinitely greater results and higher profits if a proper system of market 
investigation and investment in plant to take care of estimated sales 
had been put into effect.(82) 
The point being made was a general one: 
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My point in giving this example is to show that we are too inclined to 
be lulled into a false sense of security by what appears to be success in 
any Group or Company and we have no means at our disposal at the 
present time of investigating and deciding whether these companies by 
better management, by better marketing investigation or by a more 
elastic policy [on price] might have ventured into new industries to 
their benefit and the benefit of the Company in general. I could give 
other examples...(83) 
The lack of skilled assessment of technical and marketing potential at ICI HQ 
backed by an authority prepared to make the organisational changes necessary to 
realise that potential had real consequences for ICI's financial performance. A crude 
but effective measure is provided by a comparison of Du Pont and ICI results by W M 
Coates in 1937.(84) On products common to both companies roughly comparable 
earnings were made.(85) On those products not produced by the other, Du Pont 
earned 19% on total assets while ICI earned 9%.(86) In the case of non-common 
products, Du Pont had new research based products - tetra-ethyl lead petrol additive, 
cellophane - while ICI had chemical staples such as alkali and lime.(87) The lesson 
was clear: the speedy development and effective marketing of new research based 
products was rewarded very well financially. As one ICI officer concluded in 1938 
after a comparative study of Du Pont and ICI: "something useful could be learned 
from a detailed study of the organisation and methods employed by Du Pont in the 
conversion of a Research Discovery into a well established Commercial Venture"(88) 
We have suggested, however, that any application of such organisation and methods 
required considerable changes to the organisation and methods of ICI as a whole. 
It is instructive to compare the relationship between the organisation of 
research and the organisation as a whole at ICI and Du Pont. There was no apparent 
difference in the quality of the research itself The work of Hounshell and Smith(89) 
on research and development at Du Pont demonstrates that there was great respect at 
Du Pont for the quality of both fundamental and new product research at ICI.(90) 
This work also shows, however, that Du Pont had clear organisational advantages 
when it came to commercially exploiting new products, particularly when they lay 
outside the scope of existing product groups. As at ICI, incremental research and 
development for existing products was decentralised to divisions. On the other hand, 
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fundamental research was carried out on programmes and in laboratories which were 
centrally controlled. Strategic new products were either developed from internal 
research or bought-in by the acquisition of other companies after intense central 
technical and commercial scrutiny. Senior managers at HQ were assisted in their 
deliberations by centrally-based treasury, chemical engineering and research and 
development departments. Once new products were launched, top management at Du 
Pont showed itself ready to readjust divisional boundaries where this appeared 
advantageous.(91) The consequence was the clear commercial advantage which Du 
Pont demonstrates over ICI in the development of new products. 
5) 	 Summary And Conclusions 
We have seen how ICI's structure evolved into what we have called a 
"divisionalised holding company" in which centralised selling and financial 
supervision were the control mechanism for relatively autonomous manufacturing 
groups. This structure and its control mechanism had significant weaknesses. The 
financial supervision was revealed on a number of occasions as illusory and 
ineffective. The structure that was established by 1931 was an effective means of 
rationalising and concentrating production of existing commodities but it was 
obstructive to technical innovation where more than one group was concerned, it was 
not very effective at commercial appraisal and forward planning and it was resistant to 
organisational change. 
The key problem, from which many of the others flow, was the lack of 
effective line and functional management of the Groups by ICI HQ. It was not that 
there was no control: the word of McGowan could be felt anywhere in the 
organisation and the control of finance, particularly capital expenditure, was very tight 
until the late 1930's.(92) It was rather that this kind of control could not provide the 
top management functions of performance review, strategic planning and allocation of 
resources in any particular way. 	 The 1929 Groups' re-organisation seemed to 
promise that the functional Executive Directors would turn into the equivalent of US 
functional vice-presidents. 	 This promise died with the 1931 re-organisation. 
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Thereafter, line and functional management between HQ and the Group was 
substituted for by an almost optional process of co-ordination and consensus through 
such bodies as the Central Administration Committee or the network of committees 
on pesticides unless there were direct instructions from the Finance and General 
Purposes Committees or McGowan himself. The general style is summed up in 
McGowan's words: 
in my opinion it is better 	 for a man to be told what he may not 
do without higher authority, rather than to define what he may do. In 
other words, men are expected to accept responsibility without 
reference to their chiefs, unless they feel the need for advice.(93) 
The question must arise as to why this particular method of organisation 
emerged. The stated intention was to free the Executive Directors for general 
responsibilities, collective management and advice to the Chairman. As a system it 
gave great power to the Chairman, McGowan, which must have been a powerful 
motive for its adoption. Yet there are also several features of the organisation which 
strongly hark back to proprietorial forms. To be sure, ICI was not a proprietorial firm 
in the sense that control was predicated on the rights of ownership. 	 In fact 
proprietors per se were given short shrift. 	 The Group boards thereafter were 
composed of functional officers - engineers or accountants - or full-time general 
managers. And if the Group boards did not represent an executive committee of 
amalgamating proprietors neither did the ICI main board whose shareholdings 
collectively amounted to 0.5% of the ordinary shares in 1935.(94) 	 Subsequent 
appointments of Executive Directors appears to have been solely on the basis of 
perceived performance and ability rather than some notion of balance between 
interests - eg Nobel and Brunner Mond. 
Yet this being said, the organisation of ICI showed the continuation of 
proprietorial forms. This is the case even if we leave aside the individualist quasi 
owner/manager style and power of McGowan himself. After 1931 the Executive 
Directors had no executive functions and effectively reverted to a position where their 
power was exerted collectively on the Board or its constituted committees. It is 
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interesting to note that when the Executive Directors were withdrawn from 
management it is because of this that HQ functions become services: 
any new organisation 	  should liberate the whole-time Directors 
of ICI from direct executive control of individual Groups, with the 
corollary that the various Departments at Millbank shall function as 
Service Departments and not as Executive Departments as hitherto.(95) 
After a period when the roles of Directors and managers were becoming 
confused with a board composed largely of executives, the 1931 re-organisation 
separated executive and director roles. In the process however it could not give 
executive power to HQ officials over Group boards and their Chairman and Managing 
Directors if the traditional status systems were to be preserved. 
Proprietorial forms may also be seen in the use of boards and committees to 
co-ordinate and control rather than delegation of line and functional powers to 
individuals. In its use of committees in this way the organisation of ICI is closer to 
the Calico Printers Association than it is to General Motors. In the latter case the 
committees were used as a forum for those with executive authority rather than as the 
executive authority itself. Traditional proprietorial patterns may be seen in the way 
that accountancy was used as a means to police manufacturing from outside rather 
than as a tool of manufacturing management. They may also be seen in the control of 
capital expenditure on an item by item basis rather than through a system of planning 
or budgeting. 
It can be suggested therefore that the survival of proprietorial forms and 
assumptions played an important part in setting up the relationship between groups 
and HQ which was the key obstacle to the emergence of a divisionalised company on 
US lines. 
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tax efficient to do so while in 1931 it is stated that "The minor companies will 
be liquidated...." (My underlining) 
9) Note initialled "WHC, 1931" at ICHO/SEC/0716. 
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Figure 14. Key to subsidiaries chart at Figure 10. 
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10) Davis to Routly, 7 May 1932 at ICHO/DIR/0537. 
11) History of the Treasurers Department (author Minto?) at ICHO/SEC/0132. 
12) See Figure 14. Source Economist, 19 January 1935. 
13) Report of policy meeting on General Chemicals Group, 7 May 1936 at 
ICHO/DIR/0637. 
14) Langford to James 7/11/40 at ICHO/CFD/7820. 
15) L. Urwick "Executive Decentralisation with Functional Co-ordination" Public 
Administration  Vol 13, October 1935, p354. 
16) See W J Reader notes The Executive Committee, the Charners Conference and 
the Finance Committee (Appendix VIII) at ICHO/HIS/0038. Strictly the 
Executive Directors were not formed into a committee at the start of ICI - the 
committee was established by Board Minute 10, 8 December 1925. 
17) W J Reader as footnote 16, p5. 
18) At first reporting to the Board had been subsidiary company by company basis 
but 'almost immediately' had been changed to a product by product basis. 
(Reader's notes, pl, Appendix IV) The Group System of Control at 
ICHO/HIS/0039. 
19) W J Reader ICI - A history Vol. II, p140. 
20) Ref. as footnote 18, p3. 
21) A D Chandler The Visible Hand pp105-7. 
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22) See Reader's notes and the paper by W H Coates Functions of Group 
Executive Boards at ICHO/HIS/0039. 
23) H McGowan, Imperial Chemical Industry Limited - Organisation, 19 February 
1931 at ICHO/DIR/0873. 
24) See eg. Reader's notes Commercial Organisation 1931-1939 pl at 
ICHO/HIS/0047 (1). 
25) ICHO/HIS/0040 Reader's notes p4. 
26) As footnote 23. 
27) H McGowan The Functions and Responsibility of the Selling Machine 
published with the 1931 reorganisation scheme at ICHO/HIS/0040. 
28) Quote for W H Coates Functions of Group Executive Boards., 30 January 1980 
at ICHO/HIS/0040 p.8. See Reader's notes as footnote 24 for subsequent 
arrangements. 
29) Prices had to be referred to London and ultimately receive the sanction of the 
Sales Executive (after 1933 the Sales Committee) the GPC and ultimately 
McGowan. Note particularly McGowan's memo of 22 March 1933 p9 (as 
footnote 24) where this is specifically set down, 
30) W H Coates Function of Group Executive Boards at ICHO/HIS/0039 and 
Reader's introductory notes at ICHO/HIS/0040. 
31) History of the Treasures Department 1926-31 ICHO/SEC/0132 p6. 
32) Financial Committee minute 1106 16/ November 1932; reproduced by Reader 
at ICHO/HIS/0045. Reader says that the collection of statements at the end of 
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meetings applied only to Group Boards not finance committees but the 
statement appears to include the latter also. 
33) Memo by A J Quig, 21 March 1941 at ICHO/HIS/0045. 
34) Memo by A J Quig, 1 May 1941 at ICHO/HIS/0045. 
35) Reader's notes at Development (and planning) 1931-1939 (Appendix XVII) 
ICHO/HIS/0049(i) and The Executive Directors and their Departments at 
ICHO/HIS/0034. 
36) Reader's notes at The Reorganisation 22.3.38 (Appendix XIX B) at 
ICHO/HIS/0051. 
37) WHC(oates) Treasurers Department - Organisation 5 September 1927 at 
ICHO/HIS/0034. This section was transferred to the Technical functions later 
that year but back to the Treasurer's department in the 1929 reorganisation. 
(See organisation charts and Readers Costs and Statistics, ICHO/HIS/0037 pl. 
38) Memo by Mr Young with Treasurer's Memo to Wadsworth, 15 May 1930. at 
ICHO/CFD.2409. 
39) See the documents on inter-merger policy at ICHO/DIR/835 and Reader's 
Appendix VII Costs and Statistics at ICHO/HIS/0037. 
40) W J Reader Costs and Statistics (Appendix VII) ICHO/HIS/0037, pl. 
41) Ibid pp 1-3. 
42) Notably the separation of overheads from prime costs to give what Mond 
called 'fighting costs' - that is the minimum price to which a firm could drop 
without loss against variable costs. ibid pp 3-4. 
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43) Quoted at ibid p.4. 
44) Deuchar quoted Reader The Group System of Control (Appendix IX) 
ICHO/HIS/0089 page 5. 
45) See Coates to Gaskell, 8 September 1938 Survey of Producion Costs at 
ICHO/CFD/5295. 
46) Ibid. 
47) Presentation of Costs (minutes of meeting at Millbank 30 January 1939 at ibid. 
48) Notes on the Supervision of a "Group" (probably H J Mitchell, probably 1930) 
at ICHO/DIR/0873, p4. 
49) Ibid. 
50) General Chemicals Group. Chlorine/Caustic Costly (Liverpool 3 March 1939) 
at ICHO/DIR/0672. 
51) Divisional Sales Managers were in sales area offices but specialist product 
sales managers were based at groups. This does seem to have been takeri 
advantage of by some groups noticeably Dyestuffs. See Reader's notes 
Commerical Organisation 1931-39 at ICHO/HIS/0047 (i) and report by 
Nicholson 8 January 1934 at ICHO/DIR/0576 (i). 
52) Extract of minute of Central Administration Committee, 11 November 1935 at 
ICHO/DIR/0576 (i). 
53) J G Nicholson Sales Report 30 January 1936 pp A6 and A7 ICHO/DIR/0576 
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54) Ibid pAl. 
55) This para except where otherwise indicated from Reader's notes Organisation 
General 1931-38 at ICHO/HIS/0045. 
56) As footnote 55 p2. 
57) GPC minute 26 October 1932, summary by Reader, Document marked 'p' 
(Appendix XIV) ICHO/HIS/0045. 
58) Reader's notes How were the Groups requests for money assessed? at ibid, p3. 
Also document Capital Expenditure Requisitions at ibid. 
59) As notes as footnote 58. 
60) GPC and Board minutes 10 February 1937 and 9 February 1938 as 
footnote 57. The issued capital of ICI in 1935 was £77m ie 1938 spending 
proposals were equivalent to 10% of capital. 
61) Reader's notes as footnote 58. 
62) Reader's ICI planning 1942-1950  (App XXIV) ICHO/HIS/0075 (i). 
63) Cronshaw to Walker 31 July 1933 at ICHO/DIR/0679. 
64) Coates to Harrison 3 January 1948 at ICHO/HIS/0600. 
65) Coates to the Treasurer 3 January 1948 at ICHO/HIS/0600. The budget 
system was apparently originated at the Blackley works of the group in about 
1937 (Treasurer to Sir William Coates at ibid). By 1947-8 there were budget 
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systems of an unspecified sort in place or emerging in three other groups and 
discussions on introducing budgets for HQ departments. 
66) See the minutes etc in Reader's notes at Finance 1944-1950 at 
ICHO/HIS/0086. 
67) See the discussion in Reader's notes Development (and Planning) 1931-39 at 
Appendix XVII, ICHO/HIS/0049 (i) for this para. 
68) CAC minute 386 quoted by Reader's notes p2 at ibid. 
69) Reader's paraphrase of memo by Munro, 11 February 1932 at ibid. 
70) Barley to Mitchell Development Policy 29 January 1932 at ibid. 
71) Barley to Nicholson, 11 February 1932 at ibid. 
72) See Reader's notes Commercial Research Department at ibid also document 
Technical and Commercial Research 2 February 1933 at ICHO/SEC/0746. 
73) Reader's notes p4. The Special Research Committe at ICHO/HIS/0049 (ii). 
74) GPC minute 148, 23 September 1931, Minute extracts titled 'Capital 
Expenditure' at ICHO/HIS/0045. 
75) Reader's notes Technical etc Organisation in the Thirties' p3; at 
ICHO/HIS/0046. 
76) ICI A History Vol II p333. 
77) ibid p. 
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78) ibid p344. 
79) ibid p335. 
80) ibid. 
81) ibid p345 
82) AJ Quig Commercial Control at ICHO/HIS/0045. 
83) ibid. 
84) WHC(oates) Dupont and ICI, Summary of Financial Comparisons 
14 September 1937 at ICHO/HIS/0045 - the accounts studied are those for 
1935. 
85) Du Pont 
	 ICI 
Earnings (%) on total investment 
	 16.58 	 17.52 (excluding goodwill) 
Earnings (%) on total investment 
	 14.73 	 11.83 (including goodwill) 
This demonstrates the large quantity of goodwill (or water) in the ICI 
accounts; Du Pont's goodwill was £7m out of total assets £54m. ICI had 
£18m of goodwill out of total assests of £76m. 
86) Rounded to nearest whole number, goodwill excluded. If goodwill is included 
Du Pont earned 18.6% and ICI 7.6%. 
87) See Table 1 as footnote 84. Du Pont's textile interests including Rayon and 
ICI's non-ferrous interests are taken for our purposes as having roughly 
comparable technological maturities. A paper by C S Robinson comparing 
ICI and Du Pont in 1938 (at ICHO/DIR/0681) makes it clear that the range of 
technological development in common products is greater in Du Pont. 
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88) CS Robinson, as footnote 87, p25. 
89) D A Hounshell and J K Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy - Du Pont 
R & D. 1902-1980, Cambridge and New York, 1988. 
90) ibid p180 ff. 
91) ibid passim. 
92) Reader suggests that control over group spending was 'nominal' (ICI Vol 2, 
p143) but I beg to differ. The audit system and the scrutiny process were 
powerful tools for precensorship by groups. If most requests went through this 
did not mean that control was weak. 
93) H McGowan speech at Ashridge The Organisation of a modern large-scale 
unit in industry 7 December 1935 at ICHO/HIS/0045 p13. 
94) See the list of Directors share holding at ICHO/DIR/0525 which total 
£193,847 (largest share holdings £88k, McGowan £3k). The ordinary share 
capital of ICI was £43.8 million in 1935. (Econmist 19 January 1935). 
95) A. McGowan Imperial Chemical Industries Limited Organisation 19 February 
1931 (the 1931 Group reorganisation) p2 at ICHO/HIS/0040. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE AUSTIN MOTOR COMPANY 
1) 	 Introduction  
The motor industry as it has developed in the twentieth century has presented 
considerable challenges to its managers. 	 It combines continuous technological 
development, high volume production requiring heavy investment in plant and a 
market volatility at times close to that of the fashion wear trades. It depended on and 
brought about innovations across a range of industrial sectors - "no other product 
yielded so rich a harvest of forward and backward linkages" as one writer puts it.(1) 
The industry also demonstrates the strongest linkage between high volume production 
and the mass market. Unless motor vehicles can be produced in large volumes, high 
unit costs will restrict the market to a rich minority. The growth in volume and sales 
with mass production and the fall in price that accompanied it was demonstrated 
spectacularly by Ford in the US. As the market grew it segmented and vehicles were 
produced in various price brackets which showed different market behaviours. The 
market as a whole was very volatile as a result of its sensitivity to changes in wider 
economic conditions. The application of the divisional form of organisation and 
budgetary control to General Motors were a direct response by that organisation to the 
segmentation and volatility of the market. The US motor industry is therefore the 
epitome of Chandler's "Three Pronged Investment" in technology, marketing and 
management. 
The UK motor industry before World War One was a collection of small and 
medium sized enterprises producing relatively small numbers of relatively expensive 
vehicles. Some of the larger manufacturers were mobilised by the government to 
manufacture munitions during World War One. The waR may not have brought 
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about engineering innovations(2) in terms of new processes but as far as Austin 
Motors was concerned it did introduce flow production (components passing from 
process to process without intermediate storage) and the use of costing as a method of 
production control.(3) (The possible application of mass production techniques to 
vehicle production was not fully appreciated by Herbert Austin, however, until he saw 
them used in the US during a trip in 1922.)(4) The UK market for motor vehicles 
was potentially greater in the interwar years as a result of the greater use of and 
familiarity with motor vehicles during the war. The example of Ford who had 
demonstrated the price sensitivity of the market for cars in the US was also important. 
At the end of World War One, therefore, for those UK manufacturers who were 
prepared to expand production both the technical means and the market appeared 
available. 
Though the number of small manufacturers in the motor industry remained 
high two large indigenous volume manufacturers - Austin and Morris - pulled away 
from the rest in the later 1920s. In 1929 Austin had 25% of the UK market while 
Morris had 35%.(5) The two manufacturers had different approaches. Morris saw 
his role chiefly as an assembler of bought-in components, setting up or buying 
manufacturing capacity only when it was necessary to ensure supply. The use of 
competition between external suppliers to ensure keen prices was extended to apply to 
competition between internal and external suppliers.(6) The relative independence of 
the managers of the Morris plants(7) resulted in a combination of personal 
management by Morris and a form of market co-ordination. Austin on the other hand 
had an integrated plant with all management present on a single site. All transactions 
therefore had to be managed internally. A fmancial crisis in the early 1920s also 
resulted in the development of a sophisticated costing system (which was to rapidly 
evolve into a system of budgetary control) and the imposition of technically expert 
full-time outside directors.(8) Thus both the technical expertise and the modification 
of Austin's power as owner-manager gave some promise of the development of a 
more sophisticated management structure than at Morris Motors. 
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We shall see, however, that the management structure at Austin Motors did not 
evolve in any particularly sophisticated way. The consequence was that the system 
of budgetary control appears to have disappeared on the death of Austin and the 
retirement of his cost accountant in 1941. We shall look at Austin Motors in three 
sections. The first will consider the management structure, the second costing and 
budgetary control and the third will look briefly at the consequence of the structure on 
the commercial strategy and performance of the firm. 
2) 	 Organisation 
Before World War One, Austin was a medium sized engineering employer 
with perhaps 2 - 3000 employees. By the war's end his employees had increased ten- 
fold(9) as had the size of the plant.(10) 	 The new plant was not, however, 
immediately suitable for car manufacture. In addition, Austin's patriotism had led 
him to take a minimal return on his munitions contracts(11) and the war's end found 
him with debts both to the government and subsequently to the Midland Bank when 
he reorganised for post-war production. His chosen post-war 20 HP model did not 
sell particularly well and Austin seems to have badly misread the onset of the post war 
slump in 1920. By March 1921 Austin was reporting losses of "several thousand 
pounds per week"(12) and by April a Receiver had been appointed. It was quickly 
"intimated" that new finance would be conditional on a "re-organisation of the 
Directorate".(13) Austin resisted with energy and ingenuity but two new Executive 
Directors were imposed on him: C R F Engelbach as Works Director in November 
1921 and E L Payton as Financial Director in April 1922. These two directors 
together with Austin, now designated "Commercial Director" and in charge of design 
and sales were now to form an executive committee of management.(14) Austin 
would retain the Chairmanship but would lose the title of Managing Director. With 
new non-executive directors and a Trustee put on the board by the creditors, now 
transformed into debenture holders, Austin was apparently effectively constrained. 
However, this constraint could only really last as long as the company 
remained in a financially delicate state. Despite all his financial problems, Austin 
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had two new models - of 12 and 7 HP - in production in 1922, nervously monitored 
by the debenture holders. The creditors clearly wished Austin Motors to trade out of 
debt and for all their nervousness had no-one but Austin to rely on. Austin, the 
owner of about half the ordinary (voting) shares and Chairman and a functional 
director was clearly the most powerful figure in the company even if he was not all-
powerful. His new models were a success and by September 1923 the firm had 
clearly turned the corner: substantially increased production was planned for 
1924(15) and further increases were made in 1925 and 1926.(16) 
With profits returning from increased sales, Austin attempted various 
stratagems to rid himself of the constraints placed on him by the debenture holders, 
particularly the outside directors. However, the debenture holders proved obdurate 
and the Finance and Works Directors and the Committee of Management were 
effectively recognised as permanent by Austin in an agreement of December 
1925.(17) Significantly, this agreement also gave Austin control over Costs in 
addition to Secretariat, Sales, Service and Design. We shall look at this in more 
detail a little later. In the event neither Englebach nor Payton seem to have insisted 
on a strong form of collective management and the Board do not appear to have 
exercised a particularly strong grip. In November 1929 - nearly four years after the 
permanent establishment of the Committee of Management - the following item was 
raised at the Board: 
Enquiries were made as to the procedures and functioning of the 
Committee of Management. It was presumed that a Minute Book was 
kept of the meetings and a suggestion was made that it should be 
produced at Board Meetings. 
The Chairman said that the Committee of Management were always in 
touch and in consultation, although the meetings were not held 
formally and the Minutes recorded. This could be done if necessary 
(18) 
No such request was made and the matter was not raised again. There is no mention 
in subsequent board minutes of Committee of Management minutes being presented. 
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It seems clear then that the three executive directors looked after their own 
sphere without formal co-ordination. Given that the responsibility for commercial 
strategy - design and sales and, subject to some oversight, prices - lay with Austin, his 
position was powerful. He also appears to have established a generally accepted 
personally dominant role. One of the non-executive directors forced on him by the 
creditors, T D Neal, described, in 1927, the Committee of Management members as 
follows: "We have Mr Engelbach in the Works, Mr Payton in the counting house and 
Sir Herbert everywhere. We find that it has worked most admirably 
	 "(19) 
Nevertheless, the delegations which the creditors forced on Austin were real and 
necessary given the growth of the firm in the 1920s and 30s. While it is conceivable 
that Austin could have run the company as sole proprietor and manager, it is 
inconceivable that he could have done it well.(20) Austin himself seems to have 
recognised that the situation was a blessing in disguise. When the long standing 
Deputy Chairman, H du Cros, who had taken Austin's side throughout the disputes 
with the creditors, died in 1928 it was Austin who proposed E L Payton as a 
replacement.(21) When Engelbach retired due to ill-health in 1938 he was simply 
replaced by L P Lord with no diminution of powers.(22) 
Thus the top management of the company, divided its functions in an 
individual, personal way. There were no written functional responsibilities laid down 
as far as one is able to judge from the surviving documents. 	 Probably as a 
consequence of the personalised structure no formal management organisation chart 
appears to have been drawn up for the Austin organisation as a whole.(23) The 
executive directors had the _power to run their departments by personal diktat and for 
Austin and Payton at least the tasks for which they were responsible could be carried 
out by simple departmental structures. The production departments under Engelbach 
were more complex but as we shall see their organisation was not well defined. In 
any case Austin himself was suspicious of any administrative overhead cost and had 
been so well before his post World War One financial difficulties.(24) 	 The 
opportunity provided by the war to establish a more complex management structure 
was declined after the war was over. Austin told a meeting of the Institute of Cost 
and Works Accountants in 1920: 
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The war upset things in most works. We got a little out of balance; 
we lost our sense of proportion and our organisation was in many cases 
on a very lavish and expensive scale 
	
 In the only direction in which 
it was possible to make changes - the overhead expenses - we have 
been able to look round and find out where we could get rid of some of 
the red tape 
	
 After several months struggling, when the Armistice 
was declared we came to the conclusion at Longbridge that the best 
thing was to cut out everything we possibly could and to leave it to the 
bare side.(25) 
As the firm became more prosperous the issue ceased to be economically 
pressing but the emphasis on low administrative overheads recurs in articles through 
the twenties and thirties.(26) A later writer relying on personal accounts from 
managers at Longbridge describes the company as "frugally run - Austin had never 
forgotten the near-disaster of 1921".(27) Austin was, however, unusual among UK 
industrialists in that his rejection of more complex management structures was an 
informed one, aware of the US literature: 
I have read, I suppose, all the works that I have seen published on 
works control and methods by American, English and other writers and 
I have come to the conclusion that when one studies a question such as 
works control - it is a complex question because it covers every 
department - if you specialise on a system such as that of Emerson or 
Gant (sic) you will realise that you are liable to drift into a system far 
too complex and quite unnecessary.(28) 
No information on Payton and Austin's departments has been found. 
Nevertheless, an organisational chart of the production departments was published in 
1935 - see Fig15.(29) This was designed to show the relationship "between the 
Engineering, Cost Control and the Production Departments"(30) rather than as a map 
of the departments themselves. This diagram can at first sight be taken as a staff and 
line structure with the Engineering, Inspection and Cost Control as staff functions and 
the production manager as line manager of the Superintendents and Foremen. (The 
"Chief Executive Officer" in the diagram is Engelbach, the Works Director.) The 
diagram does, however, have some anomalous features. For example we may query 
the Production Department's apparent line management of the Production Manager. 
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One presumes that the Production Department produces the detailed schedules and 
programmes for the manufacturing departments and measures progress against them. 
Surely this is a task for which the Production Manager must take responsibility - and 
did, in fact, take responsibility.(31) We are given no information, however, whether 
the Production Department "belongs" to the Chief Executive or the Production 
Manager. 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
ENGINEERING WORKS PRODUCTION 	 INSPECTION COST 
DEPARTMENTS MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT CONTROL 
PLANNING 
EFFICIENCY 
IIG and TOOL 
DEPARTMENTS 
PRODUCTION 
MANAGER 
PROGRESS STAFF 
	
SUPERINTENDENTS 	 CHIEF BUYER.  
FOREMEN 
OPERATIVES 
Figure 15. Austin Motors production departments organisation. 
Source: 	 CRF Engelbach "Production Management Technique" Reports, Sixth 
International Congress for Scientific Management, London 1935 
The relationship between staff functions such as Engineering and Inspection 
and Production is unclear. In a true staff and line structure they would have the 
authority to require performance of their wishes within their remit by and through the 
Production Manager. 	 Ultimately their authority is that of the Works Director. 
Engelbach, however, in a discussion on the Inspection function insists that what is 
required is co-operation rather than authority.(32) Similarly the "Chief Executive 
Officer must not allow himself to be absorbed in details. Each individual member of 
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the staff must be responsible for his own work 	 instructions as to how to do their 
work should be in the form of friendly advice rather than instruction."(33) Rather 
than by formal authority, co-ordination appears to have been achieved by a weekly 
meeting "of all heads 	  so that difficulties can be discussed and failure 
rectified."(34) The organisation diagram at Figure 15 therefore appears only to 
differentiate functions, not indicate authority levels between specialist functions and 
line management. 
The final difficulty with the chart at Figure 15 is the position of costing. As 
we have seen, costing had been put under Herbert Austin's auspices under the 
agreement of December 1925. There is no record of the responsibility for costing 
being transferred to Engelbach and his paper curiously omits discussion on the topic 
because it "is 	  too lengthy a subject to be included in this paper, which deals only 
with production problems."(35) The assumption that costing was not a production 
problem or a means of identifying and rectifying production problems was very much 
a traditional attitude but was one that Engelbach apparently shared.(36) Costing was 
the responsibility of A Perry-Keene(37), first Cost Accountant then Comptroller. He 
seems to have worked closely with Austin both before and after the receivership and 
was almost certainly the sole author of the budgetary control system (see the section 
of Financial Control below) which he administered. A budget system as we have 
seen proceeds from the assessment of future markets to the formulation of the 
production programmes. But for Austin Motors the estimated market was a market at 
a given price. Decisions on pricing and production volume, under Herbert Austin's 
control determined production programmes with "itemised estimated costs, both for 
materials, labour (productive and non-productive) and oncost charges in every 
department."(38) 	 Actual costs were then tracked by Perry-Keene's department 
against these estimates used as standards. As a consequence, the budgetary control 
system had a useful function as far as Herbert Austin was concerned of effectively 
giving him control of production through Perry-Keene. As Austin was perhaps 
ingenuously to tell an audience of cost accountants in 1925: 
234 
Mr Perry-Keene 	 does not exercise any control over the other man's 
department other than giving him figures 	  the figures control the 
Directors just as much as they control anybody else 
	  
It is not the fact that you are present at the works but that you have the 
data on the sheet of paper which you can present with confidence to 
them and which they will believe in - which controls their future 
actions. (39) 
In the specific circumstances of the Austin Motor Company, therefore, the use 
of a budget system can hardly be used as a diagnostic test for the emergence of a 
Chandlerian management structure. While the costing system did provide essential 
financial control and gave comfort to the firm's creditors in the early 1920s by 
demonstrating financial control, its persistence may in part be due to its use as an 
instrument of personal control by Austin in a structure where he was formally 
excluded from production matters. It also explains why a sophisticated budgetary 
control system co-existed with a less well developed management structure. 
3) 	 Costing And Budgetary Control 
Herbert Austin had been interested well before World War One in the use of 
costing as a means of predicting costs as well as recording them. His public 
statement on this predates the US "efficiency engineer" H Emerson's articles which 
supposedly first emphasised the importance of having costs before rather than after 
the event.(40) It is not, however, apparent that Austin had succeeded in this 
aspiration before the war. He refers in 1920 to attempts rather than successes: 
For more than thirty years I have been trying to obtain a condition in 
the works cost office that control should commence even before one 
started on the work, rather than building up an organisation for 
recording the figures and results at the end of some period.(41) 
During World War One, Austin Motors was one of the firms who broke the 
shell manufacturers' cartel by demonstrating that shells could be produced at radically 
lower costs than those previously claimed.(42) The availability of this cost data 
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indicates that the Ministry of Munitions costing system or one very like it was used at 
Longbridge. For all that Austin was to denounce "the cost keeping of the 
Government, particularly during the war [as] very, very bad"(43) his war experience 
seems to have taught him how costs might be predicted. "Before the Armistice was 
signed, at Longbridge we had not only produced our model car but 	 had laid out the 
estimated cost of the car in its various details, components and completed whole."(44) 
The method used was to break the production process down into individual operations 
which were given a time. This meant that even when wage rates changed the time 
basis of the costs did not and a recalculation of predicted costs was straightforward. 
Similarly by producing details of material quantities required and pre-planning 
supervisory staffing levels for the proposed car material and overhead costs could 
easily be re-calculated as prices and salaries changed. This had proved its worth in 
the volatile post-war period: 
Although we have had, as a firm, to make considerable increases in our 
selling prices, our estimate remains today within the results of our 
experience during the past year, showing that, if you set out to do so, 
you can lay down the cost of even so complicated an article as a motor 
car 	  
If it is possible to lay all these things down in the circumstances of the 
change over at our works, it shows that we can from the cost 
department ensure the future to a very large extent - an extent which 
has never been realised in the past.(45) 
At the war's end, however, Austin had not managed to establish a system 
which would feed back costing data rapidly which, taken together with a lack of 
marketing feedback, lay at the heart of his post-war financial difficulties. We will 
look at the marketing question shortly. As far as costing data was concerned, Austin 
was to say in 1920: 
I have been trying for thirty years to obtain a condition of affairs that 
would place me, as manager or managing director, in a position which 
I knew from week to week, or almost from day to day, that I was 
carrying on the works at a profit, and did not have to wait until the end 
of some period before I knew whether we had made a 'profit or a big 
loss 	  I am still struggling, but with the help of some very efficient 
and willing men at our works at the present time.(46) 
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It seems clear from the Austin Motors board minutes, however, that Austin 
was waiting months for cost information in 1919-20. In late October 1919 the price 
of his 20HP car was raised by £100 - a considerable amount - as a temporary measure 
"only until such times as our costs were ascertained" and the issue was to be 
reconsidered in six months.(47) In March 1920 - just over four months later - the 
board were given "extracts from the Cost Sheets which had been prepared at the 
works' and again prices were raised.(48) 
	 More information was promised in 
December 1920 but none is subsequently noted in the minutes.(49) It is possible that 
one piece of the administration that Austin had removed at the end of World War One 
was the Ministry of Munitions' or a similar costing system. The Ministry system 
delivered costs monthly(50) and given that Austin's shell manufacture costs were 
used against the armaments cartel the timing of the latter dispute indicated that his 
costs must also have been available within a month of a cost system being 
installed..(51) We have already seen how costs were preplanned for the 20HP car 
before the Armistice. All this indicates the existence of a substantial costing section. 
Yet an article by Austin in a business magazine in November 1919 entitled Making a 
Modern Car - A Study in Organisation makes no mention at all of costing or a costing 
section.(52) The halting availability of cost information presented to the board in 
1919-20 appears to confirm that Austin had abandoned the wartime system. 
Given the acute pressures that Austin was facing from his creditors, his energy 
in 1921 and 1922 was extraordinary. Not only did he manage to design and put into 
production the new 12HP and 7HP cars that were to restore his fortunes but oversaw 
the establishment of a costing system that not only could provide costs on a daily 
basis by July 1921(53) but which had evolved or was evolving into a budgetary 
system of financial control. From the sources available it has not been possible to 
precisely date the evolution of the system. It seems to have been fully in place by 
April 1922.(54) In July 1921 Austin described his "Cost Keeping Department as 
being the starting point of all our organisation".(55) At this point the drawings for 
the 12HP car had been completed(56) and the board was being told that the 
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"Efficiency Engineer" had estimated the cost of producing 12 prototypes.(57) It 
would appear that the new model was being costed in advance in the same way that 
the 20HP model had been. But there was a key difference: in proposing the new car, 
Austin was responding to requests by dealers who suggested that there was a 
particular market for it.(58) The clear implication was, however, that to meet this 
market the car had to be designed to a price. And this was even more important when 
considering the smaller 7HP car, which is first mentioned in the board minutes in 
August 1921.(59) But the discussions on selling prices, volumes and costs for this 
smallest model took place in meetings of the board between May 1922 and December 
1922. By September 1922 Perry-Keene was publishing a series of articles on the 
financial management system in the Cost Accountant. All the indications are, then, 
that the budgetary control system was evolved with the proposals for the production 
of the 12HP car in 1921. 
The series of six articles on "Cost Control in the Motor Car and Allied 
Industries" in the Cost Accountant between September 1922 and February 1923 are 
the first public account of a budgetary control system that has been found in the UK. 
They start in the same year that the first systematic account of the process was 
published in the UK - James 0 McKinsey's Budgetary Control. While hints and 
partial systems may have been provided by publications before 1922(60) the Austin 
system, as published, is pioneering work. The scope of the system is wide and 
clearly represents a response to Austin Motors' difficulties since the war's end. In his 
introduction Perry-Keene says: 
The fluidity of commercial conditions which developed during the war 
and the consequent necessity for taking new bearings has brought 
about an acute need for accurate costing and statistical work, together 
with some method of continuously controlling both production and 
expenditure, more especially in the case of large concerns 	  The 
momentum acquired by a manufacturing plant in full swing is such, 
under today's conditions, that immediate closure could not be effected 
without appalling financial loss. Therefore the ebb and flow of 
quantities to match seasons and markets must be controlled and 
controlled with knowledge.(61) 
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The starting point was the selling price of the car. Following the previous 
practice with the 20HP car the new model had been broken down into its many 
constituent operations which were given times. These had been pre-costed in terms 
of labour and material. With the new model, however, each of these component costs 
had a limit set by the percentage it represented of the target cost of the complete car. 
The costing system now monitored the actual cost of each operations against the 
target costs - or "allowable costs" as Perry-Keene calls them. In order that the cost 
information should be available quickly a large Powers mechanical accounting system 
was acquired using Hollerith-type punched cards, card sorters and tabulators. 
According to Perry-Keene the system allowed him to extract costing details of any 
process at any time. The main use at this time (ie 1922) does seem to have been to 
produce a weekly trading account which showed actual performance against 
programmes for production, sales, expenditure and profits. But the availability of 
readily analysable information did allow an audit trail back to the level of the 
individual section if worrying variations from targets required it.(62) 
A thirteen week production programme "based upon average of sales in 
sight"(63) was modified in a relatively smooth and timely way. A cash flow forecast 
was also produced and the cash position monitored against it.(64) Together with a 
number of business ratios used as performance indicators(65) the system both gave 
tight control of costs and gave early warnings of problems of shortage of cash or the 
growth of inventory or unsold finished cars. In this it answered Austin's immediate 
need for commercial certainty. 
Thus from the beginning the system installed at Austin Motors to control costs 
was much more than that since it contained the feedback loop typical of a system of 
budgetary control. As time passed the opportunities which were offered by this 
feedback were used for managing and reducing costs rather than keeping them to pre-
set limits. By 1925, in a presentation on "Budgetary Control" to the Institute of Cost 
and Works Accountants (ICWA), Perry-Keene, while retaining the emphasis on 
accurate detailed pre-costing, placed a new emphasis on an "active attempt to create 
and maintain a market through manufacturing and selling products at a price which is 
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truly economic from the point of view of the purchasing public."(66) By 1928 Perry-
Keene is explaining how working back from the selling price for a car the company 
took each of the 6000 parts "a piston, a connecting rod, and so on 
and reduces them to their actuarial terms of what we shall get for them. 
We then say in effect to labour, "We are not your paymasters we are 
merely agents of the general public which pays us all and which will 
only pay "X" price for a piston, connecting rod and so forth. Your 
share is "Y" 	 "(67) 
The general practice in the UK, says Perry-Keene, has been that "the works 
accountant goes down to the works and asks what a part is made for 
but that is totally wrong as we have shown by our system of definitely 
determining at what cost an operation should be carried out, having 
regard to the previously fixed price of the finished product.(68) 
While the system clearly depended in part on "speed-up" as far as labour was 
concerned, the labour times were shown to be practicable by demonstrating any 
operation "by an average man". Care was taken to prepare machines, jigs etc to 
eliminate setting-up times and reduce handling. Perhaps most importantly care was 
taken to make the sequence of operations more efficient. Perry-Keene gives an 
example from 1925 when "in the case of the gear box, for example, [we] re-arranged 
operations and were able to produce a particular gear box for nearly 41 per cent less 
than the original cost without any opposition from labour" whose earnings, it is said, 
increased.(69) In 1928 the whole of Longbridge was re-organised for flow 
production. The primary- intention was to increase production to meet increasing 
demand and was the culmination of improvements and experiments from about 
1925.(70) 	 But Perry-Keene's contributions to the Cost Accountant and the 
Proceedings of the Institution of Production Engineers also make it clear that flow 
production was also the culmination of attempts to achieve radically reduced costs of 
production. 
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The introduction of flow production brought about some shifts in emphasis in 
the budgetary control and cost monitoring system. Firstly, the greatly increased 
production volume re-emphasised the necessity of achieving the best possible 
predictions of market demand in order to adjust production levels or increase 
advertising. Estimates of sales from Austin's now greater network of agents were 
carefully assessed, weighted where necessary by reference to the success or otherwise 
of previous estimates.(71) 	 Secondly, with the increased capital intensity of 
production the "allowable cost" of each operation now not only focused on the layout 
and material cost but on the cost of the machinery itself. The heavy depreciation 
charges meant that they became a significant part of the costs of any operation. 
Therefore machinery had to cost no more than the multiple of allowable machine 
costs per operation and the estimated number of operations it would perform in its 
working life. Where outside suppliers could not supply machinery within those 
limits the Austin Motors Company built their own to pre-specified costs.(72) 
Thirdly, increasingly capital intensive production shifted (but certainly did not 
eliminate) the emphasis on labour productivity. Now the usage of a machine to its 
target level was important if the on-cost per unit produced was to remain within 
allowable limits. Intensity of machine usage became a focus of labour discipline as 
much as the rate for each operation. Perry-Keene said in 1931 that "the man who is 
earning the biggest money is by far the cheapest operator in the Company".(73) 
Unless workers earned bonuses of 80% they were sacked.(74) There was a personal 
daily cost account for every worker(75) and the company claimed to know within 
hours if the oncost percentage was rising for any worker.(76) 
By the 1930's then, budgetary control had become an integral part of company 
business planning which started at market research and covered production capacity, 
investments pay-back, "make or buy" decisions, replacement of labour by machinery 
and so on. As Perry-Keene said in 1934: 
Budgetary control as now being applied is more than an assembly of 
estimates. Based upon actuarial averages it discloses a method of 
anticipating events and arranging their happening in a logical order and 
at the right cost.(77) 
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This attitude of mind was not restricted to the Comptroller's department. In 
an initiative which clearly owed something to the cost control system, J A Hannay, 
the Austin Production Manager set up a system using punched cards with mechanical 
sorting and tabulating to control work in progress.(78) This appears to have been set 
up after the introduction of flow production in 1928 and was seen as a way of further 
integrating costing and production: the system was conceptualised as "a progress 
scoreboard, with means of transmitting the score to all who require it, including the 
department which must check production costs."(79) By complementing the cost and 
inventory control systems with control of routing and easily available detailed 
information on work in progress it brought about the completion of a system of 
production planning and control. 
As presented in published articles, especially those by Perry-Keene, the 
systems of control both at the level of production and for the firm as a whole were 
capable of sustaining considerable further growth in capacity and forming the basis 
for an expanded managerial hierarchy. But as we shall see, as a result of the 
leadership of the firm and the commercial environment of the 1930s the potential of 
the planning and control systems was not realised and the systems themselves were 
dissipated and lost. 
4) 	 Leadership, the Market And Commercial Success at Austin Motors  
In terms of progress towards Chandlerian managerialism, then, Austin Motors 
presents a mixed picture: a personally managed, loosely integrated management co-
existed with a highly effective system of planning and control. Whether or not the 
firm proceeded to build a management hierarchy depended on market conditions, the 
strategy adopted in response to those conditions and the specific wishes and desires of 
the leadership of the firm. 	 Professor Church has surveyed the now extensive 
literature on the performance of the British motor industry.(80) His conclusion is that 
the response of the motor manufacturers to the market in the 1930s was rational and, 
in Austin's case, profitable. We will conclude that in the market conditions of the 
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1930s whatever the long term consequences for the industry(81), a commercially 
successful response did not require the development of a management structure in 
depth. 
The impetus towards capital intensive flow production was checked after 
1930-31 by a change in consumer demand. In the 1920s competition in the industry 
had been driven by the falling prices of the smaller models of Morris and Austin who, 
through the economies of large volume production, radically reduced costs. Prices of 
cars fell by about 50% in the 1920s(82) but in the 1930s prices stabilised and the basis 
of competition changed: 	 "design and model differentiation within price and 
horsepower bands was the principal determinant of companies' share of the 
market".(83) Or as other writers put it: "Success came to those firms whose models 
selling at the conventional price for their class, made the greatest appeal to the 
public."(84) As far as the largest producers, Austin and Morris, were concerned the 
consequence was an increase in the number of models and the frequency of model 
changes. This checked the advance of capital intensive, high volume methods. As 
C R F Engelbach, the Austin Works Director, put it: 
Rapid changes in fashion and ideas have slowed up the progress of 
special single operation machines. Continuous high production is too 
uncertain for special machines to be further developed. Designs have 
to be changeable at short notices 	 at present there is no market likely 
to develop sufficiently that will lead to the extension of such 
specialised tool methods.(85) 
This change in the nature of the UK car market had the effect of decreasing 
concentration as previously relatively minor car producers were able to increase 
market share through commercially successful designs manufactured with a high 
proportion of bought-in parts. Thus market conditions in the 1930s favoured a 
relatively un-mass producing, un-mass distributing industry. The qualities required 
for success were less those of a strongly integrated management structure with 
effective planning and control and more those of the entrepreneurial marketeer. The 
latter was closer to UK owner-management traditional practice and the pressure for 
structural change was correspondingly less. 
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Furthermore, there were no pressures for organisational change from other 
organisations or as a result of diversification. The relatively prosperous nature of the 
industry did not inspire moves towards defensive merger or reorganisation. None of 
the major producers appears to have shown Napoleonic tendencies towards take-over 
and given the nature of the market, it is not clear what economies of scale any take-
over could have achieved. In Austin's case the final removal of the financial 
restraints placed on him by his creditors did not take place until 1930.(86) It is 
understandable that he would not wish to expose himself again to the discomforts of 
raising capital. 
The only other pressure towards structural change would appear to be the 
consequence of a strategy of diversification, either within the motor sector, 
geographically or into other product lines. Fortuitously, all Austin's attempts at 
diversification did not produce sufficient success to bring pressure for change. 
Within the motor sector, Austin produced a range of vehicles from 7HP to 20HP, 
including light commercial vehicles. But a sample weekly production programme 
from 1935 shows that out of a total of 2060 vehicles only 290 were greater than 12HP 
and only 165 were commercial vehicles.(87) It is safe to conclude, therefore, that 
Austin's attempts to diversify outside the production of small cars were not successful 
- certainly not successful enough to consider some kind of divisionalisation. 
Attempts by Austin to diversify geographically were not particularly successful either. 
An associated US company was set up just before the 1930 slump and collapsed as a 
result of it.(88) A licensing arrangement with the German company BMW was 
undermined because of difficulties in repatriating fees from the Nazi state after 
1933.(89) 
Production diversification was limited and also unsuccessful. The Austin 
Lighting Company, which emerged after World War One to continue manufacturing 
products requested by the Government during the war was finally wound up in 
1927.(90) Negotiations to establish a joint venture with Vickers to produce aero 
engines collapsed in 1929 when Vickers withdrew.(91) 	 One area where new 
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products were not tried was machine tools. This is perhaps surprising. As we have 
seen, Austin Motors had been able to produce machine tools for its own use at 
considerably lower costs than outside suppliers were prepared to quote. These lower 
costs were achieved by preparatory attention to the details of the manufacturing 
operations required and the efficient sequencing developed for producing cars.(92) It 
is not clear how extensive a market existed but there was certainly a gap in the market 
as far as machines specific to car manufacture were concerned: Engelbach was 
complaining in 1927 that Austin Motors were unable to buy many types of machine 
tools from British makers and were forced to buy them from the US or Germany.(93) 
Despite the apparent opportunities, no steps were taken. 
Thus there was no pressure, whether externally or internally generated, for 
Austin Motors to reorganise to give greater depth of management. The management 
remained loosely integrated and personal in style. Such integration as there was, was 
represented by Herbert Austin himself and his death rendered the firm vulnerable in a 
way that only became apparent when the special circumstances of the Second World 
War (and the sellers market after it) disappeared. Herbert Austin was the life force of 
the company. He alone understood and linked marketing, design, finance and 
production. While he lived he did not construct a top management structure which 
could replace him. When he died in 1941 there were no individuals within the firm 
or forces outside it able or willing to do the job. After Austin's death Payton now 
Chairman and Lord (deputy chairman), ran the company as joint managing directors 
until 1945 when Payton was committed under the Lunacy Act.(94) This left Lord in 
sole control. Leonard Lord was a "brilliant production engineer" but was not the man 
to bring a new top management to Austin Motors: 
He detested pomp and also distrusted anything approaching 
sophistication in the running, of the business. 	 He regarded both 
salesmen and accountants as overheads 	 Nor was he even a believer 
in the simpler forms of training for industry 	  This was the man on 
whom the fate of the British motor industry was to rest for almost 
thirty years 	 (95) 
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Lord sacked J A Hannay, the systems-literate production manager, after he 
succeeded Engelbach in 1938. Perry-Keene retired in 1941. It is not clear whether 
Lord dismantled the planning and control system or simply left it to wither away, but 
by the 1960s BMC (formed by a merger of Austin and Morris under Lord's 
leadership) is described as not having "a sensible way of pricing its cars, because it 
did not know precisely what they cost to make."(96) By this time, there were clearly 
no traces left of Austin and Perry-Keene's pioneering work. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
UNILEVER WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LEVER 
SOAP COMPANIES 
1) 	 Introduction 
The official company history of Unilever which covers the inter-war years(l) 
is in fact largely an account of the component parts before the merger took place. In 
two volumes with over 700 pages of text, only some 66 pages are devoted to Unilever 
in the ten years from the merger to the Second World War. Other authors cover some 
aspects of the firm in more detail(2) but neither they, nor Wilson, consider the 
structure of Unilever, or the way it was controlled, in any depth. It is nevertheless 
upon these secondary sources that Chandler's assessment in Scale and Scope relies.(3) 
Chandler feels able to assert that Unilever was a typical example of the British 
approach to organising large enterprises: minimal change on a purely reactive basis 
combined with a preference for personal management. This approach "led to a 
reliance on federations of relatively small enterprises."(4) 
As we shall see, however, a closer study of Unilever's central organisation and 
of its UK operations reveals a radically different picture. Unilever, in fact, rapidly 
established a tightly centrally controlled organisation, rationalising production around 
its marketing requirements and controlling the enterprise with a developed budgetary 
control system. While the company had not reached a finished Chandlerian form - a 
personal management style obstructed the growth of top management and the control 
of some overseas subsidiary companies was loose(5) - it does not deserve the 
characterisation laid upon it by Chandler. 
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Unilever was formed in 1929 by a merger of Lever Brothers and the Margarine 
Union. Both firms were themselves the result of mergers. Lever Brothers had 
grown by acquiring many UK soap companies and had diversified, largely by 
acquisition, into oils and fats, margarines and foods. 
	 It had also established 
subsidiary companies in Europe, the Empire and North and South America. The 
Margarine Union was an amalgamation of European oil and fat firms with major 
interests in margarine. Unilever had, therefore, a developed structure outside the UK 
to a much greater extent than the other case studies. This does not, however, 
invalidate comparisons between them. Unilever's management was centralised in 
London. Furthermore, while information on the non-European activities of Unilever 
remains incomplete(7), the available literature shows that the most complex 
management tasks faced by the company were in the UK. 
The major UK operations of Unilever were in oil milling, margarine and soap, 
with more minor operations in chemicals and non-margerine food manufacturing and 
retail. Of all these activities the most complex in terms of marketing, rationalisation 
and management was soap. The soap firms acquired by W M Lever had been 
encouraged to compete with each other and had largely been left with their original 
management structures. Here, if anywhere, the federalist tendencies which Chandler 
describes would be at their strongest and would provide the greatest test of top 
management resolve to build a more integrated management structure. The soap 
firms also provide a good test of the thesis that where UK companies did manage to 
produce integrated management structures they remained underdeveloped because of 
the persistence of proprietorial principles of organisation. 	 Consequently after 
considering the overall organisation of the enterprise as a whole we shall consider the 
evolution of the Unilever UK soap businesses. This is followed by an examination of 
Unilever methods of financial control. 
2) 	 The Organisational Framework 
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The formal agreement to amalgamate the Margarine Union and Lever Brothers 
was signed on 2 September 1929. The ruling body was a board of directors 
representing interests from the UK to Czechoslovakia.(8) The inconvenience of 
frequent meetings of all directors quickly caused the board to delegate much of the 
more formal business to ad hoc meetings of available directors(9) and day to day 
running to a small group of directors in an Executive - later Special - Committee.(1 0) 
The full board now met only three times a year.(11) According to Wilson, by 1931 it 
was fully accepted by all parties that the administrative centre for the enterprise as a 
whole and the seat of the Special Committee should be London.(12) 
The Executive/Special Committee started its weekly meetings in mid-October 
1929 and at only its second meeting set up an array of 29 committees and sub-
committees "for the purpose of dealing with the various matters which are of common 
interest to Union and Levers."(13) The committees were composed of both senior 
managers and directors and covered every aspect of the new company's business. 
The Executive ruled, however, that all committees "should act only in an advisory 
capacity with power to recommend and that nothing should be done without the 
approval of the Executive Committee 	 "(14) Decision-making was thus reserved to 
a committee of the board with formally delegated powers. It is not clear whether or 
not it was intended that a highly centralised Executive with a range of advisory 
committees was to be a permanent arrangement. In the shorter term the advantages 
were clear: the committees brought people together from the various constituent 
parts of the amalgamation and established a common sense of identity and purpose. 
This was particularly important because the various companies' London offices 
remained operational until a purpose-built unified Unilever HQ was finished in 1932. 
But the system of committees became increasingly unwieldy: a May 1931 list 
gives 40 committees(15) and by June the number had reached 46.(16) At this point 
the Special Committee agreed that 
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while these Committees have served their purpose in making the 
personnel of each side acquainted with each other, it is found that in 
practice, delay is caused owing to the necessity of one Committee 
discussing matters with other Committees, and it is also considered 
that government by Committees is destructive of that sense of 
responsibility which should exist in the Executives. 
It was decided to abolish all committees, with the exception of the Special 
Committee and the Overseas and Continental Committees, the latter two bodies being 
responsible for the non-UK subsidiaries. In place of the committees, 26 "Executive 
Departments" were set up, the word "Executive" meaning that they were run by full-
time managers.(17) The departments ranged in size from small headquarters staff 
bodies dealing with audit, taxation and trademarks to bodies responsible for financial 
control and the management of large parts of the company's UK business. The latter 
task was given to three important bodies which were, effectively, the three Unilever 
UK product divisions: the Home Soap Executive, the Home Margarine Executive 
and the Oil and Fat Executive.(18) 
To a degree, the setting up of these executive departments may be seen as the 
beginnings of a managerialist structure. Power had been taken from committees and 
given to individuals. Furthermore, there was a distinct concentration of power in the 
case of the three product division Executives who were given the responsibility to 
both manufacture and sell their respective products.(19) 	 Prior to the 1931 
reorganisation, these activities had been the responsibility of different committees. 
The Executive s 	 evolved from the committees set up to sell these groups 
of products and the concept seems to have emerged initially as a pragmatic response 
to difficulties in co-ordinating the UK soap subsidiaries. The selling committee for 
soap, the Home Soap Committee, was reduced to three people in February 1931, 
renamed the Home Soap Committee of the Board and a Commercial and a Technical 
Officer were appointed to serve it. The appointment of a Technical Officer indicates 
that this body now had responsibility for soap manufacture. By May 1931 it was 
being referred to as the Home Soap Executive(21) and was thus fully formed before 
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the general reorganisation of June and July 1931. The establishment of the three 
Executives thus appears to have been the result of the streamlining and concentration 
of an unwieldy committee system and the perceived need for a common focus of 
authority for each of the three main groups of products. 
Yet the delegations of power as a result of the 1931 reorganisation were very 
limited. The new structure was antipathetic to the Chandlerian divisional model in 
two key respects. 	 Firstly, there was no decentralisation: the Executives, the 
executive departments and the Continental and Overseas Committees were sharply 
centralised on the Special Committee. Secondly, there was no attempt to differentiate 
between line, staff, and functional departments or to indicate the authority relations 
between departments as distinct from the very clear subservience of the departments 
individually to the Special Committee. The sharp centralisation and the imprecise 
relations between departments is graphically demonstrated by an organisation chart of 
the financial functions shown at Figure 16. (This is the only organisation chart of 
Unilever as a whole which has been found for the period before World War Two.) 
Figure 16 shows how great the span of control of the Special Committee was 
even after the groupings of functions and companies under the Executives and the 
foreign committees. Even in this schematic account the Special Committee is shown 
directly managing nine manufacturing and marketing groups and seven HQ 
departments. In fact, there were five further commercial departments and ten more 
HQ departments who appear to have had no other master than the Special 
Committee.(23) It is also clear from the chart that along the lines of authority 
radiating from the Special Committee there is no ambiguity as to the power and status 
hierarchy. No connection at all, however, is shown between the bodies lying on 
different lines of authority. The accounting system (which will be dealt with in more 
detail below) lies alongside other lines of authority but has no authority of its own 
over subsidiaries. 
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The centralisation of power on the Special Committee was accompanied by 
detailed centralised scrutiny and decision-making. After the 1931 reorganisation a 
timetable of meetings between the Special Committee and bodies it supervised was 
established. An example is given at Figure 17. 
What is striking about this timetable is that the Special Committee is in more 
or less permanent session. The frequency of some meetings was later reduced and 
some ceased to be regular and were called on an "as and when required" basis but the 
pattern of Special Committee meetings occupying the working week remained until 
World War Two.(25) The timetable shows that only one session, entitled General 
Matters, is not a joint session with another body. Examination of the minutes for the 
General Matters meetings show that they were not strategy or planning meetings. All 
the Special Committee meetings considered the various areas of the business and 
made decisions in great detail, the General Matters meetings simply considered 
matters that could not easily be put onto other meetings' agenda.(26) The Special 
Committee, therefore, do not seem to have reserved time to consider the overall 
strategy and direction of the company. At the same time the Executives do not seem 
to have met separately from the Special Committee to consider matters under their 
jurisdiction.(27) One can only conclude that the function of the Special Committee 
was to run the company directly and that no decisions of any importance were made 
by the Executives: all decisions were made at the joint meetings with the Special 
Committee and delegations were minimal. The structure established in 1931 was not, 
therefore, a hierarchy of decision-making bodies but one decision-making body 
working through bodies of managers (the Executives) who gave advice and carried 
out instructions. It appears that the streamlining in 1931 of the previous unwieldy 
committee structure had not abolished a system of Special Committee plus advisory 
committees but had reintroduced it in a new form. 
The immersion of the Special Committee in detailed matters does not seem to 
have been balanced by any other formal structures of the board. The minutes of 
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directors meetings show no discussion of strategic matters and the formal meetings of 
the board three times a year were too infrequent to do the job. No papers have been 
found which indicate that policy formation took place formally at any level other than 
the detailed, departmental or Executive level discussions of the Special Committee. 
It seems likely therefore that company-wide policy formation took place more 
informally at the non-decision making Directors' Conferences introduced in 1933- 
4(28) or through personal contact: " 	  directors and experts from the controlling 
committees of both Dutch and English companies travelled endlessly, reporting on 
factories, politics, economic trends and, most important, on men."(29) 
The close central control of the Special Committee led to an 
underdevelopment of top management. While Unilever had established product 
divisions and a full range of headquarters functional specialisms the connections 
between functions and divisions were not through a hierarchy of managers, but 
through the centralised personal control of the Special Committee. The unformed 
nature of top management is illustrated by discussions on how the most senior staff 
were to be graded which took place in 1932 and 1937.(30) In 1932 an inter-
departmental committee had recommended a hierarchy of managerial staff in six 
bands.(31) The Special Committee had reduced this to five bands, all staff above the 
level of Department Manager being designated a single class of "Directors and Senior 
Servants". The meeting in 1937 was called to advise whether this most senior class 
could be split into two and, if so, on what basis. The meeting agreed that such a split 
might be advisable but seemed at a loss as to how such a split might be made. The 
principal difficulty was how to rank, say, a Deputy Chief Technical Officer to the 
Home Soap Executive with the Chairman of a manufacturing subsidiary or the head of 
a middling sized HQ department. The meeting failed to reach agreement on how this 
might be done, but recommended that designations of people or positions as top grade 
(or, if split, either of the two top grades) should be recommended by a joint committee 
of Executive and HQ nominees. In other words, the decision whether someone was a 
senior officer and, if so, how senior they were, was not always immediately apparent 
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from the position they held but was a matter for their colleagues to judge on a case by 
case basis. 
There were strong reasons for a particularly centralist role of the Special 
Committee. Lever Brothers and Jurgens and Van der Bergh, the latter two the chief 
partners in the Margarine Union, all had autocratic traditions. The Unilever merger 
brought about a board and a Special Committee designed to balance the merging 
interests.(32) While the board of Unilever may have become less of an issue as far as 
a meticulous balance of interests was concerned the Special Committee remained 
carefully balanced in 1949.(33) 	 The Special Committee thus had a particular 
importance to the directors and it is not surprising therefore that its leading role 
should be emphasised and preserved. This situation was also quite consistent with a 
more general UK tradition of separating the roles of directors and managers. The 
Special Committee was a committee of the board, the Executives were not. While 
the Executives might have members who were directors, they were not directors 
because of their positions in the executives.(34) 
Yet is must be said that the structure for all its imprecise„ personalised and 
centralised nature did not fail in any obvious way. The Economist which had been 
worried in 1930 about the "earning capacity of Unilever's enormous capital"(35) was 
later to judge the company as "extraordinarily efficient".(36) It would seem that 
because its core businesses were relatively well integrated around oils and fats(37), 
with intelligent and effective leadership the company could still be managed 
successfully in this personal way. It has been said that in the mid 1940s "Unilever, 
for all its size, was still a comparatively simple business"(38) and that the company 
"in 1949 was still - just - a business which one man could understand in the way in 
which a nineteenth-century entrepreneur understood the business he owned."(39) 
We might judge that such a structure had reached the limit of its organisational 
capacity and that it was vulnerable to rapid expansion or diversification. The point 
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would come at which decentralisation and delegation would be necessary without the 
line and functional management structure in place to allow it to be effective. Yet 
Unilever adapted itself relatively smoothly to post World War Two expansion with a 
strategy of decentralisation(40) and indeed was preparing for such change during the 
war.(41) This was not an achievement one might expect from a federation of 
relatively small businesses. 
So far, we have discussed the organisation at the top of Unilever. We shall 
now look at the most complex of the product divisions, the UK soap businesses under 
the Home Soap Executive (HSE). We shall see that the integration of manufacturing 
and marketing under the HSE was a key pre-condition for effective rationalisation and 
commercial success. But it also suggests that the integration of marketing and 
manufacture was the key to relatively smooth further delegation and decentralisation 
at a later date. 
3) 	 Marketing, Rationalisation And The Organisation Of The UK Soap 
Businesses  
The Home Soap Executive was set up to manage the UK soap businesses, 
largely those acquired by W H Lever.(42) Before the Unilever merger little progress 
had been made in rationalising the selling or manufacturing organisations of these 
firms, though centralised control of advertising and exports had been introduced by 
W H Lever before his death in 1925. At the time of the merger there were 49 soap 
manufacturing companies within the concern in the UK with 48 separate sales 
organisations.(43) It was also a time of intense competition from the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society and smaller rivals and of a clear shift in demand from hard soaps 
to flakes and powders.(44) The large majority of the firms in the concern produced 
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hard soaps and there were thus strong incentives to close the least efficient an 
concentrate production in the more efficient factories. 
On the other hand, any rationalisation process had to take account of the 
complexities of the UK soap market. W H Lever and his successor as Chairman, 
Francis D'Arcy Cooper, had believed in diversity of and competition between 
subsidiary companies within the concern for two broad reasons. The first was that 
competition kept the subsidiaries efficient. The second was that the wide diversity of 
products produced within the "family" contested as many as possible of the available 
segments of the market and was the best competitive strategy.(45) It was the fear of 
losing the competitive advantages of diversity that prevented both Lever and 
D'Arcy Cooper from pursuing a policy of rationalisation before the formation of 
Unilever despite abundant evidence of the success of Lever's US subsidiary in its 
policy of heavy concentration on a few successful brands.(46) It was considered that 
the complex overlapping of regional, local and national brand loyalties in the UK did 
not allow such a strategy. 
The solution to the problem of reconciling rationalisation and diversity was 
discovered within two years of Unilever's foundation. In its essentials, it separated 
brands from subsidiary companies and considered the diversity of brands and the 
rationalisation of production as two different, though related, problems. 
	 The 
diversity of brands was the primary problem which had to be solved through a 
marketing strategy. This strategy then determined the way in which production was 
reorganised. As Geoffiey Heyworth was to put it later: "our organisation was built 
specifically to meet the tasks it had to do - mainly dealing in consumer goods."(47) 
It is probable that this approach emerged from the way in which tasks were 
divided by the committees set up almost immediately after the merger: in the case of 
the main product categories committees were set up for selling and a separate 
Rationalisation Committee was set up to consider the concentration of production.(48) 
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The pressure for rationalisation can only have increased with the merger. The 
Margarine Union had already started a robust rationalisation process, before Unilever 
was formed, which was continued afterwards. When the Rationalisation Committee 
set up sub-committees, the Rationalisation of Soap Factories Sub-Committee actually 
contained a majority of ex-Margarine Union members.(49) When the HSE was 
formed, L G Fisher, a member of the Rationalisation Committee was appointed 
Commercial Officer. External factors also pressed the case for rationalisation. As a 
result of the slump, hard soap sales dropped 18,000 tons or 11% from 1929 to 
1932.(50) Unilever also faced financial difficulties because it had committed itself to 
the purchase of raw materials at pre-slump prices and volumes. Competitors buying 
at spot prices during the slump had an advantage of approximately 50% lower prices 
than Unilever in 1929-31.(51) There is some evidence of impatience among directors 
at the slow pace of change in 1929-30.(52) Decisions to close Gossages and a small 
London soap factory were clearly taken as a result of these pressures.(53) 
But as we have indicated, rationalisation in the UK soap trade had to be based 
on a marketing strategy if it were to be anything other than a short term measure. 
This strategy was first publicly explained by Geoffrey Heyworth in 1931.(54) It was 
intended to work over 5 to 10 yeats to a situation where there should be three 
competing nation-wide sales organisations, each handling no more than ten branded 
soap products of various types with no competition between products, within each 
selling organisation. There would be separate additional organisations for toilet, 
unbranded and industrial soaps. The consequence would be savings as the number of 
sales organisations and sales staff were reduced to achieve this strategy. In turn, the 
reduction in the number of lines would expedite concentration of production and the 
reduction in output of hard soap. 
Because the timescales proposed was long and because the ideal of three 
national selling organisations selling in all no more than thirty products, was not 
achieved until World War Two, the accepted view appears to be that the approach was 
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gradualist.(55) In fact, there appears to have been an initial rapid phase of ground 
clearance followed by a more deliberate period. The earlier phase was easier because 
it involved deleting a large number of small selling lines and was pushed forward by 
immediate pressures of the slump. After 1932 trade began to revive(56) and 
rationalisation involved the more complex problems of dealing with brands with some 
significant consumer loyalty. This was an important issue: 85% of Unilever's soap 
sales were in proprietary and named lines in 1931.(57) These two phases overlapped 
to some degree but can be said to broadly cover 1931-1934 and 1934-1939. 
In August 1931 the "non-goodwill" Pioneer Group of companies selling 
unbranded hard soaps was established(58) and there was already in existence a "non-
distributive" section selling to institutions, laundries and industry which had reduced 
its number of lines by 65%.(59) By September proposals were made to join the sales 
forces of Crosfields (of Warrington) and Christopher Thomas (of Bristol).(60) In 
October 1931 the toilet soap companies were brought together into two selling forces 
led by Gibbs and Pears for branded lines, and a "non-goodwill fighting group" for 
non-branded toilet soap lines. 	 In April 1932 T H Harris' sales force was 
amalgamated with that of two firms in Exeter and Plymouth. Each of these 
amalgamations of sales forces was followed by the cutting of lines and a loss of sales 
staff, the concentration of production and administration, and eventually the closure of 
factories. Between November 1931 and August 1932, for example, the Pioneer 
Group withdrew 357 out of 578 packs and further reductions were proposed.(61) By 
May 1932 a pricing strategy for the leading toilet soaps had been established 
accompanied by reductions in the number of other lines.(62) By December 1931 the 
manufacture of "fighting group" toilet soaps had been concentrated at two sites as had 
"non-distributive" manufacturing by June 1932.(63) As a direct consequence of these 
decisions, three factories were closed in London in 1931, 1932 and 1933.(64) As a 
result of T H Harris' absorption of the sales forces of the two South West firms, the 
factories of the latter were closed in 1935.(65) We have already mentioned the 
closure of the factory of the Widnes firm of Gossages, though this is something of an 
exceptional case. Gossage mainly produced for export and its closure involved fewer 
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issues of local brand loyalties and goodwill.(66) The Gossage sales force, however, 
survived for the time being. Through closures, the merging of sales forces and 
offices, and dismissals following efficiency exercises by HSE officials(67) the HSE 
lost over 2,000 employees between January 1931 and January 1933, 13% of its 
workforce.(68) It seems safe to conclude that the early rationalisation efforts were 
thus vigorous and effective in reducing costs. 
Marketing led concentration and rationalisation was to continue after this early 
period, but at a slower pace. A major element of Heyworth's strategy of establishing 
three national selling organisations was achieved by the establishment of two such 
organisations under the leadership of Levers and Hudsons by May 1934.(69) (This 
was followed by the closure of Hudson's Bank Hall factory in 1935.)(70) These two 
national organisations sold the nationally advertised Unilever brands such as Sunlight 
Soap, Lux Flakes and Toilet Soap, Rinso, etc. A third national organisation was 
difficult to achieve. Neither the Crosfield/ Christopher Thomas amalgamation of 
sales forces of 1931 not a later amalgamation of the sales forces of Watsons (of 
Leeds) and Gossages in 1936 produced a truly national sales force. The reason was 
simply that there were an insufficiently compact number of national brands for such 
an organisation to sell. Apart from the Levers and Hudsons organisations, by the late 
1930s there were three selling organisations with more than £100,000 per year profit: 
Crosfield/Christopher Thomas, Watson and Gossage and John Knight.(71) Each of 
'these organisations had major national branded lines: Crosfields had Persil, Watson 
and Gossage had Eve toilet soap and shampoo and Knights had Castile toilet soap. 
An examination of the sales projections of these organisations however shows that 
each of them were still expected to make profits of at least £50,000 from branded hard 
soaps with local markets in 1939, even after a decade of decline.(72) It was only with 
the further decline of the local markets for branded hard soap that further 
consolidation of selling organisations could be expected. This was rapidly achieved 
by government regulation in the Second World War which brought the amalgamation 
of Knights with Hudson and Crosfields with Watson and Gossage.(73) This left 
smaller organisations like T H Harris (which by 1939 had absorbed the "pioneer" 
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unbranded companies for hard and toilet soaps) and toiletry subsidiaries like Gibbs 
and Pears.(74) Because of this tail of smaller companies and the persistence of a 
number of small selling lines - 124 lines were cut at the outbreak of the war 
representing only 2% of home soap tonnage(75) - it is possible to miss the extent to 
which the Heyworth strategy had been achieved by, say, 1940. Any remaining 
"untidiness" was largely attributable to an entirely rational desire to keep local market 
share in hard soaps or the smaller toiletries market. 
The Heyworth strategy, as we have already stressed, was first and foremost a 
marketing strategy. Concentration and rationalisation of production was desirable in 
itself but had to be consistent with the needs of marketing. The subsidiary companies 
retained a formal legal existence but no particular effort was made to keep production 
of any brand in a factory with which it had a historical association or to locate sales 
forces where products were made. As a consequence the production facilities of the 
HSE are best understood as a collective flexible resource producing for the company 
as a whole. This may be seen from the following examples. The Lever and Hudsons 
selling organisations were run from Unilever House in London, while Hudsons' 
products were made at Port Sunlight (Lever Brothers) and Warrington (Crosfields) 
after Hudsons' own factory was closed. When the British Soap Company of Hull 
was closed in 1934, production was transferred to Watsons of Leeds and Cooks of 
London while the sales organisation was transferred to Gossages in Widnes.(76) The 
production of Erasmic toiletries was transferred from Crosfield (of which Erasmic was 
a wholly owned subsidiary) to Port Sunlight while Erasmic sales were transferred to 
Gibbs' selling force.(77) On the other hand, when the sales forces of Watsons and 
Gossages were amalgamated in 1936 into a new company Watson and Gossages(78), 
that and the two manufacturing companies were all located at Whitehall Road, Leeds 
and all had the same board of directors.(79) There seems to have been no intention to 
integrate sales and manufacturing behind these arrangements, it was regarded as a 
simple administrative convenience. The only whisper of such an integration comes in 
a suggestion that field control of Crosfields' sales be located at Warrington but 
nothing further appears to come of it.(80) 
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The use of all manufacturing facilities as a single flexible resource is 
emphasised by two decisions. The first, made in 1931, was to standardise the sizes of 
packs.(81) This clearly aided the switching of manufacture and packing from plant to 
plant. The second was an agreement in May 1933 between Lever Brothers Limited 
and thirty-four subsidiary companies for "reciprocal manufacture of each others 
products".(82) Many of these companies had neither manufacturing facilities nor 
sales forces and the agreement appears to have been a way of putting concentration of 
production on a simple contractual footing between the subsidiaries. 
The rationalisation of the legal structure of the subsidiary companies was 
barely considered. The marketing led strategy was not affected by the continued 
legal existence of a large number of subsidiaries. There were, at the very least, 
irksome administrative consequences but this was not, for the most part, a problem for 
the HSE but for the Company Secretaries. It is not clear how many subsidiaries 
Unilever actually had. There were certainly more than the 52 listed in the Economist 
in 1930.(83) As we have seen, at the time of the merger there were 49 companies 
manufacturing soap and this takes no account of the companies that had ceased 
manufacturing. 	 The list of moribund companies with neither selling nor 
manufacturing organisations was apparently simply allowed to grow. No proposals 
to liquidate these companies were put to the Special Committee or the board. 
Occasionally they were used as shell companies for other purposes(84) but for the 
most part these companies were unproductive low-level administrative burden, each 
company requiring boards of directors, number of shareholders consistent with the 
articles of association, the appointmen of proxies, annual meetings and secretarial and 
accounting services.(85) On the retirement of one of Unilever's Company Secretaries 
in 1938, for example, it was necessary to redistribute 63 different positions or 
shareholdings devoted to maintaining this undergrowth of subsidiaries. He was not 
an isolated example.(86) 
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There are no structural or ownership explanations for this situation. Most of 
the subsidiaries were completely owned by Unilever.(87) In the majority of cases, 
therefore, there were no shareholder interests which could prevent liquidation. Even 
when there were outside shareholder interests the HSE did not move particularly 
forcefully to try and acquire them even after the problems with outside preference 
shareholders at Gossages in the early 1930s objecting to its closure. Even with the 
typically limited rights of such holdings(88) it was still possible for Gossage 
Preference shareholders to use legal actions to delay closure by at least six 
months.(89) The response of the HSE seems to have been to ensure control by 
adequate "head office representation" on the boards of subsidiaries rather than 
acquisition of all outside shares and subsequent liquidation. (The board of Gossages 
had also resisted closure and an uncompliant board was clearly a greater threat than 
discontented Preference shareholders.) 
In only two cases were steps taken to try and achieve complete ownership of 
subsidiaries before World War Two. The first example was perhaps the technical case 
of T H Harris and Sons Ltd whose shares were all owned by John Knight Ltd which 
was only partly owned by Lever Brothers. The position was simply rectified by 
exchanging Knight's holding of Harris shares for Lever Brothers shares of equal 
value.(90) The second case was Joseph Watson and Sons Ltd where small blocks of 
remaining outside Preference shareholdings were being pursued in 1933-4 and 
1937.(91) Action on T H Harris and Joseph Watson may have been taken merely 
because they were considered to be simple to tidy up. It seems unlikely that the 
significance of the companies as manufacturing centres was the main motivation 
otherwise the outstanding Preference shareholdings in Crosfields, Knights and Pears 
would also have been pursued.(92) It was not until 1940 that attempts were made to 
acquire all the shares of Pears and Atkinsons.(93) Unilever did not acquire all of 
Gibbs shares until 1950.(94) The motivation in 1940 was greater financial privacy 
and commercial freedom. It was not until after World War Two that the motivation 
was more clearly the wish to radically reorganise product divisions. 
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The key question, however, is whether the untidy legal structure of the soap 
companies obstructed the HSE in any way. The answer must be that it did not. The 
HSE was able on the evidence of surviving minutes and papers to operate with 
complete freedom once the problems with Gossages were behind them. 	 The 
reimposition of control over Gossages had been accompanied by the, sacking of its 
Chairman and another board member and demonstrated that the HSE would not be 
defied.(95) For this reason or because of the imposition of selected trustworthy 
directors referred to earlier, no other subsidiary resisted the imposition of the HSE's 
will. The majority of the active subsidiaries in any case had boards of directors made 
up of local salaried managers augmented where necessary by part-time HSE 
nominees. But even where there was a substantial family presence on the board, for 
example at Gibbs, the board was compliant. There also appears to have been a policy 
of moving up and coming young family members away from their family firm to 
other parts of the business to weaken dynastic ties.(96) In any case, the progressive 
decoupling of selling organisations from manufacturing units as a result of the 
marketing-led strategy was accompanied by the steadily decreasing significance of the 
formal legal structures of subsidiary companies. The HSE was able to orchestrate its 
selling organisations and its manufacturing units at will. 
This process was carried out directly and personally without an intermediate 
managerial hierarchy. Because of the absence of an organisation chart the precise 
roles of individuals connected with the HSE are often difficult to assign and only 
general remarks are possible. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the top management 
of the HSE remained tiny throughout the 1930s. The HSE HQ organisation is 
described in 1932 as comprising 24 managers and 24 typists plus the Executive of 
three.(97) By 1939 the staff at HQ connected with the HSE had grown to 242 but 
detailed evacuation proposals show that most of them were involved in sales 
organisations and the core executives and staff designated for the war time HQ 
numbered only 25.(98) There were extensive flows of management information to 
the HSE from its selling and manufacturing units (see below) and this certainly helped 
to reduce any problems in controlling them. But the inevitable consequence of a lack 
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of management structure between the HSE and its operating units was a personal 
management style involving many visits to outside sites by the three members of the 
Executive.(99) 
An indication of the way the HSE dealt with more complex questions may be 
seen from the career of Mark Vardy. He may have had a family connection with the 
firm of Christopher Thomas and Brothers of Bristol.(100) He first comes to notice in 
October 1931 when he is described as "acting for the HSE in the co-ordination of the 
Toilet (soap) companies."(101) 	 He was clearly very active in the next three 
years reorganising sales forces and concentrating production. He also intervened in 
D & W Gibbs to help "reposition" products and develop new ones including 
Gibbs SR.(102) This demonstrates that his position was one of considerable power 
enabling him to issue instructions to the management of subsidiary companies. Yet, 
in a move which was clearly seen as a promotion he was made Chairman of Pears in 
June 1934.(103) That is to say, from a position of power over a number of 
subsidiaries he was promoted to run just one of them. The HSE had clearly not 
intended that the job of reorganising the toilet soap companies should become the job 
of managing them. Had Mark Vardy's position of authority over the toilet soap 
companies been made permanent then an intermediate management layer would have 
been created. The HSE showed no sign of wishing to build a managerial hierarchy 
between a small top management and the operating units. They clearly wished to 
retain direct control. 
And that direct control was very direct. Examination of those minutes of 
operating units that survive for the period before World War Two shows very limited 
local decision-making and a great deal of reference back to HQ over minor matters. 
Both Watson and Port Sunlight managements in the late 1930s appear to be seeking 
permissions from HQ to spend money on items costing more than £50.(104) 
Watsons took four months to persuade "technical services" at HQ that a repair was 
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necessary on an essential piece of plant in 1939 and Port Sunlight felt it necessary to 
get HQ permission before it felt able to serve its staff morning tea in 1938.(105) 
Thus the HSE ran its part of the Unilever business in the same way that the 
Special Committee ran the business as a whole with great attention to detail and 
personal management. The structure of Unilever displayed strong proprietorial traits 
in its organisation which can be seen most clearly in its centralised decision-making 
by a directors' committee but also in the refusal to build management hierarchies and 
in the fragmentation of top management. No proposals were put forward to change 
this structure between the reorganisation of 1931 and the start of World War Two. 
Indeed, no trace of any discussion of organisation at senior level has been found in 
this period. Yet a number of elements in Unilever's organisation did mean that 
change towards a more Chandlerian structure could be relatively straightforwardly 
achieved. 
The internal barriers to change were being removed as the legal entities of the 
subsidiary companies became less and less significant and the scions of family firms 
were turning into managerial recruits. The product divisions were closely controlled 
from the centre but in two crucial respects they were well placed for greater autonomy 
through increased delegations and decentralisation. 	 Firstly, they had combined 
responsibility for marketing and manufacture which meant that in the event of 
decentralisation they would be complete businesses. Secondly, as we shall see 
shortly, the system of financial control through budgeting which had been evolved as 
an instrument of close central control was also a means of delegating and 
decentralising. It can also be suggested that an indifference to formal organisational 
precepts and a certain imprecision of management structure combined with a strong 
commitment to follow the market allowed the structure of Unilever to follow 
commercial strategy. Nevertheless, while the organisation of Unilever made change 
into a modern business enterprise potentially straightforward there were constraints on 
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such change which can be seen clearly in the financial organisation and the way 
financial control was used. 
4) 	 Financial Organisation And Budgetary Control 
The discussion that follows will show that the centralisation of Unilever 
affected both the financial organisation of the company and the financial systems it 
used. The financial organisation of Unilever in the 1930s was efficient yet clearly 
demonstrates top management fragmentation as a result of the strict centralisation of 
the functional management of the organisation. The systems of financial control 
were separated from and imposed on the sub-units of the organisation. 
Manufacturing units do not appear to have used the costing information they were 
required to provide to headquarters. The budget system set sales targets centrally and 
had evolved essentially as a way of centrally assessing the likely profitability of the 
businesses within the organisation on the basis of those sales. During the 1930s the 
budget system was not used as a system of decentralising the organisation nor was it 
used as a method of investment appraisal or the planning of manufacturing cost 
reductions. The budget system did not, therefore, reach the full potential of which it 
was capable. 
The financial organisation of Unilever was set out in a memorandum to the 
Special Committee in 1932 accompanied by the diagram already given at 
Figure 16.(106) The diagram shows the formal responsibility for the organisation of 
finance lying with "Head Office Administration" which in turn is directly responsible 
to the Special Committee. Originally, according to the memorandum, it had been 
intended to carry out the accounting and statistical work on subsidiary companies "by 
a combination of Service Departments under the supervision of the Office Manager's 
Department". The Office Manager was responsible for the accounting machines, 
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machine book-keeping and the Sales Ledger Department. 
	 When financial 
supervision of subsidiaries was moved to "Head Office Administration" (which 
according to one report "would be more appropriately called Chief Accountants 
Department"(106) these book-keeping responsibilities remained with the Office 
Manager. This split responsibility for accounting from the book-keeping upon which 
it relied. No particularly adequate explanation was offered for this split.(108) The 
diagram at Figure 16 also shows four further independent accounts related 
departments, all of which had heads of executive status.(109) They were also shown 
as directly responsible to the Special Committee though they were also required to 
keep the "closest possible contact" with Head Office Administration.(110) These 
splits in responsibilities appears to have remained in place at least until 1939.(111) 
In a classic Chandlerian structure all these accounting related functions (with the 
possible exception of audit) would have been placed under a single senior officer such 
as a Vice President for Finance. Such a figure would, however, be powerful and an 
implicit challenge to the board powers vested in the Special Committee. As with 
other matters, the Special Committee clearly intended to have direct and detailed 
control of finance. This fragmented the finance departments and prevented the 
manager of Head Office Administration formally leading the hierarchy of finance 
functions despite the pre-eminent role of his department. 
The organisation of finance followed but was not delegated to the various sub-
units of Unilever. To each Executive or Region, "the place where the Managerial 
Control is centred 	 there_as been attached an Accounting Officer through whom all 
accounting matters pass relative to the Companies under the control of the respective 
Executives or Regions."(112) These Accounting Officers were responsible to Head 
Office Administration for the accountancy principles to be followed, the circulation of 
instructions (presumably on accounting matters) to subsidiary companies, the 
preparation of their accounts and the preparation of weekly financial accounts of the 
Executive or Region. The Accounting Officers were responsible to the Executives or 
Regions for the supply of trading results and "all statistical information necessary for 
their Managerial Control including the supervision of the preparation of the detailed 
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Factory Cost Accounts on the lines laid down for the Concern." The Accounting 
Officers were therefore responsible for providing control information on operating 
units to the Executives or Regions and also, via Head Office Administration, for 
providing control information on the Executives and Regions for the Special 
Committee or foreign committees. 
Organised in this way the flows of financial information reflected and 
emphasised the centralised control of Unilever. On the evidence of the minutes of the 
meetings between the Special Committee and the HSE the Executive was not starved 
of information and the results given to the Special Committee were tabled and 
discussed. It is not clear, however, how much of the information was used or was 
allowed to be used in operating units. Sales effort seems to have been very much at 
the direction of the HSE but there are no apparent surviving records of sales 
organisations. As far as the manufacturing units were concerned, it is clear that they 
must have gathered the data that was used to compile the factory cost accounts though 
from May 1932 the HSE decided to make up the various returns itself that had 
previously been made up by subsidiary companies.(113) This cost information 
appeared to play no part in local decision-making: surviving records of the local 
boards at Watsons and Port Sunlight contain no discussion of costing or other 
financial information.(114) 	 No local management structure appears to have 
contained a finance expert in a senior position.(115) There are claims in the later 
1930s that a system of Tariff Costing (see below) had inspired local managements to 
greater efforts to achieve lower costs than their colleagues elsewhere.(116) This is 
not reflected in the surviving records. 
This apparent disinterest in costs in the production units reflected the way that 
costing had been traditionally used in the Lever soap firms. From early times to post 
World War Two the focus of costing information in the Lever companies had been to 
provide information for trading accounts rather than as a means of achieving efficient 
production. Such systems could show if there were higher than average costs but not 
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how to achieve cuts in current costs. The Unilever archives possess notebooks for the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century which contain detailed cost and profit 
information for each Lever Brothers product line.(117) The figures were produced 
every six months, however, which is not frequent enough to give real assistance in 
managing costs of production. The timing of the inception of these costing books is 
significant. While there were fluctuations, the overall trend of raw materials prices 
was a steady rise from the late 1880s to 1914. At the same time the soap market was 
highly competitive which compelled soap makers to keep prices steady. Calculations 
from figures given by Wilson show that the cost of raw materials made up about half 
of Lever's selling price in 1900 but by 1913 it was two thirds.(118) Under these 
circumstances control of the more obviously controllable expenses such as 
advertising, selling and transport costs was imperative and was clearly a motive for 
proposals for the "Soap Trust" of 1906.(119) There is no evidence that cost 
information was used to try and cut production costs. 
By the inter-war years prior to the merger, accounts were being produced 
quarterly for Port Sunlight showing sales, trade discounts, costs ex-works (ie raw 
materials and production costs combined), distribution, selling and advertising 
charges and profits both in total and per ton for each product made.(12) The 
conflation of raw material and production costs again indicates that these were a form 
of trading account rather than an attempt to survey or control manufacturing costs. 
At this time, too, overseas companies reported operations in considerable detail but 
again the emphasis was on trading performance rather than manufacturing costs.(121) 
We may presume that other UK subsidiary companies were required to submit similar 
detailed accounts. Prior to the merger, while W H Lever was alive, the use to which 
this information was put was as a form of personal supervision. 
He followed closely every aspect of the business even when it was 
world wide and diversified 	 he was not only the boss but the owner 
of the business and he wanted to know. His knowledge enabled him 
to be alert to praise and when necessary to criticise but, being 
informed, he left his managements to attend to their business.(122) 
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Here is some evidence that while the system of supervision remained the 
personal reserve of W H Lever the system of compiling and storing records may have 
been subject to delay and under-use. A senior Unilever manager, A M Knox, says in 
his memoirs that the systems in use provided historic data of limited value for 
progress chasing of local managements.(123) To a degree this was inevitable, partly 
because in the period to which Knox refers - 1922 to 1924 - the records were 
compiled by hand. 	 By 1928, however, the compilation of returns had been 
mechanised using Hollerith and other office machinery.(124) 	 This did not 
particularly affect the frequency with which subsidiaries reported to head office - sales 
figures were always reported weekly - but in the speed with which this information 
could be summarised and analysed. Therefore when the system of Executives was set 
up in 1931 a more systematic and immediate scrutiny of the summaries and analysed 
data was possible. But even with the greatly increased information processing 
capacity available there was little focus on production costs even though it is clear that 
they were used to make inter-firm comparisons from time to time(125) or in decisions 
on factory closures.(126) It is noticeable that the efficiency investigations first 
carried out by Special Committee nominees, then by a Head Office Investigation 
Department, were all concerned with selling or administrative structures rather than 
production departments. 
The most likely explanation for this lack of attention on production costs is the 
central importance of marketing to the organisation. This may be clearly seen in the 
attitude of Geoffrey Heyworth, HSE member and later Chairman of Unilever, as 
remembered by someone who had been his personal assistant in 1949. As a trainee 
he had been "shocked 	 to find how many Unilever companies in the UK were old- 
fashioned and badly managed" and had reported as much to Heyworth. 
Surprisingly often, he knew. He knew the company needed better 
educated, technically more competent management. 	 He knew that 
the Unilever factories left something to be desired but his attention was 
always on the marketing side. He argued that extra efficiency in the 
factories would make only limited savings while getting the marketing 
right in a business with high advertising and promotion costs 	  was 
fundamental. The argument was correct but certainly by the later 
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nineteen-fifties it would have been desirable to do more about 
modernising the factories.(128) 
Unilever, then, separated the process of assembling production cost 
information from the managers of production. 	 Although the information thus 
assembled was not used to intervene in the production process, above average costs 
would be noted readily. 	 This use of average costs as a benchmark was 
institutionalised by the introduction of "tariff costing" in 1933. This averaged the 
manufacturing costs for similar lines across all factories and actual costs were 
compared with this average.(129) This may have been an "incentive for the various 
Factory Managers to work up better figures"(130) but hardly helped them do it. The 
general overriding indifference to production questions except where they affected 
marketing meant that production costs were not a priority issue. 
The long established tradition of detailed trading returns aided by the later 
extensive mechanisation of accounting did serve, however, to reinforce the use of a 
system of budgetary control. W H Lever had evolved the system as early as the late 
1870s when "he was running the Wigan branch of his father's grocery business".(131) 
He started by comparing his own trading performance against estimates for a quarter 
ahead. As time went by, the period was lengthened to a year and the system was 
applied to the various parts of his expanding business. 
An annual estimate 	  was prepared by the management of each 
associated company. This estimate was in full detail giving sales, 
margin of profit, advertising expenditure, cash flow and so on. 
[Lever] examined these and then set what he called the datum for the 
company concerned. If he agreed with the annual estimate the datum 
was the figure of total profit as shown by the estimate. If he did not 
agree with the estimate, he just set an arbitrary figure as the datum and 
the management concerned had to do their best to attain that 
figure.(132) 
Combined with detailed returns and the year end accounts this system gave a 
feedback loop both for those at the centre with access to the original budget and to 
local managements which encouraged action when the target set looked unlikely to be 
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achieved. Under Lever and subsequently in Unilever in the 1930s the system was 
undoubtedly used as a system of tight centralised control of sales performance. It is 
clear from the Special Committee/HSE minutes just how intense the scrutiny of 
performance against estimate was. Yet the system could be readily adapted to cope 
with decentralised decision-making by delegating power to act within the limits set by 
the budget and lengthening the intervals between reports to the centre. It may be 
noted that the returns from subsidiaries were simplified in 1932 but the motivation 
appears only to have been to save money by reducing the numbers of accounting 
staff.(133) During the war, however, the decision was made to decentralise control of 
the foreign businesses and the, by now reduced, number of operating units in the UK 
by using a system of budgetary control. This system was put into operation in 
1949.(134) 
The budgetary control system at Lever Brothers/Unilever was thus primarily 
an instrument of central control for directing sales effort to meet targets. It also 
undoubtedly provided some increased certainty of business conditions but unlike, say, 
Austin Motors where market signals could be used to plan or modify the inward flow 
of components or raw materials, Unilever was placed in a position where it had to 
contract well ahead for raw materials and/or had plantations whose costs were already 
sunk.(135) The budget process could therefore only have a minor influence on raw 
materials purchasing. Neither does the budget process appear to have particularly 
influenced capital investment decisions. 	 We find no discussions of costs of 
production, projected future volumes and savings versus costs that new plant might 
bring. This must be, in part, because the market trends were clear and steady in the 
1930s, particularly the decline in hard soap and the rise in flakes and powers. 
Capacity in the former was closed and was increased for the latter. Overall there is 
no evidence that Unilever failed to make all the products it could sell or failed to sell 
the products it made. On the other hand we find discussions of under-capacity in the 
London factories in 1937 in terms which indicate very little forethought. Renewals 
and extensions were "urgently necessary" at Knights while Harris was expensively 
sub-contracting production to Port Sunlight. But "the trouble is to arrive at the ideal 
solution 	  in such a way that the money is spent in providing adequate 
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accommodation at one of the factories, which can be added to in future years, rather 
than in piecemeal extensions at each of the three small London factories".(136) Both 
Knights and Harris were producing long-established products whose market trends 
were well understood. It would appear that in this case (and possibly others too)(137) 
the budget system being primarily a marketing tool was not used as a production 
planning and investment tool. Capital expenditure was treated as a separate process. 
Proposals were made to the special Committee with expected savings and the results 
were later audited to ensure that the savings had been achieved.(138) 
Summary And Conclusions 
We have seen how Unilever achieved an organisation that was tightly centrally 
controlled at least as far as the UK and continental subsidiaries were concerned. This 
control centred on the Special Committee made up of key Unilever directors. Their 
control was direct and personal as far as they could manage. They worked through 
Executives for the UK which were un-decentralised product divisions and via board 
committees through Regions elsewhere. The Special Committee considered matters 
in great detail at least as far as the UK was concerned, which may have reduced its 
ability to think strategically. Nevertheless, the company was prosperous after some 
problems in the first years of the 1930s' slump. The conclusion must therefore be 
that Unilever's structure provided no barrier to commercial success because, for all its 
great size, Unilever was fundamentally a simple business in the 1930s. 
We have also seen how the component parts of the enterprise were subsumed 
particularly in the area where most problems might be expected, the UK soap firms. 
While there were conflicts, particularly over the closure of Gossages, the Home Soap 
Executive had a relatively easy time bringing the UK soap firms into a common 
Unilever mould. In part this was achieved by firm control of the membership of the 
boards of the active subsidiaries. But, we have suggested, it had as much or more to 
do with commercial strategy that the HSE followed. By concentrating on the selling 
of the products, the strategy effectively uncoupled the connection between the legal 
structure of a company, its manufacturing unit and its selling organisation. The 
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consequence was that subsidiary companies were effectively left as husks despite their 
continued legal existence. 
The strong central control centred on the Special Committee was exercised 
therefore over an increasingly homogenous organisation as the 1930s progressed, at 
least as far as the UK was concerned. The proto-Chandlerian divisions established by 
the Executives and the Regions remained tied to a centralised system of control until 
World War Two - even if the logistics meant that the control of some overseas 
subsidiaries was loose. 	 Two broad problems thus faced the organisation if it 
contemplated expansion beyond the capacity of its sharply centralised organisation. 
The first question was of how it would decentralise its divisions without losing 
control of them. The second problem was how it would organise the relationship 
between the centrally controlled functions organised from HQ and the decentralised 
divisions once the Special Committee ceased to be the node through which all 
information passed and all decisions were made. The particular traditions from 
which Unilever came made the first problem rather easier to solve than the second. 
The product divisions of Unilever controlled both the marketing and the 
manufacture of their products. This meant that any decentralisation would give 
divisions the main components of an autonomous business. The system of budgetary 
control evolved by W H Lever potentially allowed the control of divisions by 
decentralising decision-making within the limits set by a budget agreed between HQ 
and division. Regular reports of actual results against the budget gave central control. 
This was the path chosen. by Unilever after World War Two. There were no 
traditions, Whoever, which could guide the construction of a line and functional 
structure out of the centralised power structure of 1930s Unilever. 	 The Special 
Committee as an executive committee of the board could not sit easily with powerful 
groupings of HQ functions such as manufacturing or finance under the leadership of 
single executives. Nor was it at all clear how the majority of the 26 "executive" 
departments set up in 1931 could make their writ run through a decentralised 
organisation without some top management power if they were not grouped under a 
powerful executive or acting as advisory groups for the Special Committee. This was 
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particularly the case where functions were split in unhelpful ways, as in the division 
of duties between the Office Managers Department and Head Office Administration. 
Unilever was not completely without possible models or structures which 
could be adapted or modified. The financial organisation which shadowed the 
organisation could have been put under the line management of divisions while 
headquarters finance was responsible for policy and methods. 
	 But all such 
possibilities had to cope with one central dilemma: it was simply not possible to 
reconcile the managerial logic of a directorate of chief functional officers under a 
chief executive officer with a supreme structure which was an alliance of 
amalgamated interests. The Unilever board was a full time working board but the 
board and the Special Committee to which it delegated powers exercised supervision 
over the business as a whole but did not individually manage any part of it. Their 
responsibilities were collective not individual. Any delegation of board powers to 
chief functional officers threatened to undermine the power of the board in a way that 
budget control decentralised divisions did not. 
The story of developments after World War Two is outside the scope of this 
thesis but it may be mentioned that after the war and into the 1950s divisionalisation 
appears to have been only proceeded with in a weak form and the headquarters 
functions were designated "central Advisory and Service Departments" with, as their 
name suggests, no power to coerce the divisions.(139) We may conclude therefore 
that Unilever created the conditions for a divisionalised structure but would not or 
could not create a top management structure to control it at the end of World War 
Two. And the reason it would not or could not create a top management was because 
it contradicted the power of the board and an executive committee set up to represent 
amalgamating interests. 
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The prices of the materials used in 1900 and 1913 were as follows (source 
Wilson (1954), Appendix 9) 
£ per ton 
1900 1913 
Tallow and Palm Oil 28 36 
Copra Oil 15 30 
Cotton Seed Oil 8 8 
Taking the composition of Sunlight soap (Wilson (1954) vol I, p 31) and using 
the above information we derive from material costs per ton of soap as 
follows. 
£ Material Price x (% used) x 63% 
Sunlight made up of % 1900 1913 
41.9 	 Copra/Kemal 	 oil 
(average taken) 
5.68 8.71 
24.8 Tallow 4.37 5.62 
23.8 Cotton Seed Oil 1.2 1.2 
9.5 Resin (assume=cotton 
seed oil) 
.48 .48 
Total 11.73 16.01 
As % of selling price £24 
per ton 
48.0% 66.6% 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has addressed the question: to what extent and why did large UK 
enterprise fail before World War Two to build managerial hierarchies on the Chandler 
model. This model of large enterprise structure takes a number of key features from 
the new type of US corporation which emerged in the early 1920s exemplified by 
Du Pont and General Motors. These key features are: a structure decentralised into 
divisions controlled by an overlaid dual line and functional management structure; 
the corporation as a whole controlled by a top management composed of full-time 
executives responsible for groups of line and functional activities under the leadership 
of a chief executive officer; the board of directors as a body of owners' 
representatives has been superseded by a board largely composed of the highest tier of 
management. The historical development of this model is shown in the Introduction 
where it is also suggested, and Chandler hardly emphasises this point, that these new 
large businesses could not realise the advantages of size unless they had systems of 
financial business planning and control, particularly a system of budgetary control. It 
was no accident that the widespread adoption of budgetary control in the US occurred 
at the same time as the new corporations emerged. 
Part One surveyed representative groups of large UK enterprise before World 
War One and concluded that such enterprise was structured in a way which made the 
emergence of the Chandlerian corporation a much more difficult project than in the 
US. The particular structure adopted by large UK joint stock enterprise, a structure 
we have called "proprietorial", was the consequence of a particular definition of the 
role of the directors of join stock companies. This role depended for its legitimacy the 
property rights of the shareholders. 	 The directors, as representatives of the 
shareholders and shareholders themselves, had the right and the duty to oversee the 
company on behalf of the shareholders as a whole. Large UK enterprise was 
structured around this principle despite the inherently part-time nature of the UK 
board members. Delegations to managers were inevitable in a large business yet 
delegation was inevitably in tension with the duty of the directors to control the 
enterprise. 	 The requirement on the directors to retain control emphasised the 
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separation of direction and management There was a strong assumption that one 
person should not adopt both roles. Where men did straddle both roles, as in the case 
of managing directors, we have seen how they were often hedged around with 
restrictions and checks and balances. This made the emergence of a fully-empowered 
chief executive officer equivalent to the president of a US corporation an unlikely 
prospect. It made the accession to the board of a number of full-time executives 
barely conceivable. 
The particular emphasis on the role of the board also inherently restricted 
decentralisation and the formation of a top management. 
	 While proprietorial 
structures could quite easily be loosely controlled this was not the same thing as 
decentralisation, since the ultimate power of the Board was not questioned. Formal 
decentralisation implied extensive delegation to managers and contradicted the 
assumed powers of the Board. The federal structures of some amalgamations were a 
different case because these were alliances of owner-managers and the important 
boundary between owner and non-owner was not transgressed. No example has been 
found of a divisionalised UK company before World War One. The proprietorial 
board also prevented the emergence of top management. Top management, by its 
very nature, put the overall co-ordination and control of the company which was the 
prerogative of the board, into the hands of full time managers. Rather than delegate 
these powers to senior managers, Boards would reserve overall co-ordination to 
themselves and supervise key functions or departments by forming committees of 
directors. The consequence was that management was essentially departmental with 
no opportunity to practice general management of a whole enterprise. To match this 
departmental fragmentation, professional skills, particularly those of engineers and 
accountants were narrow in scope and neither developed nor aspired to general 
management skills. 
The financial control of these companies was limited. It was not that the issue 
was ignored but rather that the board's perceived function was to safeguard 
shareholders funds and to supervise the business rather than manage it. 	 The 
consequence was that boards would often take a very detailed interest in expenditure 
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permissions or in the case of banks, decisions to lend. But proprietorial boards seem 
to have had no ambition to examine and improve the efficiency of the firms they 
managed nor do they appear to wish to plan or to set goals for their businesses. In 
particular, the use of cost accounting was limited both in production and in the 
assessment of the cost effectiveness of administrative or other processes. Costing 
was not integrated with the management of production or under the control of 
production managers, but was used as a form of general supervision focusing on 
exceptional or over-average costs. Where wider issues were involved, such as the 
rising costs of operation in the traffic departments of the railways, boards simply 
appeared at a loss as to what action to take. It was impossible to assess the 
effectiveness of such action as was taken. 
Without a clear sense of the costs of the constituent parts of a business it was 
difficult to make decisions on pricing, cost reduction or investment. If it were 
difficult to make such decision it was difficult to make decisions on business strategy. 
It is not surprising therefore that there is barely any evidence of budgetary control or 
other forms of business planning in large UK enterprise before World War One. The 
only example found is that of Lever Brothers which was not yet among the largest UK 
companies at that time, the budget system being an instrument of personal control by 
W M Lever, who owned all the voting shares. It was not an instrument of control by 
the Lever Brothers board. 
Thus, much flowed from the perceived role of the board of a UK joint stock 
company. The consequences before the First World War were under-performance 
rather than disaster. 	 With hindsight, however, it is clear that the proprietorial 
company structure placed upper limits on the organisational complexity or pace of 
change that it could cope with. Simultaneously, it was not building up the managerial 
human capital that would be necessary to move towards new structures of the 
Chandler type. The key question in Part Two, therefore, was the extent to which the 
new, larger enterprises in the UK in the inter-war years were able to break away from 
their proprietorial origins and construct new managerial structures. The approach 
used in Part Two depends on case studies which were selected because either through 
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leadership, sector or repute these firms might be expected to have advanced furthest 
towards the Chandler model. Each of these studies required slightly different 
approaches to take account of their particular origins and commercial circumstances. 
Nevertheless, common themes emerge and general conclusions can be drawn. 
Three of these studies were amalgamations; LMS, ICI and Unilever. In all 
three cases the new amalgamated firms successfully produced new integrated 
management structures. These were not federal holding company structures with 
financial integration only. 	 Before we consider the forms that these integrated 
structures took it is important to emphasise that their creation depended on the 
suppression of the interests of participant owners or proprietors. As far as the 
creation of the LMS was concerned, the process involved the loss of directorships in 
constituent firms in large numbers, but appears to have been achieved relatively 
smoothly between the Railways Act of 1921 and the start of the new companies in 
1923. The process was undoubtedly helped by having the force of legislation behind 
it. In the case of the two manufacturing companies, ICI and Unilever, however, many 
subsidiaries had vendor managers, minority shareholders and sub-subsidiaries of a 
similar type. Here ownership structures and management structures were intertwined 
with each other and with further arrays of local sectional interests. 
ICI and Unilever both overcame these problems though in rather different 
ways which seemed to stem from different market situations and different 
organisational requirements for rationalisation. Unilever was greatly conscious of 
local brand loyalties and yet had a need to rationalise production, particularly of hard 
soaps. The response was to preserve the legal existence of subsidiaries even when 
their factories were closed. Separate selling forces were amalgamated and the 
subsidiary, still with a separate legal existence, was eventually added to a growing list 
of moribund companies. Unilever were content to live with minority shareholdings 
and some untidiness of sub-subsidiary holdings as long as the central will was obeyed. 
To this end they relied on the appointment of loyal directors to the subsidiaries, many 
of whom were simply salaried managers. ICI on the other hand did not have to deal 
with local consumer brand loyalty but required a much greater degree of 
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reorganisation if it were to rationalise production. It was not only a question of 
closing inefficient or excess plant but of transferring production of different types of 
product between various subsidiaries so that they could be put under generic product 
management. All selling was put in the hands of a centralised selling "machine". 
The subsequent dismemberment of subsidiaries was so great that their continued legal 
existence was pointless and a process of liquidation was put in hand. ICI forced the 
pace of change, using legal devices to assert control over subsidiaries (ICI became 
"sole Director and Manager") and to coerce minority shareholders to sell out. 
Unilever achieved control without these methods, probably because they were 
commercially impelled to move more slowly. It should be noted that when Unilever 
wished to carry through an extensive re-organisation after World War Two it too 
proceeded to liquidate subsidiaries. 
We may conclude therefore that large enterprises formed by amalgamations to 
initially produce new companies with complex webs of ownership and sectional 
interests did not present insuperable obstacles to the construction of integrated 
management structures or rationalisation of production or operation. 	 The key 
requirement was a central directing will. But while ownership and proprietorial 
interests were swept aside the structures of all four of our case studies bore the imprint 
of earlier proprietorial forms of organisation. Most obviously and least surprisingly 
Austin Motors, for all the imposition of outside full time directors on Herbert Austin 
by creditors, remained a company dominated and co-ordinated by its founder. Austin 
provided the personal link which connected commercial and marketing strategy with 
design, production and finance. Despite finance and production being formally 
outside his jurisdiction, Austin, by retaining control of costing and budgetary control 
effectively controlled production and though still constrained on capital spending had 
great influence on financial planning. The Austin Motors management structure was 
sparse and the top management can be said to amount to one person, Herbert Austin. 
The death of the founder left no management structure to replace him. 
LMS, despite some minor innovations, retained most of the features of a 
traditional departmentally structured, board dominated railway. The introduction of a 
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system of vice presidents led by a President of the Executive was a response to the 
impossible administrative burdens placed on any single general manager who 
attempted to run such a large company. 	 It was not a system to increase 
decentralisation or delegation. The traditional system of Board committees remained 
in place and cut across the areas of jurisdiction of the vice presidents to the only 
slightly modified traditional system of department heads below them. There is no 
evidence to show that the board contemplated giving up any of its powers or that the 
vice presidents asked for more at any point. It is conceivable that when Josiah Stamp 
was appointed Chairman in addition to his post as President of the Executive he might 
have been able to press for at least a streamlined system of board committees working 
to the vice presidents. Even this modest reform was never officially suggested. 
Thus what was at best a sparse top management was constrained and weakened by a 
continuing system of detailed board scrutiny. 
The manufacturing conglomerates, ICI and Unilever, were rather more 
complex cases but still displayed strong proprietorial legacies in their structures. In 
the case of Unilever, the initial phase produced a large number of committees. These 
committees had the power only to recommend, decision making being reserved to an 
Executive Committee of directors, later renamed the Special Committee. In effect 
this was a much expanded version of the structure of earlier amalgamations like the 
Calico Printers Association. This structure was found unwieldy and slow moving 
and was reformed. A small number of committees were renamed "executives" and 
were put in charge of the day to day running of the manufacture and marketing of 
groups of products - soap, margarine, etc. The other committees were replaced by 
what were called "executive departments" and comprised mainly headquarters based 
functions. There was potential here to develop a line structure through the executives 
4 
and a functional structure through the executive departments. This could not develk, 
however, because of the continuing central role of the Special Committee. This 
remained the sole co-ordinating link between headquarters departments and between 
them and the executives. Frequent meetings between the executives and the Special 
Committee were detailed decision making bodies rather than the executives 
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themselves. Thus while manufacturing had been organised into product groups these 
groups were not decentralised divisions. 
The consequence was an organisation which was tightly centrally controlled 
but which had an uncertainly defined headquarters structure. The delegation of much 
of the running of Unilever by the board to the Special Committee was not followed by 
delegations to managers. While senior managers undoubtedly had set functions and 
responsibilities their powers remained ambiguous as between functional departmental 
heads and chief officers in the executives. Furthermore, since more or less every 
decision taken by the executives appeared to require Special Committee approval, it 
can be said that the executives were almost as much emissaries of the Special 
Committee as they were managers of their product group. As a direct consequence of 
the reservation of detailed scrutiny and decision making to the directors' Special 
Committee top management remained under-developed and undefined. Even when a 
post World War Two reorganisation brought delegation and decentralisation to 
manufacturing and marketing, the relation between them and the headquarters based 
functional departments remained mediated through the board or was purely voluntary. 
The need for a clear overlay of line and functional management was not addressed 
until the 1960s. 
As we have already seen in the discussion of ICI's treatment of sectional 
interests and subsidiary organisations, the company moved rapidly to organise product 
groups. Unlike Unilever these groups were decentralised into manufacturing 
divisions with a great measure of autonomy. However, in a number of key respects 
ICI resembled Unilever. Board powers were largely delegated to a group composed 
of managing and executive directors. 	 This group soon became more or less 
completely dominated by one of the managing directors, McGowan, but this should 
not obscure the way the status difference between this group and non director senior 
managers appears to have determined the way in which the relation between 
functional and line management was structured. The divisional re-organisation took 
place in two stages in 1929 and 1931. In the 1929 re-organisation the executive 
directors retained control of functional departments at HQ and these departments were 
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accordingly executive departments able to instruct manufacturing divisions. In 1931 
executive directors were withdrawn from the management of functional departments 
and these were as a consequence reduced to advisory status. In other words, only 
directors were to have the power to give orders to senior management. Senior 
management was required to mutually co-ordinate. 
This principle is also noticeable in another aspect of the 1931 re-organisation. 
There is no line management structure set above the manufacturing divisions. A co-
ordinating committee of divisional chairman acted as a conduit for instructions from 
two ICI main board committees to divisions but itself had no powers. Unlike 
Unilever, which does not have appeared to engage in discussion of the principles upon 
which it organised itself, ICI was fairly explicit, publishing its organisation charts and 
explaining them in publication and speeches. We can remain in no doubt therefore 
that ICI with a privileged knowledge of US corporate structures chose this particular 
structure deliberately, whereas in the case of Unilever it could be argued it arose 
contingently out of immediate commercial and administrative needs. In both 
Unilever and ICI, however, the result was the same: an under-development of top 
management and a failure to construct an overlaid line and functional structure. 
We may conclude from our four case studies that the reservation of co-
ordination and decision-making powers to the board or its committees (or in the more 
obvious case of Austin Motors to the founder and chief shareholder) acted against the 
development of the Chandlerian managerial hierarchy. In particular it prevented 
unambiguously empowered management structures emerging at the top of these 
organisations in explicit hierarchies based on clear delegations of power. 	 The 
particular circumstances of each firm may provide partial explanations in the details 
of personalities, origins or markets. But it seems clear that there was an endemic 
separation between the board of directors and top managers in terms of status and 
duties which had sufficient continuing weight to prevent the development of a 
Chandlerian top management. The vertical split between directors and managers 
caused fragmentation horizontally between senior managers. 
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We may also note that in no case was an unambiguous chief executive officer 
in place. There was no single individual acting as a focus for management at 
Unilever, this function being carried out by a committee of directors. Stamp and 
McGowan were chairman and chief executive officer combined. Austin had been 
stripped of his title of managing director by his creditors but effectively filled that role 
and was also chairman. In all cases the issue of the powers of a chief executive 
officer vis a vis the board were simply side-stepped. 
The point in all this is not whether large UK enterprise failed to measure up to 
some abstract normative organisational scheme drawn from US examples. The issue 
is rather that these US models appear to have been the most effective way of dealing 
with the problems of administering a business organisation as it passed some 
threshold of size and complexity. The purpose of a business organisation is to 
survive and prosper. What then were the consequences for our case studies of the 
structures they adopted; in terms of effective administration and the ability to survive 
and prosper? 
The fragmentation of management that we described above was reflected in 
the way all our case studies administered their businesses. All of them in some 
combination separated marketing, management accounting and production/operation. 
At Austin, as we have already said, marketing and cost accounting were under 
Austin's control, while production was run by a director imposed on Austin by his 
creditors. In practice, however, the business was effectively dominated by Austin 
acting as a traditional ovmer/manager. But the balance between these different 
elements of management - indeed the very existence of cost accounting and marketing 
- depended on Austin himself. With Austin's death and the succession of Leonard 
Lord, marketing and cost accounting seem simply to have faded away. The failure to 
build a top management at Austin Motors while the founder was alive meant the loss 
of essential elements of business administration after his death. 
LMS combined the marketing and operation functions under one of its vice 
presidents and management accounting under another. A further vice president was 
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in charge of engineering, including production and maintenance of rolling stock. 
These responsibilities were the culmination of a departmental structure under-written 
by the distribution of responsibilities of the board committees. 
	 There was no 
decentralisation of line management to even the minimum extent of relatively 
autonomous operating divisions. There was thus no structure which naturally created 
places for decentralised functional officers. Therefore everything. depended on the 
vice presidents and the President of the Executive to balance and integrate functions 
across the business. Where the will was there, particularly the will of the President, 
as in the case of the application of costing to rolling stock production and repair, 
members of one vice president's departments could be outposted to another's. Where 
the will was not there, as in the application of costing techniques to traffic operating, 
nothing happened. There was no facility within the departmental structure for the 
Vice President for Traffic and Operation to run his own management accounting 
department. Thus the fragmentation of top management which was the consequence 
of a board committee dominated departmental structure lived on after the creation of 
the vice presidential system. LMS did create a sparse top management but any 
change in administrative procedure was always in potential tension with the 
departmental structure and new initiative depended both on new acts of will and co-
operation rather than flowing easily from the requirements of the structure as a whole. 
Unilever integrated marketing and manufacturing under the control of the 
executives. 	 The finance departments, including management accounting, were 
headquarters functions responsible directly to the Special Committee. As far as the 
management of the executives was concerned there does not seem to have been the 
separation in practice that these spilt responsibilities implied. This was because the 
Special Committee was also keeping close control over the executives through 
detailed weekly meetings to which financial matters were routinely brought. The 
system was therefore one of unified control though that unified control was that of the 
Special Committee rather than the executives. Thus while the top management 
structure of Unilever was ambiguous and unclear, as far as the relationships between 
executives and executive departments was concerned there was no weakness in 
administration as long as the organisation remained of a size and/or complexity 
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capable of control by such a concentrated system. This remained the case until the 
end of World War Two. Though the period post World War Two is outside the scope 
of this thesis it may be further remarked that the transformation of this highly 
centralised system into a decentralised and then a divisionalised structure seems to 
have been managed without undue organisational or commercial disarray. The one 
weakness in the administration of pre-World War Two Unilever was the absence of 
adequate cost information for the purposes of managing production. It was the 
opinion of senior managers that the inefficiencies this might hide were of a far less 
significance than the losses from inefficient marketing. This may well be true given 
relatively simple or traditional products. It can be said, however, that the evidence is 
simply not now available to judge the matter one way or another. 
IC1 separated marketing, production and financial management from each 
other. As a result there were significant administrative disbenefits. At various 
points both manufacturing and selling costs were revealed to be significantly 
inaccurate and inferences drawn from them were illusory. The management of 
production was weakened by the absence of useful information on profits and costs. 
Marketing was weakened by the withholding of information on profits and costs. 
Central management was not able to judge the performance of its divisions and 
neither were the divisions themselves. The fragmentation of management functions 
was designed to give central control through the financial and marketing functions 
while allowing decentralisation of manufacturing and product development. The 
intention was to retain commercial initiative and strategic decision-making at the top 
while decentralising the supposedly routine matters concerned with manufacture. But 
ICI was attempting to use the traditional departmental checks and balances, or putting 
it more strongly, departmental divide and rule which may have been appropriate for a 
smaller less complex firm but were now inadequate. But because any empowerment 
of headquarters functions over the divisions and/or decentralising and integrating 
marketing and finance into divisions conflicted with the ascribed role of the executive 
directors any progress in this direction was slow and difficult. Marketing slowly 
became integrated with divisions before World War Two and finance during the war. 
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But while this allowed the divisions to act as autonomous businesses it did not resolve 
the problems of central control over divisions and how it was to be achieved. 
The commercial consequences of their administrative arrangements were 
different for each of our case studies. For Austin Motors the failure to build top 
management and the loss of marketing and cost accounting skills after Austin's death 
had no immediate effect. The period of the war and the immediate post-war years 
were a seller's market and the firm was prosperous. In the longer term as the UK 
motor industry began to amalgamate and face increasing foreign competition, the lack 
of top management and marketing and management accounting skills can be 
accounted a key factor in the indigenous industry's decline. At LMS the most 
important result of the structure was the failure to control manpower costs in the 
Traffic departments. This was the single biggest item of variable cost for the 
company. As a consequence the competitiveness and profitability of the firm were 
less than they could have been though this is unlikely to have affected LMS's (and 
other railway companies) long term competitive disadvantage against road transport. 
Unilever appears to have suffered no adverse commercial consequences of its 
particular organisational structure. Even during the process of product diversification 
and decentralisation during the post World War Two years, it appears to have been 
possible to control the organisation strategically and balance investment and returns 
profitably. This must be accounted for by two factors. Firstly, the company was 
extremely sensitive to the market and prepared to adapt its organisation accordingly. 
Secondly, the company had a system of business planning which provided sufficient 
protection to the company from shortcomings in its structure after it decentralised and 
before its structure became more Chandlerian. 	 We shall consider the issue of 
business planning below. 
The commercial consequences of ICI's structure were clear. The separation 
of marketing and accounting from product development and manufacture hindered 
product innovation in an industry where innovative products sold at a premium. The 
structure of the product divisions also hindered product development where two or 
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more divisions developed similar products because the centre appears to have 
abrogated its power to decide product matters between divisions. At divisional level 
problems were lessened as marketing and costing were integrated into the divisions. 
Inter-divisional problems remained to be resolved at the end of World War Two. As 
we shall see, unlike Unilever, ICI had no system of centrally controlled business 
planning which could mitigate the problem. 
Even though the commercial consequences of the structures of our case studies 
were diverse it is possible to derive a number of conclusions. We may conclude that 
the structural form which was the legacy of the proprietorial firm did adversely affect 
the commercial performance of companies but that this depended crucially on the 
size/complexity of the firm and the availability of methods of business planning. 
Both Unilever and Austin Motors were tightly centrally controlled firms. The 
moment of danger for these companies came when amalgamations or diversification 
produced a situation where decentralisation and delegation became necessary and was 
carried through without the management in depth of a Chandlerian structure. At this 
point the different fortunes of the two firms is clearly related to the possession by 
Unilever of a system of business planning. LMS appears to have been close to the 
limit at which a company of its size could be managed in the traditional proprietorial 
manner. The consequence was significant under-performance rather than crisis. The 
company showed little sign of wishing to restructure. ICI, alone out of our case 
studies, was simply too large and complex to be run as a tightly centrally controlled 
organisation and had to find some method of decentralisation in the inter-war years. 
We can conclude more _generally therefore that the most important negative 
organisational and commercial consequences of the proprietorial form of organisation 
came when decentralisation was forced on the company. To use the terminology of 
Elbaum and Lazonick and Chandler, the key institutional consequence of the 
proprietorial form of organisation was adaptive failure at the point of 
divisionalisation. 
We have seen how that adaptive failure could be mitigated by the use of 
systems of business planning. 	 It should be stressed, however, that the business 
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planning systems at Unilever and Austin Motors were not designed for this purpose. 
Both had earlier origins in the desire of owner-managers to retain control of expanded 
businesses at times of cost uncertainty. Their successors retained or abandoned these 
systems quite contingently, it would appear. Business planning in the form of a 
simple system of departmental cash limiting appeared - then disappeared - on the 
LMS. ICI centrally had intense problems trying to plan capital investment in the later 
1930s and had no business planning for income and expenditure until after World War 
Two. 	 Full budgetary control was, however, evolved by one of the divisions, 
Dyestuffs. It is difficult to see how ICI could have evolved a system of central 
budgeting and planning without introducing an empowered line management of the 
divisions at HQ whose powers would contradict those of the executive directors. We 
may therefore see the failure to establish central planning at ICI as a further adaptive 
failure caused by the institutional legacy of the proprietorial form of organisation. 
The situation contrasts with the simultaneous appearance of budgetary control and 
divisionalisation at General Motors. 
Overall we can conclude that none of our case study firms had built a 
managerial structure on the Chandler model with an overlay of line and functional 
management in the inter-war years. By extension we may strongly suggest that no 
UK company had built such a hierarchy. Though some firms had systems of business 
planning they emerged for reasons other than the control of the Chandlerian structure 
and cannot be taken as an indication that such structures existed. The failure to build 
such structures for the most part had significant long or short term negative effect on 
their administrative efficiency and profitability. A key reason for the failure to build 
these hierarchies was the persistence of organisational rules drawn from assumptions 
about the role and responsibility of the directors of joint stock companies vis a vis 
managers. These in turn derived from the assumed prior rights of property over any 
status or autonomy due to skilled administrators of the network of processes which 
made up the firm and without whom the capital invested in the firm was worthless. If 
there was no managerial revolution at the level of the firm in the UK in the inter-war 
years it was because the structure of the firm had been designed to prevent it. 
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APPENDIX I 
Three lists of companies are appended to show the top 50 companies by 
capitalisation and by market value and the top 50 manufacturers by numbers 
employed in 1905/1907. 
There is no particularly scientific method for selecting groups of companies 
from the three lists. The railways clearly form a dominant group. The banks form a 
strong group in the list by market value. Of the remaining companies after these two 
groups in the lists by capitalisation and by market value the next strongest group is 
amalgamated manufacturing companies. If the top 20, say, manufacturing employers 
are examined for amalgamated manufacturing companies, we can identify ten, the 
balance being railway or railway related, state enterprise, the CWS or family 
companies. Taking the amalgamated manufacturing companies from the three lists a 
certain pattern emerges: 
By Capitalisation 	 By Market Value 	 By Numbers Employed 
Imperial Tobacco 
Watney Combe Reid 
J & P Coats 
United Alkali 
Calico Printers Assoc 
Vickers 
Fince Cotton Spinners 
Associated Portland 
Cement 
Bleachers Association 
Armstrong Whitworth 
J & P Coats 
Imperial Tobacco 
Vickers 
Armstrong Whitworth 
Watney Combe Reid 
Fine Cotton Spinners 
Fine Cotton Spinners 
Armstrong Whitworth 
Vickers 
Calico Printers Assoc 
John Brown & Co 
J & P Coats 
GKN 
Bleachers Association 
United Alkali 
Stewarts & Lloyds 
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We can establish four broad groups in the steel, shipbuilding and armaments 
conglomerations (Vickers, Armstrong Whitworth, John Brown); brewing and tobacco 
(Imperial Tobacco, Watney Combe Reid); textiles and textile finishing (J & P Coats, 
Calico Printers Assoc., Fine Cotton spinners and Doublers, Bleachers Assoc.) and a 
miscellaneous group (Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, United Alkali, 
Guest Keen & Nettlefold, Stewart and Lloyds). 
It is not proposed to treat the brewing and tobacco group in the body of the 
thesis. As far as Imperial Tobacco is concerned, integration was clearly the last thing 
on the participants minds. (See the remarks of Sir Wilfred Anson, deput Chair of 
Imperial Tobacco in Business Enterprise, R S Edwards and W Townsend, London, pp 
65-6.) The brewery industry's position in the lists was largely the consequence, of the 
artificially high values placed on retail outlets - the public houses - as a result of 
restrictions on licenses by magistrates. Their organisations were simply unitary 
board structures made up of the partners of the amalgamating companies. (See 
J Vaizey The Brewery Industry 1886-1951, London.) 
It is also not proposed to deal with the miscellaneous gas companies, insurance 
companies, extraction companies and others that form the balance of the capitalisation 
and market value lists. The groups extracted above appear to provide a sufficient 
basis for what is intended to be an illustrative survey. 
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LARGEST 50 UK COMPANIES BY CAPITALISATION, c 1905 
Company Capitalisation 
(£000's) 
1.  Midland Railway Co 191,051 
2.  London and Northwestern Railway Co 122,825 
3.  Great Western Railway Co 92,806 
4.  North Eastern Railway Co 78,006 
5.  Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co 68,001 
6.  Caledonian Railway Co 66,660 
7.  North British Railway Co 63,939 
8.  Great Northern Railway Co 58,385 
9.  Great Eastern Railway Co 54,207 
10.  London and Southwestern Railway Co 50,421 
11.  Great Central Railway Co 46,678 
12.  South Eastern Railway Co 32,075 
13.  London Chatham & Dover Railway Co 28,629 
14.  London Brighton & South Coast Railway Co 27,991 
15.  Gas Light & Coke Co 25,797 
16.  Glasgow & South Western Railway Co 24,630 
17.  London and India Docks 18,975 
18.  Imperial Tobacco 	 _ 17,545 
19.  Manchester Ship Canal 16,603 
20.  Metropolitan Railway Co 15,764 
21.  Watney Combe Reid 14,950 
22.  Bank of England 14,553 
23.  Great Southern & Western Railway Co (Ireland) 13,381 
24.  Metropolitan District Railway Co 12,407 
25.  J & P Coats 11,181 
26.  National Telephone Co 10,833 
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27.  North Staffordshire Railway Co 10,454 
28.  Underground Electric Railway Co 10,200 
29.  Taff Vale Railway Co 9,421 
30.  South Metropolitan Gas Co 8,820 
31.  United Alkali 8,490 
32.  Great Northern of Ireland Railway Co 8,267 
33.  Calico Printers Association 8,227 
34.  Eastern Telegraph Co 7,897 
35.  Furness Railway Co 7,818 
36.  Hull & Barnsley Railway Co 7,669 
37.  Great North of Scotland Railway Co 7,611 
38.  Vickers Sons & Maxim 7,440 
39.  Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers 7,290 
40.  Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers 7,061 
41.  Highland Railway Co 6,824 
42.  Bleachers Association 6,820 
43.  Midland Great Western of Ireland Railway Co 6,511 
44.  Cambrian Railway 6,306 
45.  Arthur Guinness 5,960 
46.  Barry Railway 5,790 
48.  Sir W G Armstrong Whitworth 5,316 
49.  Samuel Allsopp & Sons 5,095 
50.  Imperial Continental Gas Co 4,964 
Source: P L Payne "Emergence of the Large-Scale Company in Great Britain, 1870-
1914" in Economic History Review 2nd Series, XX, 3 December 1967 with the 
addition of companies taken from Peter Wardley's lists of market values (q.v.) with 
capitalisations from the Stock Exchange Year Book for 1905. 
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LARGE BRITISH COMPANIES IN 1904/5, RANKED BY MARKET VALUE 
Rank Company 
Market 
Value 
(E1\4) 
1.  Midland Railway Co 136.7 
2.  London & North Western Railway Co 126.7 
3.  Great Western Railway Co 92.3 
4.  North Eastern Railway Co 90.9 
5.  Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co 63.7 
6.  Caledonian Railway Co 58.2 
7.  North British Railway Co 58.0 
8.  Great Northern Railway Co 54.9 
9.  London & South Western Railway Co 54.5 
10.  Great Eastern Railway Co 47.9 
11.  Bank of England 44.5 
12.  Coats (J & P) Ltd 42.1 
13.  Great Central Railway Co 41.8 
14.  London Brighton & South Coast Railway Co 38.0 
15.  South Eastern Railway Co 35.6 
16.  Gas Light and Coke Co 25.0 
17.  Rio Tinto Co Ltd 22.8 
18.  Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd 22.6 
19.  London Chatham and Dover Railway Co 19.8 
20.  Glasgow and South Western Railway Co 19.7 
21.  Guinness (Arthur), Son and Co Ltd 19.9 
22.  Metropolitan Railway Co 17.4 
23.  London & India Docks Co 16.9 
24.  Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa 15.8 
25.  Great Southern & Western Railway Co (Ireland) 14.5 
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26.  Lloyds Bank Ltd 14.1 
27.  National Provincial Bank of England Ltd 13.1 
28.  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 12.0 
29.  Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd 12.0 
30.  London, City and Midland Bank Ltd 11.6 
31.  Great Northern Railway Co (Ireland) 11.6 
32, Armstrong (Sir W G), Whitworth & Co Ltd 11.3 
33.  Watney, Combe, Reid & Co Ltd 10.5 
34.  North Staffordshire Railway Co 10.1 
35.  Bank of Ireland 9.9 
36.  London & County Banking Co Ltd 9.8 
37.  South Metropolitan Gas Co 9.5 
38.  Barclay and Co Ltd 9.1 
39.  Eastern Telegraph Co Ltd 8.8 
40.  Metropolitan District Railway Co 8.6 
41.  Union of London and Smiths Bank Ltd 8.5 
42.  Manchester Ship Canal 8.5 
43.  Imperial Continental Gas 8.2 
44.  Taff Vale Railway Co 8.1 
45.  Underground Electric Railway Co of London 8.1 
46.  Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers Assoc Ltd 8.0 
47.  London and Westminster Bank Ltd 7.8 
48.  Brunner, Mond and Co Ltd 7.3 
49.  National Telephone Co Ltd 7.2 
50.  Parr's Bank Ltd 7.1 
Source: Peter Wardley "The Anatomy of Big Business: Aspects of Corporate 
Development in the Twentieth Century", Business History,Vol 33, No 2, April 1991, 
Table 3. 
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LARGE MANUFACTURING EMPLOYERS OF 1907 
Rank By 
Employ- 
Ment Firm 
Estimated 
No Of 
Employees 
1.  Fine Cotton Spinners' & Doublers Assoc 30,000 
2.  Royal Dockyards 25,580 
3.  Sir W G Armstrong, Whitworth & Co 25,000 
4.  Vickers, Sons & Maxim 22,500 
5.  Calico Printers' Assoc 20,495 
6.  Great Western Railway Co 17,770 
7.  John Brown & Co 16,205 
8.  Royal Ordnance Factories 15,651 
9.  Metropolitan Amalgamated Railway 
Carriage & Wagon Co 13,868 
10.  London & North Western Railway Co 13,500 
11.  Co-operative Wholesale Society 13,203 
12.  J & P Coats 12,700 
13.  Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds 12,451 
14.  Bleachers' Assoc 11,280 
15.  Platt Brothers 10,708 
16.  Stewarts & Lloyds 10,600 
17.  North Eastern Railway Co 10,000 
18.  United Alkali Co 9,049 
19.  Pilkington Brothers 9,000 
20.  I & R Morley 9,000 
21.  Midland Railway Co 8,500 
22.  Harland & Wolff 8,500 
23.  Workman, Clark & Co 8,000 
24.  Rylands & Sons 8,000 
25.  North British Locomotive Co 8,000 
26.  G Kynoch & Co 8,000 
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27. Palmers' Shipbuilding & Iron Co 	 7,500 
28. Bradford Dyers 	 7,500 
29. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co 	 7,250 
30. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society 
	 7,000 
31. Singer Sewing Machine Co 	 7,000 
32. Great Eastern Railway Co 	 7,000 
33. Huntley & Palmers 	 6,500 
34. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) 	 6,147 
35. Horrocks, Crewdson & Co 	 6,000 
36. General Electric Co 	 6,000 
37. Imperial Tobacco Co 	 6,000 
38. Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co 	 6,000 
39. Steel Co of Scotland 	 5,694 
40. Bolchow, Vaughan & Co 	 5,487 
41. Fairburn, Lawson, Combe, Barbour 	 5,050 
42. Waterlow & Sons 	 5,000 
43. Scotts' Shipbuilding & Engineering Co 	 5,000 
44. Irish Lace Depot 	 5,000 
45. Howard & Bullough 	 5,000 
46. Hibernian Lace Co 	 5,000 
47. British Westinghouse Electical Co 	 5,000 
48. Birtwistle & Fielding 	 5,000 
49. Charles Bayer & Co 	 5,000 
50. Lister & Co , 	 5,000 
Source: Christine Shaw "The Large Manufacturing Employers of 1907", Business 
History, Vol 25. This list gives manufacturing employers as the manufacturing 
components only of such businesses as railways. 
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APPENDIX II 
This appendix shows four organisation charts for pre-World War One 
railways. Each of them shows the General Manager in the position of 
a chief executive officer and none of them show the relationship 
between chief functional officers and the committees of the Board. 
These charts are taken from Ray Morris Railroad Administration, New 
York and London, 1910. 
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SKELETON ORGANIZATION OF THE LANCASHIRE Et YORKSHIRE RAILWAY, 1910 
31,000 Shareholders 
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